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Kalikrishna Banerjee's Article entitled 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayikas': Some Observations[1]

Indrani Sanyal

Professor Kalikrishna Banerjee is one of the esteemed philosophers of contemporary India, who was well-versed in Nyaya philosophy but whose involvement and interest in Euro-American philosophy was equally phenomenal. His commitment to ontology and metaphysics would remain noteworthily beyond any suspicion. The actual date of the publication of this essay is not available from the editorial introduction to this volume, which contains a collection of essays by Kalikrishna Banerjee. Still, from his writing, it is evident it was undoubtedly a post-Philosophical Investigations publication that is roughly a post-1953 writing. Banerjee's stand was never anti-metaphysical. He observed the importance of language in Philosophy, but unlike the–then trend in some quarters of Western philosophy, engaging in language analysis to banish metaphysics was not what he had ever recommended. The article selected for the present discussion highlights some of these major features of Banerjee's philosophy in the context of an imaginary conversation between a Naiyayika and a follower of Wittgenstein. As a proponent of Nyaya, Banerjee did not say the motive that led him to enter this dialogical conversation with Wittgenstein. By then, the distinction between the earlier Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations period was already in vogue. The one marked point of similarity between Tractarian Wittgenstein and Naiyayika is that they had similarities in upholding some versions of the referential theory of meaning. However, whether highlighting the dissimilarities between these two theories was Banerjee's primary aim may be questioned. In his discussion, Banerjee considered Wittgenstein's term, 'language game,' thus introducing Wittgenstein's concept of language as a form of life. Banerjee did not reveal the deeper

[1] A shortened version of this lecture was delivered at the Department of Philosophy, Gour Banga University, Malda, on 10.12.2019.

insight or objective behind this exploration and analysis in so many words. Kalikrishna Banerjee did not hint whether he was suggesting a reinterpretation of Western theories by utilizing contributions from non-western, especially Indian philosophers, and vice versa. These are all deep research questions, and of course, they are impossible to address within the limit of a single article. It has always been well acknowledged that 'The range of his philosophical canvas was wide; he always had the devotion to something afar – beyond the bounds of narrow specialization in a particular field.'[2] This discussion would also shed some light on the comment of the editors' Introduction to the volume, stating, 'He (Professor Kalikrishna Banerjee) took an active and creative interest in any philosophical problem.'[3]

In philosophical discourse, language- a 'communication instrument' always proved to be a matter of great importance and concern – whether for a Naiyayika, an analytical philosopher, or his logical positivist predecessors. Many philosophers played a role in the development of modern analytic philosophy, but the contribution of Ludwig Wittgenstein towards its genesis has often been considered remarkable. This, however, is a matter of debate whether Wittgenstein himself was a product of analytic philosophy or consciously a root of analytic philosophy. The present title of the article by Kalikrishna Banerjee is quite self-explanatory; the main problematic subject for discussion here is the nature and the import of the referential theory of meaning, the endorsement of which describes the Tractarian Wittgenstein and revocation of it marks out the later Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* period. *Philosophical Investigations* begins by quoting passages from *The Confessions of St. Augustine* explaining a theory of meaning, nicknamed by Wittgenstein as the Augustinian theory of meaning, a statement of the Tractarian referential theory of meaning. The central tenet of this theory is to hold that the meaning of a word or expression is what it points out in the world. It is also known as the referential theory of meaning. 'Every word has a meaning. This

[2] Editors' Introduction, *Language, Knowledge and Ontology*, ICPR, New Delhi, 1988
[3] Ibid., p. ix

meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.'[4]

Nonetheless, the Naiyayikas are also committed to this kind of theory of meaning. In this article, Professor Banerjee imagines a counterfactual situation where a Naiyayika meets a Tractarian and is deeply occupied in an engaging dialogue. In this case, it must be borne in mind that they are, as if, dealing with only one of the critical portions of the philosophy of language, concentrating on words and their meanings. If the actual tone of Kalikrishna Banerjee can be heard, this may enable us to make good many wrongly fought wars in the domain of philosophy. Many such discussions are left open for future consideration.

I. On the What and Why Aspects of Analysis

There are some similarities in the philosophy of language between the followers of early Wittgenstein and Naiyayikas since both relied upon analysis as a philosophical tool. The notion of analysis, however, assumed variant shades in different contexts. In this early period, Wittgenstein was greatly influenced by the Fregean-Russellian analysis model, which depended upon the language of the two-valued propositional logic. The Naiyayikas had a rigorous argumentative style. We can find at least three broad ways of classifying analysis: Logical positivists and logical atomists did not believe in speculative metaphysics. Russell and the logical atomists identified philosophy with analysis. They were firmly committed to the view that the mishandling of language and uses is accountable for the rise of metaphysics and multifarious paradoxes and issues. They resort to analysis as prophylactic against linguistic abuses; hence, their tenet may be understood as distributing prophylaxis through analysis. However, neither Wittgenstein nor a Naiyayika subscribes to this view on analysis. Wittgenstein strongly promoted analysis for bringing out the logical form of any sentence. For the Naiyayikas, analysis is required to bring out the true import of a sentence. Wittgenstein would say that a logician should analyze a sentence to make it a picture of reality. The term 'picture' occurred to Wittgenstein's mind when he came across a

[4] *Philosophical Investigations*, (PI), tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, 1953, p. 1

schematic picture in a magazine depicting the possible sequence of events of a motor car accident. He got the clue from this imagery to explain the relationship between language and reality. He harped on the thesis that language is the mirror of reality. 'But why should language picture a reality?'[5] is a pertinent question. Without structural correspondence between language and reality, it would be impossible to talk about the world. Wittgenstein provides an example of a musical score and a piece of music. In this connection, Wittgenstein considered introducing a law of projection as a rule that enables the musician to read the musical score or note describing the pitch and the duration of a musical sound. This is for Wittgenstein, a rule of translation[6] that provides a tip-off for rendering the language of a musical score into the language of a gramophone record.

To some, this interposing of a law of projection as a requirement for securing structural similarity may appear unacceptable. If a law of projection enables the translation of musical notes meant for instruments, say clarinets, piano, trumpets, violin, etc, to a musical symphony orchestra, then musical notes or scores are representable or expressible through music or melody. The task of correlating musical scores with musical symphony gets accomplished, and thus, the necessity for the identity of the structure becomes relatively futile. Long back, J.O. Urmson, in his *Philosophical Analysis*, raised one such suspicion.[7]

Another query of great consequence is regarding the structure of a sentence. Grammatical rules and conventional rules have determined the structure of a sentence. Under that circumstance, what guarantees that the structure of the sentence and the structure of fact would resemble one another? No doubt, this objection bears testimony to Ryle's contentious claim, as found in his article, 'Systematically Misleading Expressions,' about how a given grammatical form is, by convention,

[5] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika,' in *Language, Knowledge and Ontology*,' p. 109
[6] *Tractatus*, 4.0001
[7] J.O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis*, Oxford and New York, 1956

made to match with facts of a given logical form.[8] This sort of critiquing would undoubtedly set the followers of Wittgenstein on fire for a sharp retort; from the point of view of Wittgenstein or his followers, the question would arise about the very purpose of any and every analysis as employed by different philosophers, including the Naiyayikas. Many Western contemporaries, such as logical positivists and Bertrand Russell, nurtured the analysis's purpose. In 4.0031 of the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*,[9] Wittgenstein makes an open statement: 'All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense).' Russell demonstrated that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real sense. A careful reading of this statement concerning analysis would reveal Wittgenstein's stand, whether pro-Russellian or contra-Russellian. The view of analysis that Wittgenstein shared with Russell is that analysis is a process of re-writing a sentence to make its logical form transparent. As an instance of analysis, Russell's theory of description may be viewed as an attempt to highlight the logic of sentences containing descriptive phrases. This may be posed as one of the answers to the question concerning what analysis is. From this Russellian perspective, regarding Wittgenstein as pro-Russell would not impair Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept and practice of analysis. However, there is also another question about why analysis is necessary, which must also be addressed. Wittgenstein is very much contra-Russell responding to this 'why' part of the question. Because Russell also believed that from the misuse of language, all metaphysical problems had their beginning; hence, like the logical positivists and empiricists, Russell also upheld analysis for demolishing speculative metaphysics. This approach to analysis may be called the prophylactic approach to analysis; we have hinted to make clear that it goes against the spirit of Wittgenstein.

What would be the reaction of the Naiyayikas to this position of Russell? The Naiyayikas have a well-structured systematic ontology, and they would not support the trend of throwing away metaphysics and

[8] 'Systematically Misleading Expressions,' A Flew, *Logic and Language*, 1st Series, 1952

[9] *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, (TLP), initially published in German in 1921, English translation was published in 1922 by C.K Ogden and F.P. Ramsay.

ontology in the vein of the logical positivists or Russell. Under no circumstances are the Naiyayikas anti-metaphysics or anti-ontology. Of course, the Naiyayikas are, however, very sensitive towards misuse and ambiguity of language as leading to unwarranted, ill-founded, or inadequate conclusions. Hence, their analysis also consisted of rewriting sentences clearly and precisely. In this connection, the Neo-Naiyayika philosophers used 'technical though ordinary language' as Kalikrishna Banerjee would say, such as negatumness, *pratiyogita* or being a negatum, *pratiyogitva; nirupita*, the quality of being specified, and *nirupaka*, the specifier or what specifies; and *avachhedaka*, the limiter, and *avachhinna*, the limited or what is limited. These expressions are typically very technical from the Nyaya perspective and are employed as an apparatus for analysis to counter misinterpretations.

The goal or purpose of analysis, 'why do we need analysis,' does not mean that they should cast aside metaphysics as useless or meaningless. Kalikrishna Banerjee, on behalf of the Naiyayika, writes: 'If to be an analyst is to be a policeman, whose chief duty is to prevent bootleg traffic into metaphysics, I am not an analyst at all.'[10] The Naiyayikas also have a reason to account for the positive dimension of the how aspect of analysis and its why aspect as well. Banerjee provides the example of the sentence '*ghatam anaya' or* 'bring the pot.' The sentence is in an imperative mood, but 'should' to be understood here as 'non-normative.'[11] It is an imperative statement, a vidhi, indicating the speaker's desire. The analysis of this sentence needs to be rewritten in the form of the following sentence: 'You are the seat of the effort that is conducive to the bringing of the object of desire for a pot.'[12] The purpose of analysis, i.e., 'what is the why of it' on the part of the Naiyayikas, has been explained very lucidly by Kalikrishna Banerjee. It has been pointed out that the goal of analysis from the perspective of the Naiyayika is different. In other words, it has been suggested that the

[10] K.K. Banerjee, vide *Language, Logic and Ontology*, p. 110
[11] Ibid, p.110
[12] Ibid, p. 111

goal here is to show how the meanings of the words forming parts of the sentences must be conjoined or *anvita* with one another. [13]

At this point, anybody from Wittgenstein's side may seek an answer as to why the sentence does not by itself show the relation. Thus, on the part of Naiyayikas, their urgency of taking recourse to analysis may be doubted. The Naiyayikas do not have any ground for conceding to this sort of skeptical doubt. The Naiyayikas need to clarify the sense of showing[14] in two different senses: the ordinary and the specific sense of showing as suitable to their context. When the expression 'showing' is understood in the ordinary sense of the term, the sentence itself cannot be considered fit for the task. A very naïve example is sufficient to discredit any such claim for a sentence: When it is written, 'A is to the right of B,' it is found that A occupies the left side position in the sentence. But it has already been pointed out that there is another specific sense of showing for the Naiyayikas. According to the Naiyayika, 'the sentence must in some sense show the relation'; thus, the Naiyayikas subscribe to the theory of showing the relation. This needs further clarification: when it has been said that A is to the right of B, one becomes aware that A is to the right of B. The utterance of the above-mentioned sentence causes this awareness that A is to the right of B. So, it is the sentence that shows the structure of fact. But for the Naiyayikas, the sentence does not copy that structure. The provoking question continues to persist: it may be asked if the sentence does not copy the structure of facts, how can it show the structure of facts then?[15] The answer from Nyaya here is that the sentence means

[13] Each school of Indian philosophy has lengthy deliberations on the Philosophy of Language. Following articles written in Bengali by some distinguished scholars are suggested for preliminary introduction to the domain: Sabdabodher Pramantaratvasiddhi', Shyamapada Mishra, 'Abhitanvayavada: Ekti Samiksha,' Gangadhar Kar, Anvitabhidhanvad Paryalocana', Dinanath Tripathi in *Dharmaniti O Sruti* , Edited by Indrani Sanyal and Ratna Dutta Sharma.

[14] The notions of showing and saying are among the core concepts in the text Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. But while Banerjee explained the Nyaya position by using the concept of 'showing,' he did not seem to provoke any charges or objections from Wittgenstein's supporters.

[15] Ibid., p. 111

facts. In other words, the sentence's meaning is the relation of facts or objects. [16]

A Wittgensteinian may think of deriving some support from this Nyaya theory, which is moving towards admitting individual words in the language as naming objects that are their meanings. This may remind us of the Tractarian statement, 3.203: 'A name means an object. The object is its meaning.' Further, it also comes up with the thesis that sentences are combinations of such names; hence, sentences mean the combinations of objects. For Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, 2: 'What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.' And in 2.01: 'A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).' However, lengthening this analogy of the Nyaya model with the *Tractatus* further would not be commendable for the Naiyayikas or the Wittgensteinians. The Naiyaikas do not share the atomistic framework of the Tractarian metaphysics. They are very much against the Tractarian conception of colorless simples as objects. We may recapitulate Tractatus, 2.02: 'Objects are simple,' 2.0232: 'In a manner of speaking objects are colorless.' Hence, the Tractarian conception of the world combines colorless objects with intrinsic nature for combining with other objects. Later, Wittgenstein deviated from this position, and in his *Philosophical Investigations*, he referred to this very position as closer to Augustine's. He did not deny that this could be one of the ways of communication, but it would be erroneous to claim it as the only way of communication in language. Wittgenstein realized some of the major pitfalls of this referential theory of meaning. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein admitted that this theory is primarily about nouns like table, chairs, and bread, as well as names of persons or places and only secondarily of certain names of actions. The Naiyayikas would also admit that when they formulated their theory, they spoke about such words, called *namapada* in Sanskrit, i.e., name words. The Naiyayikas, however, do not consider this a deficiency of the theory. Instead, from the account of the Nyaya philosophers, enough justifications are available for subscribing to this theory of meaning. It has been pointed out that because of a more extensive occurrence of

[16] Banerjee, in this case, cites *Sabdashakti Prakashika* (SSP), Atul Krishna's edition, p.231 [Collected from his article, p. 124]

namapada (noun words) in most sentences, the discussion about the theory of meaning rotated mainly around those expressions. However, it has not been claimed by the Naiyayikas that the Nyaya theory applies only to those words. The Neo-Naiyayikas have affirmed that this theory holds good even of the inflections. Banerjee also considered these explanations of the earlier thinkers belonging to the Nyaya school.

Kalikrishna Banerjee argues that a sentence must, in some sense, if not in an ordinary sense, show the relation.[17] But in the example, as pointed out, when it has been said, 'A is to the right of B,' it is unacceptable to hold that this sentence can show the structure. From the Nyaya perspective, from someone's saying that 'A is to the right of B,' one becomes aware that A is to the right of B. The uttered sentence causes this awareness, so the sentence shows the structure of fact, though it does not copy the structure. To quote from Banerjee: 'To show how the different objects of which one is aware when one hears the sentence are related, i.e., show how the meanings of the words forming parts of the sentence are to be anvita.'[18] Thus, Banerjee sought to direct the following of the path of the Naiyayikas, did not necessitate believing that without copying the structure, the fact cannot be shown by the sentence. This would be no doubt a difficult position for the Wittgenstinians to digest easily. Banerjee gives reason to support his claim: 'Because the sentence means fact. The meaning of a sentence is the relation of facts or objects.'[19]

The indomitable Wittgenstein, pursuing the path of *Philosophical Investigations,* who questioned the credibility of the referential theory of meaning, decries Augustine's reflections as an oversimplified account of the phenomena of language. Wittgenstein observed from the passages of *Confessions* that Augustine did not distinguish between different kinds of words. Wittgenstein did his best to convince the opponents about the helpless situations resulting from the blind acceptance of the Augustinian theory of meaning through his examples of the shopper's and builder's language. Wittgenstein's point is that this theory is not

[17] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika,' p. 111
[18] *Language, Knowledge and Ontology*, p. 111
[19] Ibid., p. 112

acceptable for all words. Thus, for Wittgenstein, it is incorrect to maintain that 'slab' signifies slab and 'apple' apple or every word signifies. Wittgenstein tried to make clear how far his approach is more specific: he maintains that when we say that every word signifies something, we say nothing whatsoever unless we explain exactly what distinction we wish to make, and the distinction in question is not meant for from words without meaning such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poems or words like 'Lilliburlero' in songs. [20]

The inadequacy or insufficiency of the theory may be considered one of the reasons for the vacuousness of this theory. On behalf of the Naiyayikas, Banerjee constructs the reply as follows: 'I admit that the assertion that every word in language signifies something is too vacuous to be significant, though I doubt if the vacuity of this assertion can be a compelling argument against a theory of the type we are discussing.'[21] From this difference of opinion between Wittgenstein and Nyaya, it is understood quite obviously that the expression 'vacuous' or 'vacuity' itself is vacuous – uncomprehending without further clarifications. The Naiyayikas or any other purported version of the referential theory of meaning may not maintain straightforwardly that every word in our language signifies some object. The Naiyayikas admit, as Banerjee subtly suggested - without elaboration, the distinction between words that are *vacakas,* i.e., significant, and words that are *dyotaka,* i.e., merely indicative words.[22]

II. Does the Word Become Meaningless when the Object is Destroyed?

Another problem that bothered Wittgenstein much about this Tractarian theory of meaning is that if a word means an object, does the word become meaningless when the object is destroyed? In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein cites the example of the sword 'Excalibur.'

[20] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika', p. 113
[21] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika', p. 113
[22] *Nyaya Kosa*, p. 422

Wittgenstein elaborated on this as follows[23]: 'The word 'Excalibur', say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently, Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence, 'Excalibur has a sharp blade,' makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if 'Excalibur' is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken into pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word 'Excalibur' must disappear when the sense is analyzed and its place be taken by words whose names are simple. It will be reasonable to call these words the real name.'

To save the situation, Wittgenstein points out that at this stage, it may be said that one is tempted to object to what is ordinarily called a proper name. This reminds us of the Russellian description theory and his reducing ordinarily called proper names to descriptions. So, Wittgenstein here suggests from the perspective of these thinkers that to account for the sense of the sentence, 'Excalibur has a sharp blade,' we have to take recourse to the analysis of the sentence to find out the corresponding objects of which Excalibur is consisted of. Thus, we may arrive at words that do name simple. However, this is not Wittgenstein's position in *Philosophical Investigations*. He finds the basic presupposition behind this Tractarian approach is that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. 'It is important to note that the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that corresponds to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name.'[24]

In this connection, Wittgenstein points out that when Mr. N.N. dies, one says the name's bearer dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have

[23] *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 19e, sec 39
[24] Ibid., p. 20 e.

meaning, it would make no sense to say, 'Mr. N.N. is dead.' Wittgenstein explains how changing the stage from referential theory of meaning to language game conception of meaning would save the situation. But that is not a requirement for the present discussion. Wittgenstein also refers to the statement, 'Moses did not exist.' Following Russell, some may say the name 'Moses' can be defined employing various descriptions, such as 'Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt,' or 'the leader of the Israelites was not called Moses,' or 'the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's daughter' or 'there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses'. But when we make a statement about Moses, are we always ready to substitute some one of these descriptions about Moses? Has the name Moses been fixed and used univocally for me in all possible cases? Wittgenstein's thrust is negative here.

Suppose a Wittgensteinian had posed this question to a Naiyayika; 'If a word means an object, does the word become meaningless when the object is destroyed? The Naiyayika would, of course, retort as follows: 'Why should the destruction of the object amount to a loss in meaning? While facing such troubling questions, the Nyaya does not take any irresolute turn from their advocacy of the referential theory of meaning. When Wittgenstein finds insufficiency in his Tractarian theory, he is also critical of its archetype exemplified in logical atomism. This theory claimed that the simples are the objective correlates of logically proper names. In this Tractarian phase, the essence of names is to stand for the elements that are their meanings, and the essence of a sentence is to be a combination of names that constitutes a description. In the *Tractatus*, objects are simple (TLP 2.02), are the substance of the world (TLP, 2.021), are the meanings of simple names (TLP, 3.203), etc. At this stage, Wittgenstein was much influenced by Russell in believing that by analysis expected to have arrived at the first elements, even though logically. This position is no longer Wittgenstein's position in *Philosophical Investigations*. The Naiyayikas, from their philosophical perspective, would not concede to the view that the destruction of the object does amount to a loss of meaning.

The Naiyayikas would deny any such elements as meanings of words. At this point, the Naiyayika would instead include universals that are nameable. How far would that be an acceptable proposition for Wittgenstein? The Naiyayika would maintain that universals are perceivable or genuinely thought of. They also maintain that a universal is sometimes known inferentially. We need to understand the difference between the perspective of a Naiyayika and that of Wittgenstein. The sense of knowledge and its scope are not understood in the same sense. In this aspect, the difference between a follower of Wittgenstein and a Naiyayika may be clarified by explaining conceptions of knowledge each possesses. This is another crucial task that needs sufficient attention.

III. Can Universals be Meanings of Words?

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein developed his theory of language as a game because he found that searching for the essence or universality of language is futile. He realized that in the case of games, we do not see any common essence that defines all games. For that reason, forsaking universality, Wittgenstein had brought in the concept of 'family resemblance' to imply that there is nothing common to all games but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them. We see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.[25] Naiyayikas, however, would insist on holding that the word game means that which is common to all games. Common sense feels no difficulty when it holds that the same name calls different individuals as they have something in common. Philosophers, from their confusion, create the problem of analyzing common names. Banerjee tries to bring out what the expression 'to have something in common' means after the Naiyayikas.

Kalikrishna Banerjee strongly defends the reality of universals as a presupposition to every sentence we utter.[26] When one apprehends any particular as definite, one also apprehends its distinction from other particulars within the sphere of some kind of being which is common to

[25] *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 31-32
[26] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika', p. 116

them.[27] So, apprehending a particular as definite is also to apprehend a universal. Kalikrishna Banerjee elucidates how the perception of a particular is twined with the perception of a universal. This is typically the Nyaya perspective. When, for instance, one perceives a particular cow, and perception is definite, one cannot help but perceive the characteristic feature of the individual animal, which he will be able to recognize when he perceives another cow. Thus, it has been ascertained that an apprehension of the particular is also an apprehension of the universal and the distinction between the universal and the particular. According to the Nyaya point of view, the reality of universals is assumed in every sentence that we utter, every definition, and every explanation assumes it.

From Wittgenstein's point of view, it may be questioned anxiously if words mean universals, and then how can we talk about individuals? The Nyaya answer that a word means a particular as qualified by universal may, to a certain extent, soothe the worry of Wittgenstein's followers. The Naiyayikas claim they have said so based on experience. As per the analysis derived from the Naiyayika, when a man who knows the use of a word, say the word cow, hears it, he comes to know not only a universal but also an individual. What it means is a particular characterized by a universal. A word means neither a pure universal nor a bare particular.

An attempt may be made to find out how the previous problem of Wittgenstein can be answered, such as whether a word becomes meaningless when the individual perishes. The Nyaya also has an explanation for this. The Naiyayika would say that hearing the word will give rise to a memory awareness of the object. The Naiyayikas maintain that this is the case with every word. Even when a word means a universal, hearing it does not give rise to a perception of it. So if the absence of the object meant rendering the word meaningless, i.e., if it is said that the object meant is not perceived, in contrast, the word is being spoken or heard, the word is meaningless, every word – not only the word meaning individuals have to be considered meaningless.

[27] Ibid.

IV. How Does an Individual Learn the Meaning of a Word?

The next question to Wittgenstein, of course, will be how an individual learns the meaning of a word. Do they learn the meaning of a word in the Augustinian-described way by observing the behavior of the elders? The Nyaya reply is that in their system, no doubt, this is the primary way of learning the meaning of a word. This is the most important and logically primitive. But this is not the only way; they admit many other ways, too.

Wittgenstein argued for an alternative viewpoint in the later period of the *Philosophical Investigations* period. He would strongly recommend giving up the view that meanings are only to be deciphered by objects for which words stand. We have already discussed his shift to the view that the meaning of a word is its use in language. This change in his perspective invited Wittgenstein to meet various other challenges. In this phase, Wittgenstein relied on the rules to govern the use. But this admission also requires the possibility of avoiding the misuse of rules. Wittgenstein explained rules as standing like a signpost; the signpost is used by the rule-followers in a certain way, i.e., by behaving in a certain way in the presence of the signpost that gives meaning to it. Hence, obeying a rule is a practice.

Banerjee's analysis of the difference between the Naiyayikas and the early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein, he had to work hard to bring out the import of the Nyaya philosophy. The underlying tricky question regarding the source of Banerjee's impetus for entering into the nitty-gritty of these problematic issues remains uncaptured. Banerjee never expressly said anything about the objective of his comparison between the two systems in this article. In his article, 'East and West in Philosophy, [28]' he writes, 'One may propose to explore the subject by asking what refreshing and reassuring light the study of Indian philosophy throws on Western philosophy, and the other way round.'[29] Professor Banerjee was a metaphysician par excellence, and he can't believe that by partially and in a defunct manner picking out some arguments from one system of belief and belittling and shaming it in

[28] *Language, Knowledge and Ontology*, pp. 319- 343
[29] Ibid., p.319

comparison with that of another can never be the goal of a genuine metaphysician like Kalikrishna Banerjee. His emphasis on these imaginary conversations between a Naiyayika and a Wittgensteinian was supposedly not an attempt to draw a line of continuity between the earlier and later Wittgenstein. Without falling prey to the assertion that name words can mean only objects, he paved the way for introducing the universals as 'simple nameables.'[30] Speaking about universals as nameable would not be convincing to Wittgenstein or any Wittgensteinian. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein introduced language communication as a game and language as a form of life. The main contention for Wittgenstein's abandoning, if not totally, but to a certain extent, the referential theory of meaning is that some basic paradoxes were not accountable by that theory. Secondly, Wittgenstein, instead of allotting all feasibility to the referential theory as a theory of meaning, propounded a broader theory of meaning in terms of language games. But he was at a loss to find anything like game hood among all commonly played games. Hence, the referential meaning in terms of its capacity to signify any universal, like gamehood, seemed non-achievable to him. Banerjee, in his humorous way, under such circumstances, asks a Wittgensteinian follower: 'Tell me if the sentence asserting that a word means a universal can be cashed. Thus, take the word game.'[31] What sort of 'cashing' or obtaining advantages was In Kalikrishna Banerjee's mind from these dialogical conversations? Was he expecting or seeking from the follower of Wittgenstein a decisive response: 'can be cashed' in a positive note, in terms of a valuable and resourceful addition to preserving or maintaining the referential theory of meaning by providing it a broader field, or in a negative note, presenting it in its narrower frame, without keeping any provision for any extension, thus, looking for some other theory frame that would not necessitate admitting any universals as nameable. It does not appear plausible for Wittgenstein to approve the first amendment after the Nyaya theory of meaning. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* straightforwardly could not decipher anything common between varieties of games like board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, child's playing,

[30] 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika', p. 14
[31] Ibid., p. 114

and ring-a-ring-roses games, nothing to be seen as common, but similarities and relationships. Wittgenstein discovered only a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.[32] From the perspective of Wittgenstein, his works, it is difficult to guess whether he or his followers would be interested in pursuing the path of the Naiyayikas or something other than that. But was there any hidden agenda behind Kalikrishna Banerjee's exploration into these allies? Kalikrishna Banerjee warned against dealing with the subject 'East and West in Philosophy' for gleaning pointless similarities and dissimilarities or turning it into an exercise in rhetoric and exhortation.'[33] Finally, if no narrow goal guided Kalikrishna Banerjee, something deeper lies veiled that needs to be explored. J.N. Mohanty introduces Kalikrishna Banerjee as follows: 'He recognizes, along with current philosophical preoccupations, the importance of language in philosophy, but refuses to use analysis of language for the purpose of demolishing metaphysics. On the contrary, he sees in language the possibility of meaning a transcendent reality.'[34] Kalikrishna Banerjee's demanding and critical hard work in the essay, 'Wittgenstein versus Naiyayika' is a proposal, no doubt, 'to explore the subject by asking what refreshing and reassuring light the study of Indian philosophy throws on western philosophy, and the other way round.'[35]

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Substance as the Meaning of the Words: A Critique

Devendra Nath Tiwari

Introduction

The discussion, herein, presents the view of language in relation to substance and substance in relation to language. In relation to substance, the theorists observe the language chiefly in three ways that are, i. it as an expresser, ii. as a reference and iii. as a representation. Herein, I examine as to how the view that the language is an expresser is best capable of resolving philosophical problems created by the theorists who accept language as a reference and representation and evaluate it only as marks or pointer to substance. Language, for them, is a tool through which the thought of the substance is manifested or articulated.

The time-honored discussion on the problem of substance as a metaphysical entity-as empiricists conclude-tends either to skepticism or to decomposition of a substance to properties, and the modern readers show little interest in spending their time for such an issue as empirically unsolvable or having no cognitive ground. Observing philosophically, the substance-whether to be found in empirical world or that of the transcendental-necessarily demands a cognitive ground in order to be known and to be expressed. Is there any cognitive-ground or justification for accepting a thing-in-itself or external-thing, beyond the grasp of the mind, as the meaning of the word? Philosophy does not occupy just with the study of external objects or things-in-themselves. Rather, it is involved with the study of cognitive objects as they flash by language. For a philosopher, who takes philosophy as a system of interpreting cognition as it flashes by language, philosophical reflections are concerned with the clarification of meaning as presented by language in ordinary communication[1] by analysis and explanation. No theory of meaning can be proper if it is not grounded on a communicative base.

For some analytic philosophers, the issue of substance, as a thing-in-itself, is not a legitimate problem of philosophical investigation. They

think that the problem is actually verbal but metaphysicians confuse it with the factual. Is it true to say that all problems of philosophy, and, hence, the problem of 'substance is a fact' are verbal for a philosopher for whom the language and its meaning are only objects of intellect or intelligible beings? A philosopher, whose aim is to explain the world of communication i.e. the world of language and meanings, takes all the issue for investigation on the basis of cognition as presented by language. Analysis and interpretation of communication or cognition by language is our philosophical concern[2] and we do not consider a substance independently of what and how the language reveals it.

Substance stands as logically and philosophically a legitimate problem if it is discussed as the language presents it. The founder of the theory 'all words denote substance' is an ancient Indian grammarian named Vyāḍi[3]. Pāṇini[4] and his commentators have followed the theory for the explanation of the meanings of words. Bhartṛhari, in his third book of *Vākyapadīya* has included two chapters entitled Dravya Samuddeśaḥ and Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, respectively, to look into Vyāḍi's view of meaning. His interpretation in these chapters is dedicated to the substance as the very general meaning of all words. Bhartṛhari accepts that soul (ātmā), Individual or thing (vastu), nature (svabhāva), reality (sattā), body (śarīra), and substance (tattva) are synonyms of substance (Dravya) [5]. An account of the discussion on substance herein is classified into two categories: (i) substance as the transcendental absolute-untouched by words (pāramārthika Dravya); and (ii) substance as it is presented by expressions or intelligible substance (sāmvyavahārika dravya). A brief account of these two follows thus:

Substance as a Transcendental Absolute (*Pārmārthika Dravya*)[6]

No category of speech is applicable to the unconditioned transcendental substance. It can be said neither to exist nor to non-exist, neither one nor many, neither unity because there is nothing except it, nor diversity because it is non-dual, and, hence, no question of diversity, neither changing nor non-changing, neither nor, nor nothing. Such things are untouched by words; they are not intelligible beings that are expressed by language and, hence, they are non-communicable beings.

How can such transcendental unconditioned substance be accepted as the meaning of a word? As all thinking is infused by language, the unconditioned is thought of conditioned by language and is communicated accordingly as this or that, one, many, unity, diversity, changing, unchanging, etc. The unconditioned is conditioned by two conditioning factors (i) conditioning by space or form (mūrtivivarta); and (ii) conditioning by time (kriyāvivarta). Time and space are non-different; the two are differentiated on the basis of action and form, respectively. All things in the world are divided into finished and non-finished characters. It is on the basis of time that actions (non-finished characters) and of space that forms, that is, finished characters are treated differently. No sequence is known isolated from a form and a form is always a form in a time. Not only that but also a being of finished character may be presented by language and known as a being of a non-finished character and vice-versa. All actions are actions in a space and all forms are forms known in time and, hence, they are correlated conditioners[7]. The same substance from the point of view of movements is sequence (action) in time and from the point of view of extension is thing moving in space. As no sequence is possible without a thing and as a thing is always a thing existing or non-existing in a time, the two are functions performed by the same power through which the unconditioned flashes are determined.

The world of communication is the sole concern of philosophy, and communicable being (language and meanings) are only intelligible beings to which the philosophical reflections are confined. Language does not express external things and the senses do not reveal meanings. A meaning is revealed by language and is non-different from the language that reveals it. The language is the signifier; it expresses its signified and not the thing or external-object which are trans-language or to whom the language does not figure. The meaning is not even an outcome of an abstraction from external-objects. It is a revealed or expressed being, the being presented by language independently of external-things.

Language-tokens that is garbs serve as indication/marks. It stands as marks to the things/entities. There are things corresponding to words but as language philosopher, we reflect on the cognition as it is revealed

by language. For such a reflection, the concept- language is ubiquitous; it is flash of consciousness, an indivisible being that reveals its meaning non-differently. It is awareness-awareness of itself and of its meaning as well and, hence, the language and the meaning are the only beings of a philosophical concern. Mind knows only its flashes; it does not know consciousness in itself that is assumed as the ontic substratum of the flashings. External-objects are taken by habit as the external basis or substratum of the intelligible beings. Meaning, as such, is not a thing assumed by habit. It is a being expressed by language[8] and, thus, there is no philosophical need and sense in assuming external-things as the object proper of knowledge which are non-communicable and are ungraspable by language.

Those who accept the external-substance as the meaning of words take substance as the substratum of qualities and of knowledge. For some, the substance is the sum total of the qualities, while for others it is something more than the qualities. Logically, the theorists, belonging to the former view, are unable to defend themselves if the question of the decomposition of substance to qualities, which are only perceived, is put before them, while those belonging to the latter view fail to produce any cognitive-ground for a substance beyond and above the qualities known. Is there any ground to perceive gold beyond the qualities or free from all its qualities? The assumption of substance as that 'which is defined through its qualities but indescribable in-itself' amounts to skepticism, and, no uniform theory of substance as the import of words may be founded on the basis of the aforementioned metaphysical view of substance.

Those who accept the words denote the form directly and the substances indirectly, confuse the term denotation. A denotation is expressed that is revealed in the mind non-differently by the words.[9] Two denotations are not cognized simultaneously. Since language infuses cognition, there is no cognitive ground to accept the consequential cognition of them .There is no justification for accepting indirectly supposed substance as the denotation which is cognized directly as expressed by the word and which serves as the basis of implication or assumption of the former as the substratum of the latter.

A denotation is an expressed one, which is directly revealed by words. There is no space in the mind in order to house external-things for being them known as they are. It can be said that external-things are there and they are things which figure in mind when words are uttered; otherwise, one cannot find any justification for the problem as to why do we not understand 'house' when we hear the word 'cow'.[10] It can also be added that the uniformity of external-objects perceived and the ideas figured in the mind by words, necessarily demand the existence of external-things as the meaning of words. Helārāja[11] refutes their arguments by putting the dialectic-whether they (external-things and their ideas) are similar to limited extent or to the full-extent? In the former case, the cognition will be like the cognition of an external entity (pot, etc.) but it is not so. In case of assuming it as an entity, it will lose its foundational character of being awareness. Not only that, but the cognition of a part or a thing, say pot, will, in that case be the cognition of all things (pot, cot, dog, etc.). Thus, the issue of similarity between an entity unintelligible in nature and the being, intelligible in nature, is baseless. In the later case, the knowledge will cease to be knowledge; it will be, then, a matter like external-things, and, thus, the logic of the sameness of a cognitive being and a physical or external-thing will amount to utter obscurity. In perceptual experiences, it may be accepted that external-things are perceived by senses. Perceiving a thing is not the knowing. Knowing is cognizing intelligible beings. Perceiving is just a tool in the manifestation of the expresser. However, there is no justification for external-things if we confine only to the cognition expressed or revealed by the words in the mind. Experiences, perception, inference, etc., serve as means in the manifestation of the expresser and the meaning is revealed by it only. If we deny the foundationality of the cognition there will be no base even for the presumption of external-things.

The view that ideas hypostatized as external-objects is the meaning of words is also confusing. The words do not reveal external-objects (whether hypostatized or otherwise). The cognition by words is the awareness of meaning revealed by words without having any recourse to external-objects. How can the words, viz., negation, unreal, non-existent, hairs-horns, etc., be explained if external-things are taken as the expressed of words? The meaning is known as revealed in the

mind by words and it is needless to admit it as personified. How the impossibility of expressions regarding being, non-being, etc. can be shown, if external-beings are taken as the meaning of language is discussed in precise elsewhere.[12] It is apparent from the observation made in the earlier pages that if substance is taken as the meaning of words, it must be an intelligible being (Buddhiṣṭha), thought-object or idea figured by words. It is not a mental construction or any kind of abstraction but a being revealed by language.

Some metaphysicians accept that the words are indicators of the thing-in-itself. They are signs or symbols of external-objects and indicate that of which they are symbols. As word and its meaning are revealed truths and as the word does not reveal anything ontic in nature, how can an external entity be accepted as the meaning which is non-different from the word? Is it not that they are assumed by implication or supposed by habit? If it is yes, how can that which is not revealed by words but supposed otherwise as expressed (vācya) of an expresser? Now, it is clear that the view of language as committed to ontology is significant for ontologists but for philosophers it misleads philosophical reflection from the right philosophical conclusion. For some, the word functions as a denotation of a sense (meaning) and as a pointer to a referent (thing-in-itself). The referring capacity of a word cannot be denied but it also cannot be denied that with the change of sense the referent is also changed. The same person is a father, a teacher, and a friend but with the uses in those respective senses, the referent does not remain the same. It is only by overlooking their differences that the referents are taken as identical.

Substance as intelligible being (*Samavyāvahārika Dravya*):

Substance, as it is presented by language is neither physical, neither metaphysical nor psychological, nor mental but intelligible and, thus, is a being of awareness in nature. It can be interpreted from two perspectives. A brief account of these perspectives is given as follows:

First Perspective: Substance and the Problem of language as Reference

Let us come to the problem of language as reference. In precise Jainas, Bauddhas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmānsakas and Advaita Vedāntins-who take

language as that which, by proxy, stands for the referents, i.e. things and thoughts-accept language as reference. The difference of language and thought is basic for them. In a more general sense, they accept the fact that the language is used to communicate the thoughts of the things of which it is a reference. Thought is basic and prior to any communication. When one intends to communicate the thought, the language comes forth to act on the purpose. Thoughts are aroused by experience; memory and perception based on the sense-object contact and the language by convention refer to those objects. This is the metaphysical understanding of language for which language is tool for pointing to or indicative of referents in the empirical world. These theorists are put in difficulty when they are asked the question: Is language not thought? If they reply it negatively then, being independent from thought no philosophical activity is possible. If they reply it positively then the question about its character arises. Is it a reference or a referent?

Indian Grammarian philosophers, aim at explaining meaning as presented by words. According to Bhartṛhari[13], some words, i.e. pronouns like idam (this), tat (that) and sarva (all) function as indicatives to substances in general (vastumātra abhidhāyinaḥ) while some other pronouns like Anya (others), anyatara (another) are expressive of qualified substances. In brief, by the term non-qualified or substance in general (śuddha-dravya), we mean sheer substance unspecified by a particular name and the associate qualities. It is transcendental to the reference or beyond the touch of language. Different from it, by the term-qualified substance, we mean substance determined by quality. This is also a metaphysical view; in this case qualities are the qualities of substance, the reality–in-itself. Apart from the meaning of qualified substance as mentioned above, the term is used for that which figures by language as something distinguished from other (qualifiers).

Presently, we propose to discuss the perspective for which a substance is that for the indication of which pronouns like idam (this), tat (that) and sarva (all) are used.[14]These pronouns are used as pointers to all sorts of things in the world without distinction of their properties, particular names, genders, etc. Pronouns are used on the place of nouns

having particular names, gender, etc., but when pronouns like idam or tat or sarva are used in the place of nouns, the specific name, gender and other distinctions are neither expressed nor expected and, thus, all that is called by those pronouns idam (this), tat (that) or sarva (all) is 'substance' in general.

Though pronouns are used in the place of nouns, their uses are different. Nouns express their own particular meanings, while pronouns as 'this' or 'that' indicate substance in general. A noun cannot be used for substance in general or for substance without its determinants, i.e. qualities. For example, the word 'dog' is not used for all substances like pen, book, etc., except its own meaning. Unlike nouns, pronouns are used as indicative to all sorts of substances, this and that. A thing may be called by different names (i.e. ātmā, dravya, svabhāva, śarīra, etc.) and by each name, their specific meanings are known or expressed but pure substance, void of names and genders, cannot be indicated by those names. A pronoun is used to indicate the substance for which a number of nouns are used.

Clarifying the position of pronouns in referring/marking to substance, the analogy of a crow sitting on the roof of the house of Deodatta[15] may be given. As the house of Deodatta is indicated through the crow (mark) sitting on the roof of his house, which is attained by the hearer through the crow indicated by the word, even if it flies later on, the substance is referred to by pronouns like this, that and all, which are separated after performing the task of indicating the substance. The pronouns function as marks or as pointer to but they should not be confused as adjectives or properties. The difference between a mark and property is that the former is separated from what it points while the latter is inseparably associated with the substance. In case of properties, as they are inseparably associated with the substance, the unqualified substance or substance void of specific forms cannot be referred. The marks may point to the unqualified (substance in general) while the properties, being a predicate, implies the substance as its substratum (samānādhikaraṇa).[16] Conclusively, pronouns, according to grammarians, function to indicate the substance in two ways. Words such as 'this', 'that' and 'all' indicate sheer substance void of all

determination. Out of them, 'this' indicates the visible Beings of present time and 'that' indicates being that is presently, invisible and is inferred.

Language is awareness by nature; it is always expressive but we do not deny the referential function of it. Conventionally, language is used to refer to the referents. Thoughts of the things are imposed on exterior things that are taken as referents. A convention is learnt by practice, perception and habit and cannot be learnt without observation of the referential use of language. We have seen in the discussion made in the earlier pages that pure substance: substance devoid of specific qualities is referred to by the pronouns like that, this, it, all.

Language is expressive by nature; it expresses the universal. The universal is imposed on an individual, a referent for which the language stands as the reference. In other words, it is by indication that the use of language is specified to the particulars on which our convention is based. Theorists who believe language as different from thought and that verbal cognition is established by convention accept the language as reference. For them, validity of verbal cognition is based on corresponding empirical existence or non-existence of the referent. Different from those theorists, Vaiyākaraṇas, who believe the language and thought as non-different, that is, language as expressive of the meaning and the meaning as revealed by language, accept referential use of language only for the sake of interpretation of conventional uses of language. Conventionally, the meaning is imposed on the referents and language is taken as the marks of those referents.

In brief, there are basically two types of approaches to cognition by the language-firstly, the language oriented, and secondly, the meaning oriented. i. In the former, the language is the original unit of cognition and it reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. It is a cognitive approach to language, for which our knowledge is confined to and is based on the intelligible being that are only revealed. These beings are only intelligible or philosophical beings and the referents or things-in themselves, to be found in the empirical world, are beyond our cognition because they are not expressed. They are known by imposition and presumption as the substantial base of intelligible beings. lithe latter view gives priority to meaning for which language is tool. The meaning for the latter is different from language. Theorists

accept the meaning that stands for the things the language refers. This perspective has created a lot of problems in the contemporary thinking on meaning, its representation and validity and has brought the thinking on language philosophy to an end.

Second Perspective:
Substance and the Language as the Expresser

According to this perspective, a substance is that which is expected as that to be differentiated or distinguished from another (bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ). In this view, the qualified substance (viśiṣtavastu) is the expressed of the expresser.

The difference between what qualifies and what is qualified is known by the use of words, and, anything, even qualities, etc., can also be presented by words as that to be distinguished by others and, then, they are also substance. Helārāja, by explaining all words grouped into five categories, i.e. nominatives, verbs, prefixes, particles and post positions, shows how they, except verbs, when presented as substantive, express an accomplished character or state designated as individual or particular or substance[17], for example, the word ‘nīla’ (blue) in the use ‘blue sky’ expresses a quality (color), but, the same word in the use 'sky-blue' expresses the 'blue' as distinguished by the sky, and, hence, substance. The word 'batting' in the sentence 'He is batting' expresses an action that is an unaccomplished character but the same word in the expression 'His batting is excellent' expresses substance that is an accomplished character qualified by the predicate 'excellent'. If the definition of substance as ‘adhikaraṇam-Dravya’ that which is presented by words as substratum of the meanings of other words of the expression, is taken for consideration, the substance will be the meaning of all words standing as substratum. For example, the word 'liberation' (mokṣa) as it serves as a substratum, in the expression ‘Mokṣe icchāsti’ (there is craving for liberation), is substance because it stands as the substratum of the desire (icchā). This definition of substance may also be explained on the basis of the definition ‘bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ’. Helārāja says, as an action is the central meaning of an expression and takes the other words of the expression as accessories that qualify the verb, so also substance is taken as the meaning of verb. Substance is considered as the import of suffixes, prepositions and postpositions also

as they function as suggestive to the meaning (substance) of the words with which they are used. For individualists like Vaiśeṣikas, the universal is a quality and not a substance, but the universal if presented by words as something qualified, it expresses substances.[18]. The above two definitions of the common-sense view of substance as mentioned above are not separate but complementary as they together characterize the common sense view of the use of words for substance.

Kumārila Mīmānsakas and vaiyākaraṇas, to whom the universal is the very general meaning of all words, reject the theory of substance as the meaning of words by saying that, as discrete individuals are innumerable, it is difficult to decide the individual particularly observed by the convention. If the convention of the word 'pot', is there with pot-A and if pot B or C is cognized by the word 'pot', it will cause an irregularity of convention and hence, a deviation from what is observed by the convention. It is not sound to say that the word serves as limiter of all of its instances (individuals pertaining to past, present and future).

The individualists, in order to get rid of the charge, say that the specific form, qualifying substance as specific (viśeṣa), distinguishes the meaning of a word from that of the others. For example, the individual 'pot' associated with a certain form is distinguished from the individual 'sun' or 'tree' associated with different forms. Speaking of the individualist's position, Bhartṛhari illustrates it as the perceiving power of eyes is limited if one perceives through a tube, the substance, when communicated by words, is cognized as qualified by the qualities-form, color, etc., and, thus, 'the substance qualified by a particular form is the meaning of the word.'[19]

It may be asked: does the word express the form or the substance without a form or the substances qualified by the form or substance and form both? For Universalists, the word expresses form and the individual, as an ontic substratum of the form is known by implication. For realists, like Vaiśeṣikas, the word expresses the individual qualified by the form. For us, the word denotes the form directly and the substance indirectly, through the forms. The denotation is not limited to form but it comprises the substance. For the Universalist, the form or the universal is the primary meaning of the word and substance is secondary, while, for individualists, the form, being the adjunct of

substance, is secondary and the substance is the primary meaning of words. In an individualist's account, substance is cognized as the primary meaning of the word and, as forms are inherent in them, they are also known by implication or by presumption.

Vaiyākaraṇas give due importance to both the views for interpreting meaning. Some unitaries like ākāśa (sky), sun, moon, etc., can be better explained on the basis of individual as the meaning of words. Terms like 'these universals' (imā jātiyān), 'word universal', etc., though they may be explained on the basis of individual as the import of words, can be better explained on the basis of universal as the meaning of words.[20] What they want to prove is that if universals are taken as primary meaning of words, individuals are secondary and vice versa. Finally, the words can be used in a sentence to mean substance or universal as per the expectancy of the speaker involved in the use of words.

The use of words as per expectancy or will of the speaker is not possible if substance is taken existent independently of language. The change of status of external-things as per expectancy or will is not possible because they are not beings figured by words (vikalpagocara). A 'vikalpagocara' is a being figured by words and, even so, independently of external-things. Cognitively, it means that the intelligible being qualified or to be distinguished by the other is known in accordance with the use of word, but in daily practices, particular utterances (sounds) by proxy are taken to stand for particular things.

Cognitively, the word reveals the universal and other meanings like the substance or the individual are known, consequentially, by implication[21] as the ontic substratum of the universal. The universalists-as meaning for them is what is revealed non-differently by words-take universals as the very general meaning of all sorts of words but the individualists view substance as a substratum of the universal and take it as the general meaning of words. It is observed that in the explanation of substance, as the very general meaning of words, the wordism of the individualists, according to which the discrete word-independently of sentence is a meaning-conveying unit which turns to sententialism, because, something can be presented as qualified or as distinguished by others, only by a unit of a sentential form.

It can be said that the exposition of substance as the very general meaning of words achieves significance only if a word is taken as a part of sentence or if it expresses a sentential meaning. Discrete words, independently of a sentence, cannot be explained on the basis of it, because, in that case, the expectancy of being qualified or distinguished by qualifiers will not be accomplished. The individualist's assumption that 'the import of a word, acquired by grammatical analysis of a sentence, is substance' implies that the words are expressive of qualified meaning. It can be said against their view that a meaning is taken as a qualified only if there is a qualifier and this is possible only in the case of a sentence. On the basis of analogy of gold[22] and its various ornaments, the individualists may say that the substance in general is the very general meaning of words and the forms are known consequently as they inhere in it; but this later assumption again implies that the non-qualified substance (gold), void of all forms, is not different from the universal. This is the meeting point of Bhartṛhari's discussion in all three chapters entitled Jātisamuddeśaḥ, Dravyasamuddeśaḥ and Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ. The all-comprehensive Being is the all-encompassing universal.

As far as the meaning of a word isolated from the sentence is concerned, Universalists are right in assuming the universal as the very general meaning of all words. For them, a word is universal and the meaning it reveals is also universal and that is the reason that identical cognition is accomplished by a word in its different occurrences and instances. The identical cognition is not possible if the universal is not admitted. Both the Universalists and the individualists accept that the expressive or primary meaning serves as the basis of cognition of other meanings of the word in its different use, which according to Universalists, cannot be explained without admitting the universals as the very general meaning of words. The individualists attempt to explain the problem of identical cognition as it is imposed, while for the Universalists, it is directly revealed and hence basic. The individualist's theory has no solution to the question as to why should one accept a being (unit) directly revealed by the word as imaginary. The logic of eternity of substance may be attractive but cognitively, it is unfounded. The logic of grammar or use of words, in daily practices, for things, is all accepted but it needs to be examined philosophically on the ground

of cognition as expressed by words. The idea that the language is a referring tool or marks confined to referring underestimates the expressive nature of it. If words are accepted as reference then the foundational character of the word as expressive of itself and its meaning may not possibly be given its due and that may cause serious cognitive problem regarding philosophical beings.

Substance as the language presents it:

Cognition by language is an issue of proper philosophical investigations. As a being is presented by words so as to be distinguished or to be differentiated, it seems right to accept substance as the very general meaning of all words. The expression regarding being or non-being cannot be possible if the substance as external being is taken as the meaning. The substance, in general, cannot be expressed as different from universality. In other words, the idea of substance, in general, is the universal which even the word substance expresses. Utterances or language-token are taken as the indicator of the substance (qualified) but the language expresses the universal. What conclusively, we derive from the aforementioned discussions, is that the universal is the import of words (if the words, derived from grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence, are taken as an indivisible meaning revealing - units). In that case, substance is known by the implication as the substratum of the universal.

We have already seen in the earlier pages that in some cases, only the uttering of word is understood as the meaning as in the cases of mantras (numinous words which are uttered in a contemplating manner). Concepts like apūrva devatā, swarga and sūtras of Pāṇini, and, in still some other cases, the word (sphoṭa) itself and the meaning non-differently revealed by it are understood as the meaning of the word. However, in no case, is a referent outside taken as the meaning of words. Words are not eternally related with things beyond words but with meanings non-differently revealed by them. The meaning revealed is imposed on referents of which words are taken, by habit, as reference.

Do words stand only as marks of things? Much has been said on the problem, and, here, I am not going to suggest anything new but to clarify the reason for thinking words as marks. When we teach the

meaning of a word say, 'cat' to a child, the most easily and sure shot method we adopt is to show him the picture of cat or an animal 'cat' sitting on the mat before him. It can be said that he learns all the principal words by observing corresponding referents. It is a remedy prescribed for a beginner but philosophical investigation is an afterward process. A philosopher who aims at interpreting the cognition by words, takes the meaning as that which the words reveal or express (vācya), for investigation. There is difference between learning pattern analysis of the function of words and that of philosophical. Those who accept words as mere referring tools confuse not only the differences of functioning of the senses and that of the words but the differences of the object of perceptual cognition and that of the verbal cognition also. They fail to observe the very instrumental character of perception and the foundational character of cognition as well. Showing the differences of functioning of senses and of the words, Bhartṛhari rightly observes 'the senses need not be cognized before perceiving objects. They do so when they are exposed to objects by their mere existence. Words, on the other hand, do not reveal objects (meaning) by their mere existence. They have to be cognized themselves first before they express meaning.[23] Manifested by sense data, it reveals itself and then the meaning is revealed non-differently. The external things may be accepted as the object of perception or as an inevitable basis of sense data but there is no question of sense- data as the meaning of a word which, is cognized independently from external objects. The hearings of a set of verbal-articulations in a sequence (taken by proxy as expresser) are not the expressers of knowledge. They are mere tools helping expression of concept-language (sphoṭa) by which the meaning is revealed. The sense data of something, acquired by the same or the other persons at different times, varies but the expresser they manifest is the constant universal and that is why identical cognition by language is accomplished. Sense data acquired by senses are not meaning; they serve as tools for manifestation of sphoṭa which, when manifested flashes forth itself its own nature from which meaning is revealed non-differently.

In case of a change of meaning of the word we do not subscribe to a case of transfer of the meaning but a case of imposition of the expressive meaning on them. In brief, we can say that sense perception

necessarily requires an external object as a prerequisite of sense data but this is not applicable to the cognition by word in which perception of articulations/utterances are tools only for the manifestation of the Sphoṭa which, out of itself, reveals the meaning and, thus, it is not an outcome of sensing contents.

My involvement here in showing the differences of perception by senses and verbal cognition is to clarify how verbal cognition by words, when considered on the pattern of cognition by senses, misleads one to conclude that words are marks of some or the other kinds of referents-empirical or transcendental. As a child in his daily practices learns the uses of the verbal utterances by taking them to stand by proxy for things he is not only driven to things through-utterances by habit, practice and perception but also identifies them with things and, thus, he does not mind the foundationality of the inner meaning revealing language. The meaning as pratibhā cannot be explained as a flash of understanding, if the word as the expresser that reveals it, is denied. The two are non-different and that is the reason identical conception or cognition by words is accomplished. The articulate-utterances are tools in the manifestation of Sphoṭa and are assumed as marks of things. These differences must be kept in mind for avoiding many difficult problems of philosophy of language. Verbal utterances as marks are taken as substitute of things, i.e. they stand by proxy for the things meant; they occupy a positions like that of the label on the commodities while Sphoṭa as awareness of itself and of meaning is an expressed/intelligible being. It is doubtless to say that while discussing the universal as the meaning revealed directly by word, it is quite clear that the substance in - itself is known consequentially by implication made on the basis of universals as its substratum.

It is remarkable to note that herein, we do not investigate into the substance-empirical or transcendental-but it as we know it in usual communication, more specifically as the meaning flashed by language. Pronouns like this, that, all, serve as indicatives to pure substance without forms (gold void of all forms) and pronouns like another(anya), different from another(anyatara) present qualified substance expected as distinguished from others. A qualified substance can be explained as the meaning of a word in the presence of its qualifiers and that is possible

only in the case of compounds and sentences. The substantives express the substance qualified by adjectives, verbs, etc. The idea of qualified substances presents it in a way that keeps us free from the danger of decomposition of the substance despite the fact that it presents it as that, which is qualified. Taking the words as independent expressers of meaning, it is epistemological justified to accept substance as the meaning of words because what is cognized discretely by the word 'pot' is not an individual ‘pot’ (a qualified substance) but 'potness' and, thus, the universal (potness) is revealed by the word 'pot'. It is justified on the plane of cognition to accept the universal as the very general meaning of words and substance as that cognized, consequently, as the substratum of universals because words are concepts. It is also justified to accept that a substance is universal, if it is presented by language as that to be qualified but that is possible only in case of sentence as the expresser and not in case of the word independently of sentence.

Conclusion:

The purpose of the theorists who accept language as reference and representation is to present an understanding of the metaphysical world that is, things-in-themselves through a logical frame. They consider perceptual entities, thoughts and language discretely separate from each other. In that manner, the significance of those theories cannot be overlooked but, in those cases, relation of language with referents or with the facts represented will be difficult to explain because of the reason that the former is a cognitive unit while the latter is metaphysical. Not only that but also the relation of reference and referent or representation and represented is neither logical nor natural. An artificial relation between the two always varies with the variation of the allegiance of the mind. In view of cognition, the language and meaning are intelligible beings; the language is the expresser of the meaning expressed non-differently by the natural fitness of the former. This natural fitness of the expresser to express the expressed is the relation between the language and meaning. It is the natural fitness by which the language is the active force and by which the expressed are naturally related. The reflection of a philosopher, while reflecting, is based on and is confined to the beings expressed in the mind that is to intelligible or philosophic beings of which language is the only

expresser. There is non-difference between language and thought; they are infused together.

Cognitive holistic theory of language does not bother about the substance in itself, whether it is eternal or transient.[25] Referentialists and representationists attempt to understand things-in-themselves for which they accept language as a referring/representing tool. The question of language as reference comes up later when one intends to understand the concept- language, in terms of logical reference and referent. The expresser, by proxy, is imposed on the garb/language- token and the meaning it expresses on the transcendental referents corresponding to the cognition expressed first. Thus, the question of language as reference stands significant only secondarily, that is, by imposition. There is no possibility of searching for a referent corresponding to the object of knowledge expressed by language if the knowledge expressed by language as the cause of incentive for that searching is denied. We are so accustomed with communicating with verbal noises that we do not mind the act of the language in cognition. The cognition expressed by language is the cause of incentive to logical modes of language and takes the verbal utterances or marks used for the manifestation of the expresser, as identified with language that stands for a referent with which one learns the convention. It is by perception, practice and habit that we ordinarily take the language token or verbal utterances or marks as language that by proxy stands for the things for which they are used conventionally and overlook the significant role of intelligible language in the manifestation of which verbal noises are only tool. The representation mode of use of language is not denied but the language is not always used in that mode. The question of language as representation does not stand philosophically significant if language and thought are non-different. It is not only improper but also underestimation to say that language stands for the referents known by other sources of knowledge like visual perception, inference, etc.

Substance is that we know and that we do not know may be a substance for a mystic that, for philosophy is of no use. Substance, as presented by language and the language are only intelligible beings. Language does not express the substance as Being-transcendental or empirical-and the substance, known as the language presents it is

intelligible substance, which is cognitive beings with which philosophers are concerned. Since the identical cognition of substance as substance in its different occurrences and instances of words and sentences are accomplished, it is taken as the individual and since it is modified or particularized, it causes incentive for certain action to do or not to do. Here, the modified universal and substance modified by qualities come to closure. Language presents beings of accomplished and of non-accomplished character. If the former character figures in by language, it is substance. Essentialists and referentialists may differ on the issue of language as the expresser but they cannot deny the philosophical significance of substance as an intelligible being**.**

Notes and References

1. Communication in our view is the accomplishment of cognition by language. It is not confined to uttering and hearing of the articulations.
2. Truth, for philosophical reflections, is that which the language expresses. It, as Helārāja puts it, is paramārthadarśanam, for which our knowledge is confined to the language and to what it expresses (Śabdapramāṇakānām hi yacchabdāha tat paramārtharūpam), Helārāja's commentary, Jāti-Samuddeśaḥ VP. 3/1 Kārikā-11.
3. Dravyābhidhānam Vyāḍi. Kātyāyana Vārtika on Aṣṭādhyāyī 1/2/64/46.
4. Sarūpāṇāmekaśeṣa eka vibhaktau, Aṣṭādhyāyī 1/2/64.
5. Ātmā vastu svabhāvaścaśarīram tattvamityapi.Dravyamityasya paryāyāstacca nityamiti smṛtam. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Chapter 2,Kārikā-1.
6. All the 18 Kārikās of Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, discusses the concept of substance as the absolute Being.
7. See, Sādhana Samuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 7,Kārikā 39-40, 42.
8. The issue of infusion of language and thought is discussed in detail, by the same author, in a paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach', JICPR, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XIV, Number 1, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 66-74.

9. Iha hi vyākraṇe na vastvārtho 'rthaḥ, apitu śabdārtho 'rthaḥ. Kriyāsamuddeśaḥ, Helārāja on Kārikā-34, VP. Part 3,Vol. 1, Chapter 8.
10. See Prakāśa Commentary of Helārāja & Ambākartrī ṭīkā of Raghunath Sharma, Varanasi 1979, on VP. 3/2/9.
11. Ekadeśena sārūpye sarva syāt sarvavedana. sarvātanā tu sārūpye jñānamajñānatām vrajet. Helārāja on Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Kārikā 9, See also Jāti samuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Kārikā 103-105.
12. A detailed account of the issue may be seen in a paper entitled 'Cognition, Being and Possibility of Expressions: A Bhartṛharian Approach', JICPR, edited by Daya Krishna, Vol. XIV, Number 1, 1996, pp. 65-73.
13. Vastūpalakṣaṇam yatra sarvanāma prayujyate. Dravyaitryucyate so'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ. Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3,Vol. 2, Chapter 4, Kārikā 3.
14. Iha sarvanāmnām dvayī gatiḥ. Vastumātrābhidhāyinaḥ kecid yathā sarvādayaḥ.Viśiṣṭavastuvācakāścānye yathānyatarādayaḥ.Tatra pūrvairdravya lakṣyate.Yathā hi-idam taditi sarvanāmapra-tyavaarśayogyam dravyam. Idamiti pratyakṣārthavācakam, taditi pramāṇantarāvagataparokṣārthābhidhānam.Helārāja on Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter 4, Kārikā 3.
15. Adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛham yathā. Gṛhītam gṛhaśabdena śuddamevābhidhīyate. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3,Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Kārikā 3.
16. Anyohyupādhirūpalakṣaṇabhūtaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyenāvacchedakaḥ. Helārāja on Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Kārikā 3.
17. Helārāja on Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP. Part 3, Vol. 2,Chapter 4, Kārikā 3.
18. Jātyādirapiviśeṣyatvena cedvivakṣitastadā dravyamiti tārthāntarīya-dravyalakṣaṇānādarāt vyādidarśanena sārvatrikī dravyapadārtha-vyavasthā siddhayati. Helārāja on Bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ, VP.Part 3,Vol. 2, Chapter 4, Kārikā 3.
19. Ākāraiśca vyavachedāt sārvārthyamavarudhyate.Yathaiva cakṣurādīnām sāmarth-yam nāḍikādibhiḥ. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Kārikā 5.

20. Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja on Jāti samuddeśaḥ, Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Kārikā 9, have beautifully interpreted the problems of universal as the import of words. A precise account of the chapter is presented by the same author in a paper entitled 'Bhartṛhari's reply to Vaiśeṣika's arguments against Universal as the import of words', Darshana International, edited by J.P. Atreya, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, pp. 22-34.
21. Jātyācchuritāyā (jātyupalakṣitāyāḥ) vyaktereva vācakatvamā. uplakṣaṇabhūtā tu jātirāśrīyata iti. Helārāja on Jāti samuddeśaḥ, Part 3, Vol. 1, Kārikā 7-8.
22. Dravyasamuddeśaḥ, Part 3, Vol. 1, Chapter 2, Kārikā 4.
23. Viṣayatvamanāpannaiḥ śabdairnārthaḥ prakāśyate. Na sattyaiva te'rthānāmagṛhitāḥ prakāśakaḥ and Ato nirjñātarūpatvāt kimāhetyabhidhīyate. Nendriyāṇām prakāśye'rthe svarūpam gṛhyate tathā.VP. Part I, Kārikā 56-57.

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Development with Dignity and Sustainability: A Study from the Perspective of Applied Philosophy

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Abstract

Development is an issue that is discussed in social sciences, mainly in economics. But from the last three decades of last century up to the present time, we find an explosion of writings and concrete proposals on development issue, which you cannot bypass by saying that it is all about economics, and I am not an economist! A minute reading of these approaches makes us understand that the discourse of development has turned interdisciplinary. Not only it includes sociology and politics (beyond economics), it has become philosophical, equally! With AmartyaSen, in particular, it goes deeply into moral philosophy. Later with AmitBhaduri and the environmentalists it accommodates many philosophical notions, like freedom, dignity and sustainability, and gradually it becomes more philosophical. But this philosophy is not traditional "arm chair" speculations, but applied philosophy. In this article of mine I, as a man of philosophy, like to take up the discourse of development from the perspective of applied philosophy. Due to space constraint, I limit myself only with the notions of capability, dignity and sustainability while delve into this discourse of development.

Keywords: Economic growth, capability, development with dignity, sustainable development.

I

Development is the process that signifies growth, progress, positive changes in different spheres of our life, along with ecological sustenance. It is not just economic growth, rather a multi-dimensional process involving restructuring and reorienting of the entire economic, social, ideologicaland ecological systems. Growth, which is mainly an economicconcept, is quantitative, while authentic development is both quantitative and qualitative. Growth generally refers to structural changes, while development refers to many positional, philosophical

and functional reorientations. Such an understanding of development has given currency to various notions, like "development as freedom" (*à la*AmartyaSen), "development with dignity" (*à la* Amit Bhaduri), "sustainable development" (*à la*Gro Harlem Brundtland), and the like.
Development is thus a comprehensive process of improving the quality of all human lives with three equally important aspects. These are:a)raising peoples' living levels, i.e. incomes and consumption, levels of food, medical services, education through relevant growth processes;b)creating conditions conducive to the flourishing of peoples' self-esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions which promote human dignity and respect;c) increasing peoples' freedom to choose by enlarging the range of their choice variables, e.g. varieties of goods and services. I shall adda fourth: d) getting rid of anthropocentric speciesism, and work for ecologically sustainable conditions for all lives, human or non-human. All these things, I shall argue, have an underlying relation with applied philosophy and environmental ethics.In what follows I like to critically exploresome pressing philosophical issues in general, and the issues of capability-cum-dignity and sustainability in particular.

II

Needless to repeat, development is a multidimensional process, and its main objective is the liberation of human potentials and arresting eco-degradation so that we can achieve the level ofstandard human and ecological conditions for flourishing. Let us start our move taking a note on so called different generations of development. Gerald M. Meier does an admirable job in identifying the differences between the firstand second generations of development economics. According to him, the first generation ofdevelopment economists had a great vision, and gave usbig theories and generalstrategies which we can calleconomic growth. On the other, the second generation was almost ethicists, supporting realismgrounded on the basic principles of neo-classical economics.(Meier2001:13-50)We can here speak of a 3rd generation of development, which has emerged with the embrace ofmultidisciplinarity, exemplified byAmartyaSen, AmitBahduri, Martha Nussbaum, and others, in widening the compass of development beyond insipid, mathematical economics.This 3rd generation of development

incorporatesparameters, like human freedom, agency, capabilities and functions, in a word, dignity (à la Bhaduri), so that we can lead a meaningful life based on our values and choices. Going beyond the idealistic, abstract conceptions, Sentakes up the Human Development and Capabilities Approach. In his*The Idea of Justice* he enquires into concrete situations, and leads a move to real measurement based on empirical findings about capabilities and functions of individual lives, rather than utilities, desire and subjective choices on the one hand, or abstract conceptions of rights and moral norms on the other.Following Sen's line of approach Bhaduri speaks of 'development with dignity'. Anyhow, followingSundarlalBahuguna's slogan "Ecology is Economics,"I like to add the 4thone, and that is ecological, and call'sustainable development', without which our exploration can never be complete. As all the different aspects are not possible to tackle with in an article like this, I will dwell upon (the Sen-Bhaduri notion of) Development with Dignity (that includes freedom and capability) and (Brubdtland-SDG notion of) Sustainable Development (minus anthropocentric speciesism).

III

To say the truth, philosophy as the basic discipline plays a fundamental role in this discourse ofdevelopment. As love of wisdom, it can instil in us a visionary look and critical approach towards the discourse of development. It examines all concepts, theories and evidences from a critical but impartial point of view, thereby unveils prejudice(s), if any, and put forward only those claims that are judged right. Moreover, philosophy as a normative discourse with consciousness of the axiological dynamism, alongwithhigh degree of knowledge and experiencesleads men to the path of liberation, be it mundane or otherwise.

Here, of course, we have to make a distinction between traditional "pure" and contemporary "applied" philosophy. Otherwise, it cannot be properly understood how the issues of development come under philosophy at all.Applied philosophy is the methodical application of those principles and concepts that we have from ongoing philosophy to a study of our practical affairs and activities, and it is to be considered*vis-à-vis*so called "pure" philosophy. It can be said that

pure philosophy is narrowly construed and discussed within the walls of departments of philosophy, within the students, scholars and teachers of philosophy of our colleges and universities.Metaphorically speaking, pure philosophy is philosophy applied to itself (i.e., to philosophical problems, such as the fundamental nature of reality, or knowledge as such), as if, philosophy for philosophy's sake, whereas applied philosophy is philosophy applied to so called "non-philosophical" existential issues of writhing humanity.

Let us refer toLippert-Rasmussenwho has introduced seven criteria (or notions or conditions) of applied philosophy, which I think truly represent this comparatively new notion. We take a halt to reproduce these conditions, as follows:

1. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it is *relevant* to some important questions of our life.
2. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it engages us in a comparatively *specific question* within some branch of philosophy, like epistemology, or moral philosophy, to which it belongs.
3. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it justifies an answer to this specific question: *what ought we to do in this particular context*.
4. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it is motivated by a strong desire of having *a certain causal effect* on the world.
5. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it involves *the use of specifically philosophical methods*beyondarm-chair reflective methods of so called 'pure' philosophy.
6. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it *is well-informed by the latest empirical evidences* provided by natural, social and human sciences.
7. Any exploration of philosophy is applied if, and only if, it is *intended for people at large, to non-philosophy audienc*e, beyond the narrow boundary of men of philosophy. (Lippert-Rasmussen 2017:3-17)

One more thing needs to be noted: Applied Philosophy is not just Applied Ethics, although ethics enjoys a more secure and established existence as a philosophical sub-discipline. There are many more issues and cruxes in our practical life which require more than just ethical norms and principles for their resolutions, and this makes room for applied philosophy, going beyond ethics. Applied philosophy gets broader in scope in including other branches of philosophy, and we may equally speak of applied metaphysics/ontology, applied epistemology, applied ethics, applied logic, applied aesthetics, applied political philosophy, and the like. No need to repeat, when the issue of development turns into thenormative domain, it specifically comes nearer to applied philosophy in general, and to applied ontology and applied ethics in particular (viz. environmental ethics), and it is clearly evident if we go through present-dayinterdisciplinary writings on development.

IV

In order to achievedevelopment in the genuine sense ofsocial ecology, sustainability, productivity, empowerment, cooperation and security, the social arrangements should be expanded to improve people's capabilities, viz. their freedom to promote or achieve valuable “beings” and “doings”. The capabilities to 'commit and act', to 'relate and attract', 'balance diversity and coherence', to 'create results' and 'to adapt and self-renew' are regarded by the capability theorists as the five core capabilitiesthat allow organisations to perform and sustain themselves in evolving environments. In this capability approach, an individual's well-being can be improved by having more choices, and as such,taking stock of the choices that an individual really has is crucial in assessing well-being.

To illustrate let us take an example fromAbhijit B. Banerjee: Improving healthy livingrequires regular hand-washing and the use of bed nets in malaria-affected areas. For this, a family needs certain material resources, like water, soap and bed nets. But having these are not sufficient. They also may need to change behaviour, and this requires a change in life styles, which can be possible by information via health education, social interaction and the media. Actual data suggest that simply providing bed nets, for example, without changing

behavioural norms yield results only in a minority of people using them. Moreover, to secure such a change may require, e.g., overriding children's preferences to sleep without bed nets (Banerjee &Duflo 2011:796-97).

It is thus evident that the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and their followers, is a broad normative framework for the propagation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements. Also, it reveals its highly interdisciplinary character, and its focus on the plural or multidimensional aspects of well-being. The approach highlights the difference between means and ends, and between substantive freedoms (capabilities) and outcomes (achieved functionings).In *Development as Freedom*, Sen says, "It is the power of reason that allows us to consider our obligations and ideals as well as our interests and advantages. To deny this freedom of thought would amount to a severe constraint on the reach of our rationality." (Sen1999:272)

In academia, it is sometimes discussed in abstract and 'pure' philosophical terms, but it becomes really meaningful when we consider it from the perspective of applied philosophy which significantly includes empirical studies (which traditional pure philosophizing ignores). This capability approach also provides the requisite theoretical foundation of human development paradigm. What we mean is that it is not just a theory that can explain poverty, inequality or well-being; but provides a tool and a framework within which to we can conceptualize and evaluate these phenomena more satisfactorily, both in qualitative and qualitative terms. Its focus on what people are effectively able to 'do' and to 'be'; that is, on their capabilitiescontrasts with traditional philosophical speculations that concentrate only on people's happiness or desire-fulfilment, or on income, expenditures, or consumption.

V

AmitBhaduri'sapproach of 'development with dignity' is not very different fromSen's capabilityapproach,rather it could be seen as its continuation.Anyhow, development with dignity presupposes the notion of dignity, so, as a man of philosophy,I like to understand what dignity is all about, and what it signifies in development discourse. We may start by saying that dignity is the right and status of a person to be

valued and respected for its own sake, and to be treated as moral person. It is an extension of the Enlightenment concept of inherent, inalienable rights, and is very much significant in morality, ethics, law and politics. The term may also be used to describe personal conduct, as when we say of someone "behaving with dignity". The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” We can also speak of different kinds of dignity, like the dignity of merit, the dignity of moral or existential stature, the dignity of identity and the universal human dignity. Anyhow, if we look at its history of usage, we could find some such following positions.

a) The notion of human dignity originates with the philosophy of 18th centurygreat thinkers,like Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, the Marquis de Lafayette and some others. When the course of founding of new liberal states, like USA was in full swing, these political sages propounded the inviolable value of individual human beings. The same followed in the process of reformation in England and France. From their propagation the notion of dignity came out as’ inviolable value of human individual.’

b) The early modern concept of dignitystems from Immanuel Kant, who in his *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals(*1785), argued that all persons have an inherent value in virtue of their rational autonomy. This value commands a distinct kind of moral respect, which we express by abiding by certain limits in our treatment of others. Thus, Kant argued that we have a categorical duty to treat persons always “as an end” and “never merely as a means.” That means, dignity is that inherent human which we deserve as free rational agents.

c) The moralized concept of dignity does not take its origin in the early modern era. It was celebrated in Giovanni Pico dellaMirandola’s*Oration on the Dignity of Man* in the year 1486as early as the Renaissance. Most interesting thing is that Pico’s oration is derived from the medieval Christian doctrine of *imago Dei*, based on Genesis 1:26 and Wisdom 2:23 of the Bible, which declares that we, the humans, are created “in the

image of God." Consequently, this likeness prepares the ground our special moral worth or status, later caught in the term 'dignity'.

d) According to the Ciceronian tradition,"dignity" originates from the Latin term *dignitas*. Although most Romans used *dignitas* only in the sense of merit, Cicero propagated a proleptic understanding of this term, which anticipated contemporary acceptance of the term in moral-political sense. (Debes2023:3-4)

The above discussion gives us the rationale of human dignity that helps us to understand Bhaduri's stance on development. Bhaduri in his *Development with Dignity* argues in favour mainly of economic, social and political dignity.He contends that the development with dignity can be made possible by solving theunemployment problem. He also gives feasible guidelines or pathways for attaining in the social scenario of the countries, like India. Pointing to the follies in the existing economic structure, he comes to assert thatincreased prosperity can only be achieved when people are valued as self-governing agents. It is his conviction that social orders that recognize autonomy and human dignity can unleash enormous productive energy. If we consider it from the perspective ofIndian Constitution, we can understand that the right to live with human dignity is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21. It means that every person has the inviolable right to live a dignified life without discriminations. They are entitled to claim equal respect from the state as well as from other persons.Bhaduri envisages, all citizens of India could live with economic, social and political dignity if we execute the development policies with sincerety.As already said, Bhaduri's approach follows Sen's capability theory on the main.Still, one point may here be added that the former gives more importance on unique self-perception of individuals, on quality of self-dignity, while the latter puts more importance on fruitful capacities.

VI

We now turn to the question of sustainability in development discourse. As economic growth in the name of development had already made a havoc on the environment, the environmentalistscame to suggestin the 1980sthat unless we abandon further move ofdevelopmental works, we have to face eco-catastrophes in near future.But the crucial issue was, and still, is, if we stop economic development, how can we eradicate poverty, especially in the developing and under-developed countries?At this juncture, a group of thinkers, including some statesmen, have come to suggest that developmental works may be pursued but in such a way that it remains compatible with the sustaining capacity of the natural environment. This model of development goes by the name 'sustainable development'.This idea of sustainability comes to the fore through the publication of the report of International Union for the Conservation of Natureprepared by Gro Harlem Brundtland (the then Prime Minister of Norway). The Brundtland report (1987) defines 'sustainable development' as 'meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.' To make it happen they initially have 12 prescriptions as follows:

1. Slow the rate of human population.
2. Make agriculture sustainable.
3. Reduce poverty, inequality and debt of the developing world.
4. Protect forests and habitats.
5. Protect oceans and coastal areas.
6. Protect fresh water quality.
7. Increase energy efficiency.
8. Develop renewable energy resources.
9. Limit green-house gases.
10. Protect the stratospheric ozone layer.
11. Reduce wastes.
12. Shifting military training to sustainable development.

Obviously, this sustainability is both inter-generational and intra-generational. Anyhow,such a sustainability thesis encompasses three main goals: i) ethical treatment of human and no-human nature; ii)

initiatives for meeting human needs based on technology that are ecologically responsible, and iii) adequate attitude, norm and policy towards natural eco-systems and the earth's regenerative processes that would conserve the capacities of these systems to endure and function indefinitely. From applied philosophical perspective, to be more specific, from the perspective of environmental ethics and deep ecology, we must serve our duty to preserve the sustainable capacity of the natural environment. We can do this

(a) by addressing the ethical aspects of the trade-offs between intergenerational human aspects and intra-generational requirements in a world of scarce resources;

(b) by drawing attention to unsustainable human practices by formulating systematic sanctions for anthropogenic activities directly implicated in loss of non-human flora and fauna, as well as different eco-systems; and

(c) by articulating adequate norm and theory of value reflective of man-nature relation.

But this environmental ethics is still vitiated with anthropocentric speciesism, and unless and until we get rid of this narrowness of thinking and doing, and take instead a holistic eco-centric worldview, no real sustainability is possible. If we take back-look, we will find that the programme of sustainable development has been thought of in speciesistterms. It may here be said that the Rio de Janeiro declaration puts human beings at the centerof concerns for sustainable development. And as to science and technology, it may be contended that they are not completely value-neutral as we think; science and technology can bespeciesist too, and give selective focus on human values and interests. The point is not that we have to radically purge science of those values, but have to understand and justify developmental values in any specific contexts waiting for actions. And we must attempt to adjust them when they become maladaptive with our short-sighted greedy behaviour. We have to make a distinction between genuine need and greed, going beyond consumer culture.

We must remain prepared to changeourselves, ourlife-styles, where needed, and adopt a holistic‘spiritual’ world-view.Such holistic ecocentrism expresses itself in Deep Ecology (1973) of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, although the first ecocentric theory, viz. theLand Ethic, was propounded by Aldo Leopold in 1949.Also there are Lovelock’s Gaia theory and Rolston-III’s Systemic Holism, which are equally eco-centric world views. Anyhow, here in formulating our development policies we may take a look on Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology Platform, a globally active ecological movement/platform. A set of ideologically explanatory but practically feasible principles is formulated by themto unite all the environmentalists working in different parts of the world under one umbrella of the Deep Ecology Platform. To understand what is actually needed, let us take a look on the Platform principles (Naess 2010:111-12):

a) The flourishing of human and non-human living beings has intrinsic worth. The worth of non-human beings is independent of their usefulness for human purposes.

b) Richness and variety of life forms on earth, including forms of human cultures, have intrinsic worth.

c) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity, except to satisfy vital needs.

d) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population.

e) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

f) The foregoing points indicate that changes are necessary in the dominant way humans until now have behaved in their relation to the earth as a whole. The changes will, in a fundamental manner, affect political, social, technological, economic, and ideological structures.

g) The ideological change in the rich countries will mainly be that of increased appreciation life quality rather than high material standard of

living, in this way preparing [the way for] a global state of ecologically sustainable development.

h) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation, directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes by non-violent means

Anyhow, in the UN Millennium Declaration of September 2000, leaders from 189 nations embraced a vision for the world in which developed and developing countries would work in partnership for the betterment of all. And if we go through these policies, we can find some reflections of these eco-principles. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that 192 United Nations member states, and at least 23 international organizations, have agreed to achieve by the year 2015. They include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as AIDS, and developing a global partnership for development. "Ensure environmental sustainability" is the 7th goal in the Declaration of United Nations Millennium Development Goals (September 6-8, 2000), and advises us to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs.

VII

But a deeper philosophical reflection and action is needed to move forward. It is not unusual that the humans are accorded some priority in value-distribution scheme, as morality is a matter of choice and value, and humans are the only evaluator and creator of value. This form of anthropocentricity seems inseparable from any moral discourse. And in order to determine our goal, and to move forward with sustainable development, this aspect of 'perspectival' anthropocentricity is admissible. But that does not mean that we have to be speciesist. Rather we can overcome that type of moral reasoning that discriminates on the basis of species-membership. Non-human species, viz. flora and fauna, too, deserve moral treatment. The question is, how can you do that? Overcoming speciesism, as a matter of course, requires a commitment

to consistency and non-arbitrariness in moral reasoning. (Hayward 1997:49-63)

We should keep in mind thatexisting patterns of development are based on the madness and inhumanity of crony capitalism, our reluctance to adopt ecocentric world-view and our arrogance not to change our life-styles as and when ecology demands.If we are really serious in keeping this (only) Earth for our future generations, we have to extendour commitment to intrinsic/inherent values beyond *homo sapiens sapiens*, and should carry on developmental projects with dignity, dignity of all that are in our eco-systems, including members of non-human species. Adopting a holistic and balanced eco-centric worldview and behaving responsibly is today's clarion call.I conclude with Gandhiji's oft-quoted assertation: "We have enough for our need, but not for our greed".

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Understanding Artificial Intelligence through Phenomenology

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Artificial intelligence (AI) was developed with the aim to solve problems for humans, however, overtime, it has been developed to such an extent that it is being suggested that artificial intelligence will one day replace humans in workplaces. However, in all this we tend to forget that humans are after all the ones who have created artificial intelligence agents (AIA)[1] and most importantly, artificial intelligence agents are "artificial" at the end of the day. Lastly, humans are the most complex beings to have ever existed. Humans are not only complex beings when it comes to their physical body, but also when we consider human thoughts. Most articles have tried to focusonaconnectionbetweenartificialintelligenceagentsandhumansbutin thisarticle through 'phenomenology' we will try to show a disconnection between artificial intelligence agents and humans. As the name suggests, phenomenology is putting humans' consciousness and thought process in the centre when studying the 'phenomena' in/of the world. Human's thoughts and its complexity will be best understood when we study it with the help of phenomenology. This complexity will show that even though AIAs are more direct in their thought process, they are still lacking in other aspects such as 'subjectivity', 'inter-subjectivity', 'qualia' and understanding of time that is past, present and future which then leads to concepts-pre-reflective stage and anticipation.

Subsequently, this article will answer questions such as – are artificial intelligence agents superior to humans? Is there a connection between artificial intelligence agents and humans?

Keywords: Artificial intelligence agents, Human thought, Experience, Consciousness, Phenomenology, IQ, EQ, SQ, AQ.

1. INTRODUCTION

Overview of AI and Human Workplaces:

It has been an ongoing study since history to simulate human thinking into symbolic AI and this can be seen in the Turing Test, Marvin Minsky's work on digital computers to inspire neural networks in 1954 and Newell and Simon's commitment to the idea of 'complex information processing' intended to model human thinking.

Alan Mathison Turing - "The Turing Test":

Alan Turing proposed in 1950 the question 'whether machines can think?' and this was popularly known as the 'Turing Test' as it was a test to see if machines (and later other putative-minded entities) have the ability to think and have intelligence like that of humans. In order to show this, he described the imitation game. Corresponding to the imitation game, it involves a human, a machine, and an interrogator. With the aim of determining if machines can think or not, an interrogator is in another room and poses certain questions to another human and a machine, and based on their responses to the same questions, the interrogator will have to decipher which one is human and which one is a machine.

The term 'artificial intelligence' was not coined until 1956 by John McCarthy, which was used to mean 'intelligent machines', and so, taking into consideration that the 1950s were a period when AI was still in its latent stage, A.M. Turing did not give up on the idea that machines (prevalently known as AI now) can think. He believed that there would be a time when AI would be developed to such an extent that it would pass the Turing test.

"I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to program computers with a storage capacity of about 109 to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than a 70 percent chance of making the right identification

after five minutes of questioning. The original question, "Can machines think?" I believe it to be too meaningless to deserve discussion"(Turning,1950).

Dr. Marvin Minsky – Inspiration for Neural Networks:

Dr. Marvin Minsky, in 1951, was the pioneer who created the first random-wired neural network learning machine. For Dr. Minsky, there is not much difference between a machine and a human brain since he believed that neurons are just semiautonomous relays in our brain. However, he does give credit to humans for being programmers to machines, and this is when machines help out humans when any work gets too complicated and difficult, especially in cases where we have to go through a large set of data. He therefore encouraged people to learn and understand the purpose of AI. In order for a machine to be able to solve problems regarding large, complicated data, Dr. Minsky suggested the five-step path for AI.

"A computer can do, in a sense, only what it is told to do. But even when we do not know exactly how to solve a certain problem, we may program a machine to search through a large space of solution attempts. Unfortunately, when we write a straightforward program for such a search, we usually find the resulting process to be enormously inefficient. With pattern recognition techniques, efficiency can be greatly improved by restricting the machine to using its methods only for the kinds of attempts for which they are appropriate. And with learning, efficiency is further improved by directing searches in accordance with earlier experiences. By actually analyzing the situation using what we call planning methods, the machine may obtain a really fundamental improvement by replacing the originally given search with a much smaller, more appropriate exploration. Finally, in the section on induction, we consider some rather more global concepts of how one might obtain intelligent machine behavior."(Turing,1950)

Dr. Minsky was someone who had confidence that AIA could achieve so much more than what it was programmed to do, but he also

pushed human intelligence, and hence, in his work on AI, he has consistently put consciousness to the test. He considered that AI shouldn't be put to the test based on the intelligence of humans; instead, it should surpass human intelligence. In an interview, when asked if the Turing test was too human-specific to evaluate the intelligence of artificial intelligence, Dr. Minsky said the following:

"The Turing test is a joke. It is sort of about saying a machine would be intelligent if it did things that an observer would say must be done by a human. So, it was suggested by Alan Turing as one way to evaluate machines, but he had never intended it to be the way to decide whether a machine was really intelligent."(Minsky, as cited in McCorduck, 2004, p. 143)

There is no doubt when we listen to Dr. Minsky or read his work on AI that he had a lot of confidence in AI, and so consequently, he urged people to learn AI and make use of it as AI will alter the society in which we live now.

Allen Newell, Herbert A. Simon and J.C Shaw- 'Complex InformationProcessing':

When computers were first developed in 1941, the link between human intelligence and machines was something that wasn't explored. A step towards modern AI was made with Logic Theorist, namely designed by Newell and Simon in 1955.

"The Logic Theorist was a computer program that could prove theorems in symbolic logic from Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. This was perhaps the first working program that simulated some aspects of people's ability to solve complex problems. The Logic Theorist and other cognitive simulations developed by Newell and Simon in the late 1950s had a large impact on the newly developing field of information-processing (or cognitive) psychology" (Newell & Simon, 1956).

Their contribution to AI was mainly along the lines that a

machine could solve problems in ways that humans could not, or, in other words, AI was a tool to accelerate human problem-solving. Humans, without a doubt, had certain problems that AI could not solve, and that is when AI came in, and this specifically fascinated Newell. Keeping the 'problem-solving machine' in the centre, Simon and his PhD student, Newell, developed the Logic Theorist program, which was the first successful AI program that was developed. When it was developed, it was able to "compare the goal state (the statement to prove) with the current state and perform one of a small set of basic operations in order to reduce the difference between the two states." (Newell & Simon, 1956).The logic theorist program solved problems just like humans did, that is, by solving a problem using the 'means-ends' analysis, and this was both simple and general. Since this program gained success, Simon and Newell, along with Shaw, programmed another AI program called the 'General Problem Solver', and this was amazingly helpful in solving well-defined problems.

Their contribution to the AI world in its initial stage was so vital that their names, over time, have become synonymous with the computational theory of mind along with Jerry Fodor. They believed that the human mind is a computer since it is the mind that performs thinking, so in the same way, a physical computer (which carries out the physical symbol hypothesis) isa sufficient and necessary condition of thinking. However, Newell and Simon differed from other computational theorists of mind on the grounds that neither of them explained motor or sensory processes in computational terms.

2. AI and Human-beings

Over time, AI has been developed so much that it is being said that AI will take over most of the work done by humans. This is mostly tedious work, such as data entry, manufacturing jobs, research, customer service, etc. Humans are doubtless fallible and prone to many uncertainties, such as sickness, family obligations, etc., but humans cannot be replaced. The reason is simple:

"When you look at AI, there's this nonstop need for training, for data,

for maintenance, and for taking care of all the exceptions that are happening. How do we monitor AI? How do we train it? How do we make sure that AI's not running amok?" (Minsky, as cited in McCorduck,2004, p. 258).

AI cannot be left to do the work on their own. Surely, there will be new jobs created, but to say that AI will one day be developed to take over humans seems too far-fetched. Human beings have a distinct nature to them that is needed in public or social relations and cannot be filled by AI, which, at the end of the day, is inanimate. Understanding Phenomenology

Trying to understand human beings and how they function is never easy. The workings of AI may seem complicated, but there is no doubt that the human mind and body are far more complicated entities. During the 20th century, a study was started to understand consciousness as experience from the first-person point of view, and this was called phenomenology. Phenomenology was largely developed by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. To give a brief overview of phenomenology:

“"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions. Phenomenological issues of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in recent philosophy of mind" (Smith, 2007, p. 15)”

The concepts used in phenomenology will help in understanding the distinct features of human beings, and this will also show how AI and humans are different from each other. These concepts are not exhaustive in showing the distinction between humans and AI, and they are also not comparable.

Consciousness and AI defining Consciousness:

Consciousness is the adverb of the noun conscious, which implies “awake and aware of one’s surroundings' '. No matter how much we “consciously” experience the various things around us, when it comes to defining the same, we realize it is not an easy task to think about or conceptualize “consciousness itself." Thus, the word “consciousness" has etymological ties toone’s ability to know and perceive and should not be confused with conscience, which has a more moral connotation of knowing when one has done or is doing something wrong.Through consciousness, one can have knowledge of the external world or one’s own mental states. The primary contemporary interest lies more in the use of the expressions “x is conscious” or “x is conscious of y." The difference between these two ways of referring to consciousness is that the former is consciousness in isolation from its content, and the latter isconsciousness as consciousness of something that has to do with the world. The problem of consciousness has been captured in the words of Smith; as he says, Lately, philosophers and scientists have been looking for the mind in all the wrong places. Physicalists of all stripes have focused primarily on the physical conditions of consciousness, from neural activity to computational function.

Meanwhile, humanists, historians, postmodernists, and culture critics have looked primarily at the cultural conditions of our discourse, as if consciousness did not exist in its own right but was “theorized” in a cultural tradition of phenomenology or scientific or humanistic discourse. Obviously, we have much to learn from the empirical sciences about bosons, atoms, organisms, evolution, and the brain, as well as from humanistic observations in art, literature, cultural history, and criticism. But this learning is informed by further disciplines that are not "empirical," "naturalistic,” or indeed “humanistic” in the conventional sense. If we are to understand the mind, we must understand more clearly the philosophical disciplinesof phenomenology and ontology, because these disciplines define the place of mind in aworld further detailed by the scientific disciplines of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and quantum physics, as well as the humanistic disciplines of literary, artistic, and cultural criticism. The concept of consciousness has been captured in the words of Nagel

describing consciousness as "what it is like to be something" (Nagel, 1974, p. 436).

This is perhaps the most fundamental and commonly used notion of consciousness, as captured by Nagel's famous words. "When I am in a conscious mental state, there is something that it is like for me to be in that state from a subjective or first-person point of view. When, for example, I am smelling a rose or having a conscious visual experience, there is something it "seems" or "feels" like from my perspective.An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world through its (eco-locatory) senses. There is something it is like to be a conscious creature, whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or a tree. This is the primary notion of phenomenal consciousness that we will like to understand in this research article. These kinds of conscious states are called phenomenal or qualia states. As Nagel puts forward this idea of phenomenal consciousness, we cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it is like. For example, we may assign general types of experience on the basis of the animal's structure and behavior. Thus, we describe bats as a form of three-dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have, in each case, a specific subjective character, which is beyond our ability to conceive. And if there's conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us."(Nagel, 1974)

Taking a clue from Nagel's above passage, we can say that consciousness, or being in a state of consciousness, constitutes the following characteristics:

- An individual as being conscious can undergo feelings, emotions, sensations, etc. In other words one who is capable of experiencing something, be it sensation, emotions or perceptual experience.
- Experiencing a particular thing is unique to one. It is unique in this sense that the moment one claims to be aware of something or knows that consciousness is present; one knows that he or she is

experiencing something, or it is his or her experience.

- The uniqueness of consciousness cannot be shared by anybody else. This unshareable aspect is the subjective dimension of consciousness. When one is not conscious orwhen consciousness is absent it is true that one is not experiencing anything.

- Now this unshareable, subjective and unique experience constitutes the phenomenal content of consciousness.
- Elaborating it further we can say that whenever consciousness is present, phenomenal content is also present. And whenever consciousness is absent phenomenal content is absent. This phenomenal consciousness is the subjective aspect which is unique in itself. It is that aspect which cannot be shared with anybody. It is also called the qualia or properties of consciousness. • For any phenomenally conscious experience E there is something it is like to have E.

Consciousness is thus that aspect of the mental phenomenon that is recognizable yet vague, common yet inexplicable, and familiar yet mysterious. This feature of consciousness is what makes it an interesting and motivating subject to study, examine, and investigate. Thus, consciousness has been variously defined as subjective experience, awareness, the ability to experience feelings, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, or as the executive control symbol of the mind. Despite the difficulty of arriving at a unanimous definition, many philosophers believe that there is a basic underlying aspect of consciousness that is agreed upon by nearly all of them.

Defining Consciousness: Consciousness ‘of’ Each mental state or experience of, for example,physical objects, events, our own selves, other persons, numbers, propositions, etc. is a representation of something other than itself and so gives one a sense of something. The following passage in Smith and McIntyre echoes the importance of intentionality in Husserlian philosophy: Intentionality is a central concept in the philosophy of mind and Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, Husserl calls intentionality "the fundamental property of consciousness" and the "principle theme of phenomenology" (Husserl, 1913/1982, p. 53).

Husserl's intentionality includes not only the actual objects of the world but also the objects that characterize our fantasies, predictions, recollections, etc. Both are intended, transcendent, and extra-mental objects. The only difference between the two is whether the referent exists in reality or does not exist. This representational character of mind or consciousness, its being "of" or "about something," is called intentionality.

So, Husserl states, If we imagine a consciousness prior to all experience, it may very well have the same sensations as we have. But it will intuit no things and no events pertaining to things; it will perceive no trees and no houses, no flight of birds, nor any barking of dogs. 12 One important corollary of the mind-world relationship is that our mind does not become intentional through external influence, and it does not lose its intentionality if the external object ceases to exist. Intentionality being an intrinsic feature of consciousness, its openness to being is inherent in it; its essential object-directedness is what marks it as an intentional structure with its inherent subject, i.e., being directed toward an object structure. When philosophers talk about phenomenological experience, they are drawing attention to the phenomenally conscious aspects of experience, i.e., to any qualia associated with the experience. The need for accepting phenomenal content is significant when one talks about the subjective feel, or more so when one looks into the broader horizon of the debate in philosophy of mind. The need to accept phenomenal consciousness becomes necessary when one tries to study consciousness the way physicalists do. No matter how much empirical study the neurologists or the physicalists may do, the fact remains that there are some truths about human mental experience that cannot be explained by the physicalist's theory. To cite an example, a blind man can be taught from childhood all the propositional knowledge in the physicalist theory about color and mental experience. The whole exercise becomes difficult when the teacher tries to explain to the blind student how it feels when one sees a certain color, say yellow, or when one has certain raw feelings of mental experience. The physicalistsmay study the neural firings and movements of neurons in the brain during a certain mental experience, while the other physiologists may do so by empirical means. But what it is to see the color yellow will be

incomplete and futile from this physicalist's point of view. No amount of their study would be sufficient to objectively capture and study the raw feelings and share them with the blind student. Thus, the argument for the need for 'consciousness-in-itself' can be understood when we realize that scientific or objective study alone cannot give us the knowledge of all that is to be known. There will still remain a mystery: the mystery of subjectivity, which cannot be understood or calculated in objective terms.

Intentionality in phenomenology can be understood as the directedness of our mental states, while consciousness, in simple words, is to have experienced or be conscious of a phenomenon's state, such as the color and shape of a thing. Here, the person is conscious of his or her phenomenon state; this can be in terms of the material things that are surrounding them, while what happens in the mental state, such as what we think of or about something, is referred to as intentionality.

When talking about intentionality, we answer questions like, What are we thinking of? And what are we thinking about? Here, the mental state is thinking about something or of something, and so there is a directedness towards an object or state of affairs. For example, humans think about their future and what they need or want in it. Edmund Husserl also extended the meaning of intentionality to objects that go beyond perceptual experiences, while Tyler Burge narrowed the meaning of intentionality to accommodate only objects in theobjective realm. Anyway, broadly, intentionality is what the mental state is directed towards, and this will also include things that a person has experienced in the past or present. On the other hand, consciousness is the experience of something or to be 'conscious' of the things around us, and to be conscious of something is to have emotions too, unlike that of a leaf falling, but when a person falls from a branch of a tree, that would be a conscious state of falling, hus leading to one having an experience.

Now, considering these two concepts with AI, how will this apply to AI? AI can be said to have an intention, in the sense that it has

some directedness or an aim for which it needs to work. Every artificial intelligence is a machine, designed and made to serve some purpose. It may lack a mental state like that of humans and the idea of past, present, and future, but it is certainly made to have a directedness towards an object with the purpose of fulfilling a task. But then again, AI lacks consciousness. It doesn't have the experience of the things around them like human beings do. AI can then be called an 'inanimate intelligent machine' whose sole purpose is to solve problems and which lacks emotions and thought.

QUALIA AND AI

Each person has a mental state with an individual subjective character, and this individual undergoes many mental states that lead them to have an experience of the things aroundthem.

"*Philosophers often use the term 'qualia' (singular 'quale') to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia*."[1]

One can understand qualia as a 'qualitative character' of our conscious state. C.I. Lewis introduced the term qualia, meaning sensory, to the mind before conceptualization. There have been debates surrounding the concept of qualia, "whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head." Itcan be said that qualia stands at the center of the mind-body problem. However, understanding qualia in its broad sense, which is the introspective, accessible phenomenal aspect of our mental lives, it can be said that AI lacks qualia. AI does not have the capacity to perceive, let alone mental states. This lack of introspection also deprives AI of the capacity for retention in terms of being non-reflective and potential with regard to having anticipation for the future.

These capacities are important because they differentiate between a person and a mere machine. Every person has these capacities in them, and they use them, consciously or unconsciously, in

their everyday lives. Human beings are experiential in nature, and hence, they choose to retain some experience, which in most cases will benefit them in the future, which evolves them to grow, thus having the 'potentiality'.

SUBJECTIVITY AND AI

Phenomenology has centred on the first-person perspective or the first person's experience. Here, an individual's experience holds key importance because the source of meanings and values is derived from the lived experience of humans. The underlying impression here is subjectivity. Every person has his or her own experiences, and this enables every person to have different meanings of life and of things around them, so there is subjectivity to meanings while also maintaining object-dependency. Deriving the meaning of subjectivity from the concepts of intentionality and consciousness, we can grasp that subjectivity can also mean introspective self-knowledge.

Amongst these many subjectivities, there is inter-subjectivity. In a sphere where people interact and share ideas and knowledge, this humbles us to know that every person thinks differently depending on their respective experience. Phenomenology doesn't undermine any person's experience as irrelevant; instead, in the midst of inter-subjectivity, one is encouragedto be empathetic and aware of the other person. There is a sense of temporal awareness and spatial awareness not only when there is engagement with the 'other' but also at the 'intentionality' or introspective level. Now, comprehending subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the world of AI can seem like a failure. There is no doubt that there are many types and kinds of AI out there, but in the sensein which subjectivity is understood, one cannot place AI to have subjectivity, and this is mainly because AI lacks mental states, a state that gives rise to introspection and alsoexperience of the things around them. Like humans, AI too has an objective, but the way humans and AI work to achieve an objective is different. Humans experience and interact with things and people around them; this can sometimes help in achieving a goal, or it can also be a hindrance. In either way, humans grow and learn, while AI doesn't have the capacity to grow and learn in the same way that humans do.

There is scope for self-growth and self-learning in humans because human beings interact and have experience with the things and people around them, but an AI cannot experience the things around them like humans do. A person's experience involves mental and physical interaction, which then gives rise to emotions, while AI experiences can be understood as 'zombie experiences', where there is only physical interaction and no mental state, hence no emotions. "*The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or "horizonal" awareness), awareness of one's own experience (self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness of one's movement), purpose or intention in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular culture).*"[2]

Human beings live a complex and intricate life not only because they are physically complex beings but also because they live a life that has to be in tune with one's own state of mind andat the same time interact with people around them while also having a goal(s) to achieve. A person also has many roles to play; for instance, a mother is also someone's wife, someone's daughter, someone's sister, someone's employer or student, etc., AI, on the other hand, only plays one role, a role that it is designed or created to perform; hence, we can say that human beings or persons are 'complex beings' while AI are 'artificial intelligent agents' or 'inanimate intelligent beings'.

Conclusion

In recent times, it has been debated whether the role is essentially subjective. The ideas of IQ, EQ, SQ, and AQ are firmly ingrained in the way people think, conduct, and perform in their daily acts. With

regard to AI, many issues are raised regarding the nature of cognitive ability, awareness, and technological capabilities. Here's a closer look at these ideas in regards to AI and the difficult problem of consciousness:

Adapting the Adversity Quotient (AQ) for AI

1. Assessing AQ:
   - Definition: The adversity quotient (AQ) is an individual's resilience, persistence, and ability to handle challenges and setbacks, demonstrating theircapacity to handle adversity effectively.
   - Human Aspect: AQ refers to the emotional and psychological responses to stress and difficulties, which are deeply connected to human experience andconsciousness.

2. AI and adversity:
   - Simulating Resilience: AI systems can enhance performance through simulated resilience, enabling them to handle errors, adapt to unexpectedsituations, and learn from failures.
   - SWOT: AI's resilience is not a result of emotional or conscious response to adversity but rather a result of algorithmic adjustments and error correction,unlike human resilience.

3. Mechanical Mimicking vs. Phenomenal Experience:
   - Algorithmic Adaptation: AI systems can use adaptive algorithms and preset processes to replicate solidity. An AI might be built, for instance, to effectivelyhandle unexpected inputs or missing data.
   - Absence of Conscious Experience: In contrast to humans, artificial intelligence is not aware of stress, failures, or misfortune.

As such of their intricate physical and mental makeup, as well as

their many roles—such as those of mother, wife, daughter, sister, employer, or student—humans lead complicated lives. Humans are "complex beings, constantly juggling multiple responsibilities and relationships," whereas artificial intelligence (AI) simply has one duty that it is meant to execute. Conversely, artificial intelligence (AI) is built to carry out certain jobs effectively without theneed for emotional or interpersonal relationships. This distinction emphasises the distinct qualities and constraints of AI and humans in many spheres of existence. AI, on the other hand, is capable of doing jobs with accuracy and efficiency with great ease, supporting people in many facets of their lives. Though they vary in certain ways, both AI and humans develop civilization via their unique capabilities and functions. This complexity adds depth and richness to human interactions and experiences that AI cannot replicate," while AI are "artificial intelligent agents" or "inanimate intelligent beings." Therefore, humans are "complex beings," while AI are "artificial intelligent agents" or "inanimate intelligent beings." Humans possess emotions, creativity, and empathy that enable them to form deep connections and meaningful relationships with others. On the other hand, AI lacks the ability to truly understand and experience emotions, limiting its capacity to engage in authentic human interactions.Regardless of how powerful artificial intelligence agents are currently, there is no chance they will outperform humans. AI still lacks the ability to experience the environment in the same way that humans do, as well as the capacity for thoughts and emotions.This is evident when we discuss quotients such as emotional quotient and social quotient-adversity quotient. We attempted to demonstrate how humans are complex entities, both physically and cognitively, via the lens of phenomenology. David Chalmers defines the "hard problem of consciousness" as the question of why and how subjective experiences occur. AI, in its current state, does not approach the hard problem of consciousness because it lacks subjective experiences. It operates based on data processing and algorithms, without any form of conscious awareness or inner experience.So, saying that AI is superior to humans would be wrong, and because there is no common ground between AI and humans other than having a purpose (completing a task), we cannot draw a relationship between the two.

[1]**ENDNOTES**

Artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial intelligence agents (AIA) will be used to mean the same thing.

1 Tye, 2018

2 Smith, 2018b

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Integral Yoga of Śrī Aurobindo: A Philosophical Analysis

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Abstract

Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy is influenced by ancient Indian philosophers, particularly Yoga philosophy and Advaita Vedānta. He reorganized and reanalyzed these philosophical thoughts, initiating a new coherent way of thinking. Yoga, a significant Indian spiritual philosophy, is derived from MaharṣiPatañjali who did not use the term 'yoga' in a general sense. Instead, he defined yoga as 'attachment to the Divine Being', which can be transcendental, mundane, or deeply personal.

Śrī Aurobindo's *Pūrṇayoga* or Integral Yoga aims to initiate divine life on earth through the restoration of the entire human race. *Pūrṇayoga* is not possible through *Rājayoga, Haṭhayoga, Karmayoga, Jñānayoga,* or *Bhaktiyoga*, as they have limitations and not infinite potential. *Pūrṇayoga* is governed by the will of the benevolent divine power, and a person who attains inner life by being introverted can only control external consciousness and attain inner silence on the path of *Pūrṇayoga*. This allows them to break through the barriers of narrowness and pass into the divine life.

Key words: Śrī Aurobindo, Yoga Philosophy, Advaita Vedānta, *Samādhis, Pūrṇayoga*, Divine Life, Indian Philosopher, Spiritual Philosophy, Integral Yoga.

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Śrī Aurobindo synthesized philosophy, literature, religion, and psychology in his writings and also developed a vision of human progress and spiritual evolution. Śrī Aurobindo's philosophical practice and his concept of *Pūrṇayoga* are indicative of a new horizon in the history of contemporary Indian philosophical practice. His philosophy is influenced by ancient Indian philosophers, especially

Yoga philosophy and Advaita Vedānta. By reorganizing and reanalyzing these philosophical thoughts, he initiated a new coherent way of thinking in his philosophy. While Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy is called prophetic philosophy on the one hand, his philosophy is also called *Pūrṇādvaita* on the other hand. But his full-dualism is different from Śaṅkara's monism.

The general meaning of the word 'Yoga' is to join. One of the most influential philosophies of Indian spiritual philosophy is Yoga philosophy. MaharṣiPatañjali is the originator of this philosophy. He accepted the existence of God in his philosophy but did not mean 'joining with God' by 'yoga.' Regarding the signs of yoga, he says, *"Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ,"*i.e. Yoga is the inhibition of the mind's activity. *Citta*means intellect, ego and mind - these three concepts together. When this mind becomes associated with an object and assumes the form of a subject, then this taking of the object form of the mind is called'cittavṛtti'. Citta is associated with events through senses and the mind and takes on the form of events. *Ātman* is pure consciousness by nature; this consciousness does not change. Therefore, the spirit that is reflected in the mind, is disturbed. That soul, because of ignorance, considers itself to be the knower, doer and consumer of everything. This is called closed state of soul. In this state the soul is afflicted by the five afflictions. Liberation of the soul from such a condition requires the cessation of thought. When the mind is completely suppressed, the soul becomes void. Such a state of mind is called*'samādhi'* or 'Yoga'.Again this state is also called as *'mukti'* or the state of *'kaivalya.'*

Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhist philosophy, spoke of *nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa* is the liberation of the soul. This is a state beyond happiness, sorrow, and desires, where one can attain immense peace and eternal happiness. After attaining *Nirvāṇa*, there is no more birth. Therefore, attaining *nirvāṇa*is the only way to get rid of suffering by preventing *karmic* rebirth.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, "*Brahman* is true, and the world is false."Śaṅkarācārya's*BrahmanSaccidānandaSvarūpa* is never as

empty as Buddha's *nirvāṇa*. Yet, a similarity can be noticed between the views of Śaṅkarācārya and Buddha. Śaṅkarācārya also speaks of merging with *Brahman* or realizing the identity of the soul with *Brahman* at the end of life. However, to reach that state, one must realize that life is just chasing mirages and the world is merely a creation of false illusions. Although Śaṅkarācārya accepted *jīvanmukti*, a state of liberation while still alive, a free man is not bound by the illusion of the world. He lives an unattached and detached life and performs selfless actions for the benefit of sentient beings. On the other hand, the liberation that comes after the destruction of the body is called *videhamukti*. The gross and subtle bodies of the freed man are destroyed and the *puruṣa*videha is liberated when the active *karma* is exhausted.

Rāmānuja accepted both the *Jīva* and the world. These two are attributes of the Supreme Lord, dependent upon the Supreme Lord. According to Rāmānuja, the ultimate goal of human life is to attain liberation from *saṃsāra* and this life and reach God.

In Indian philosophy, the practice of yoga means the pursuit of miraculous powers. However, it is not easy for everyone. But the yoga that Śrī Aurobindo spoke about is possible for everyone to follow. That is why he did not give special importance to *Prāṇāyāma, Āsana*, or various types of breathing and body exercises in Patañjali Yoga philosophy. Besides, he did not prioritize chanting mantras. According to Śrī Aurobindo, 'Yoga' is union with God, which may be transcendental, mundane, or purely personal or all three together. Hence his Yoga is called *Pūrnayoga*. This complete yoga is the yoga of the heart. All that is required is some discipline, spiritual consciousness, and purity, which are easily practicable for all.[1]

According to various philosophers of Indian philosophy, yoga usually awakens one's conscience and thereby separates the *anātma* from the soul. But Śrī Aurobindo did not believe in this separation; he believed in the elevation of the soul to the soul. In addition, unlike many philosophers, he also believed that the goal of yoga is to

illuminate the body with the light of the soul without completely abolishing the body.

Various spiritual persons believe that when a person attains the state of *samādhi* through yoga, all waking consciousness disappears, and all ties with the surrounding world are severed. But Śrī Aurobindo believed that connection with the divine is possible only through our awakened consciousness. According to Śrī Aurobindo, yoga is never the yoga of rejection of life; rather, it is the approach of the seeker to the Supreme God.

The aim of Śrī Aurobindo's *sādhana* is to realize one's identity with the Supreme Being, become empowered with infinite power, and awaken the latent divinity within man. He thought that in this way, the entire human race would become the possessor of divine life.

According to Śaṅkarācārya, *Brahman* is true, the world is false. But according to Śrī Aurobindo, according to Brahmasatya, the world is true; falsehood is only our attachment to the world through pride. So attachment must be given up, and the desire to gain *karma* must also be completely given up. All *karma* and pride must be surrendered to God. The main ideal of Bhagavad Gītā is also to renounce ignorance and egoism and perform selfless actions. Vedic ṚṣiRāva similarly advocated the ideology of *Karma Yoga*. Śrī Aurobindo believed that it was through this kind of sacrifice and self-sacrifice that God would incarnate among men, and it was in this effort that he pursued his life-long pursuit. This surrender to the Supreme is the main goal of Śrī Aurobindo's *Pūrṇayoga.*

The word *'māyā'* has two meanings. According to the first meaning, *Māyā*is a form of energy, which is constructive and creative. And according to the second meaning, *Māyā*is the method of creating illusion. ŚrīAurobindo did not accept *Māyā* in the second sense. If he had accepted *Māyā* in the second sense, the whole world would have been deluded. He did not lie to the world. In that case, it is clear that Śrī Aurobindo accepted the first meaning in the context

of *Māyā.* Hence, *Māyā* is the energy that created the world and can also be called *Divya Māyā*.

Śrī Aurobindo called self-realization the real goal of human life. This 'I' exists within. The true divine nature of man is this inner being. The fate of this internality is met only by transcending the existence of external entities. But this realization is never possible through *Rājayoga*or*Haṭhayoga*or *Karmayoga* or *Jñānayoga* or *Bhaktiyoga*, because all these yogas have limitations. Hence, the realization of this inner being is possible only through *Pūrnayoga. Pūrnayoga* is the only infinite possibility.[2]*Pūrnayoga*aims for complete God-realization, self-realization, fulfillment of being and consciousness, and transformation of nature, resulting in a complete perfection of life here, and not just a return to eternal perfection elsewhere.[3]

Śrī Aurobindo's goal of *Pūrṇayoga* transcends the goals of all other yogas and wanders far above. The main goal of all other yogas is to reconcile the *yogī's* own consciousness with God consciousness; it can be *Saguṇa*or*Nirguṇa*. This is the first stage of yoga. Then in the second step, we have to pass through the *Ātman*sand let the divine energy descend into our own reservoir. As a result of which the present man will be transformed into a god-man.

All other yogas speak of rebirth or liberation from suffering in the hereafter or the upper world by being absorbed in *Nirguṇa Brahman*. But Śrī Aurobindo's *Pūrṇayoga* is unique. He does not talk about leaving the family. He wanted to turn the world into heaven and pass the divine life there. Other yogas are only for the liberation of a few, but *Pūrṇayoga* is for the liberation of all people irrespective of caste, creed, and religion. That is, other Indian philosophers thought that the liberation of the individual is the main goal of yoga. But Śrī Aurobindo felt that this can never be the only goal of yoga. While one aspect of the ultimate goal of yogais the liberation of the individual, the real ultimate goal of yoga is the restoration of all mankind and the initiation of divine life on earth.

The very first step of a *Pūrṇayoga* is to surrender himself to the Supreme. In this case, the *yogī's* surrender will be unconditional. Besides, the *yogī* should purify his mind by receiving God's grace. All *karma* must be surrendered to God. But even if *karma* is surrendered to God, the *yogī* will not refrain from *karma*. He will act only out of a sense of duty and surrender all *karma* to God.

Śrī Aurobindo also called his *Pūrṇayoga* the Synthesis of Yoga.Because in this yoga all types of yoga have been combined. In this case, there is emphasis on certain things which are absent in other cases. For example, *Haṭha Yoga* emphasizes the discipline of the body, *Rāja Yoga* emphasizes the mind, *Jñāna Yoga* emphasizes knowledge, *Bhakti Yoga* emphasizes devotion, and *Karma Yoga* emphasizes action. Although these different types of yoga are not contradictory, they did not give any importance to the opinion of others while establishing their own opinion. Śrī Aurobindo realized this and spoke of his *Pūrṇayoga*. He did not freely combine all other yogas into *Pūrṇayoga*. He left out the methodological details from all other Yogas and took only their essence. As a result, all types of yoga are realized in this yoga.[4]

The foundation upon which the entire structure of Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy rests is – 'Truth of both spirit and matter.' He tried to achieve a real harmony between the two. Materialism and spiritualism have long given their own interpretations of this world. On the one hand, spiritualism called the material world false and imaginary, and on the other hand, materialism denied the soul. But in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy, we see a combination of these two things. He said in his book 'The Life Divine' that the realization of divine life on earth is not possible until we accept that 'the soul resides in the body.' [5]

According to Śrī Aurobindo, divine life is to be full of consciousness, energy, and joy. One aspect of attaining perfection is to become one with the world. To attain perfection, one has to give up the narrow ego and feel one's own. If you can feel their consciousness and joy as your own, then divine life is possible. We have to realize

that we are not just a body, nor are we confined to a narrow unconscious mind. We have to rise above this kind of mind-consciousness to attain divine life. But this transition to divine life is not possible without inner life. [6]

It is not enough to be extroverted. We have to introspect and know our true selves. This is how the transition to divine life will begin. Śrī Aurobindo believed that if we could introspect and realize our true consciousness, then it would be possible for all of us to attain this divine life. In fact, humans are extroverts by nature. We therefore do not try to know the soul. We are busy with external things in our life. Being an introvert does not necessarily mean wanting to know the soul. But a person who has gained inner life by becoming introverted knows that only if he can control the outer consciousness and attain inner stillness, can he possess the divine nectar of God. On the path of *Pūrṇayoga*, he will pass through all the barriers of narrowness to the divine life.

In order to establish divine life on earth, it must be done through worldly means, which is possible only through *Pūrṇayoga*. By the practice of *Pūrṇayoga*, one can acquire miraculous powers and rise to the level of transcendental consciousness. As a result, he can take a step towards his liberation. But even if a single person is liberated in this way, there is no welfare for the world. Śrī Aurobindo therefore speaks of bringing the Supermind to the world. He spoke of the liberation of the collective rather than the liberation of the individual.[7]

Śrī Aurobindo believed that a divine life in a divine body is the ideal. He outlined evolution as the process of liberation, with consciousness being the basic element to be transformed into higher levels and ultimately to greater perfection. Life is the first step, followed by the mind. However, the evolution does not end with the mind; it awaits a spiritual and supramental consciousness. The next step is the development of the Supermind and Spirit as dominant powers, allowing Divinity to release itself and manifest perfection.[8]

Śrī Aurobindo's Integral Yoga aims to harmonize the paths of *karma, jñāna,* and *bhakti yoga*, forming a synthesis of Vedānta and *Tantra*. The core tenet of his philosophy is that the Truth of existence is an omnipresent Reality, referred to as *Brahman*, an Absolute that transcends the manifested universe and is inherent in it. The aim of Integral Yoga is to make oneself fit to manifest a divine consciousness, which he refers to as the Supermind.

To overcome limitations, one must embark on a process of self-discovery, uncovering their Divine nature. This process involves three stages: a movement within, a deepening of the mind, and a supramental change of the mind, heart, and body. After the stages of awakening, the goal is to make earth divine by manifesting the Supermind, or Truth-consciousness.

Śrī Aurobindo suggests purification of the personality and its constituents as a method for manifesting the awakening. According to the Bhagavad Gītā, performing duties without expectation does not affect us, and happiness and sorrow simultaneously create a state of equilibrium. This balanced state is the yoga, and Śrī Aurobindo's Integral Yoga teaches this type of integration and directs human life to be transformed into a celestial one. Aurobindo's mind was shaped by the Upaniṣads and Gītā, as well as meditation and Indian Vedānt's influence. His education also introduced ideas like the theory of evolution, which significantly influenced his thought. [9]

In the philosophy of Śrī Aurobindo, we see the reflection of the supreme wisdom of the Vedas and Upaniṣads. But nowhere does he speak of ignoring the real or mundane world. He only spoke of conversion; everything is supposed to be given new life and new shape. This requires physical, mental, and organizational changes. And this change is possible only through *Pūrṇayoga*. [10]

Pūrṇayoga of Śrī Aurobindo is his spiritual pursuit. But *Pūrṇayoga* and its establishment of divine life on earth—these are matters of practice, encounter, and realization, never mere theoretical

discussion. So only through practice can a proper understanding of this spirituality be achieved.

Integral Yoga or *Pūrṇayoga*, a spiritual path by Sri Aurobindo, aims to unite the individual self with universal consciousness. It comprises three inseparable aspects: realizing the Divine within oneself, bringing down the Supermind, and transforming nature. Realizing the Divine involves experiencing the presence of the Divine in every aspect of life, transcending ego limitations. The Supermind, a higher state of consciousness, surpasses human mind limitations through spiritual growth. The transformation of nature reflects inner growth and realization of the Divine, leading to a more harmonious, compassionate, and selfless existence. This holistic approach empowers individuals to participate in the evolution of human consciousness.

The triple transformation process, according to Śrī Aurobindo, is a spiritual process that leads to the realization of the Divine Consciousness in human life. The three transformations are:

1. Psychic Transformation:This is the initial phase, during which the person starts to recognize their inner self and the psychic being (soul) starts to manifest. It entails growing in empathy, intuition, and self-awareness as well as knowing others and oneself better.
2. Spiritual Transformation: The person enters a higher state of awareness at this point, and the spiritual self-starts to emerge. It entails developing virtues like love, compassion, and knowledge as well as realizing the Divine within.
3. Supramental Transformation:At this ultimate level, the Supramental Force—also known as the Divine awareness—transforms the person's awareness. It is associated with the ego's transcendence and the birth of a new, spiritualized identity.

The triple transformation method developed by Śrī Aurobindo is a comprehensive and all-encompassing approach to spiritual development that aims to realize the Divine Life on Earth and alter the whole person—body, mind, and spirit.

The Synthesis of Yoga is achieved through personal aspiration, rejection, surrender, peace, calm, and equity. It involves a deep desire for spiritual growth, self-realization, and letting go of limitations and ego. Rejection involves rejecting external world limitations and attachments. Surrender involves surrendering to the Divine Will and embracing the present moment. Peace involves inner calmness, equanimity, and acceptance of challenges. Calm is inner tranquility, and equity is equality in all aspects of life. The Synthesis of Yoga is achieved by embracing these qualities simultaneously, merging them into a unified state of consciousness.

Observation: Śrī Aurobindo's Synthesis of Yoga is a holistic approach that integrates various yogic paths, including jñāna, Bhakti, Karma, and Raja Yoga, to achieve a balanced and harmonious development of the individual. It emphasizes unity of paths, integral transformation, supramental consciousness, divine life, no conflict, dynamic balance, an evolutionary perspective, spiritual evolution, and practical application. The ultimate goal is to manifest a divine life on earth, where the individual becomes an instrument of Divine Will. This unique approach sets it apart from other yogic traditions.

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The Role of *Dharma* in Society and Personal Life

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Abstract

This article aims to determine the actual meaning and nature of the term *dharma* and to evaluate cryptically the role of *dharma* in society and personal life. *Dharma* is one of the most debatable concepts at the present juncture of time giving birth to various controversies. Here may be raised questions what is the meaning of *dharma*? Is *dharma* only some activities or some else? Can we think about our existence without maintaining *dharma*? Generally, the term *dharma* refers to some activities that are somehow connected with God, more categorically to say it suggests we obey the different principles to offer devotion to God, follow the different styles of prayer and different manners to worship God, observe different ceremonies and activities, which are offered to create the gratification of God or gods. All these activities are rituals. However, in Sanskrit, the meaning of the term *dharma* is different from what we normally understand. What is the role of *dharma* in the present scenario of society and an individual life? We cannot think of existence in this world without maintaining *dharma* in our lives for that reason.

In the case of an object, the essential property upholds it. Hence, the essential property of an object is its *dharma*. For, this property bears its identity of it. *Dharma* is one without which nothing remains the same. In the like manner, the essential property of man that upholds him and distinguishes him from others is the *dharma* of man, i.e., something without which man is not recognized as a man in the true sense of the term.

Key Words: *Dharma, Puruṣārtha, Pancamahāvrata,Varṇa Dharma, Āśrama Dharma,* Righteousness, *Satya*.

Introduction

The present paper is an effort to deal with the role of *dharma* in society and personal life. Before going into discussion, we need to know briefly the meaning of *dharma*. The root, from which the word *dharma* comes, is '*dhṛ'*, which means to uphold or to support or to nourish or to sustain. Thus, in its widest sense, it refers to that which sustains and holds together the society itself and in the present article, the word *dharma* will be taken in this sense viz. *dharma* is that which sustains the society. '*Dharma*' is one of the most debatable concepts at the present juncture of time giving birth to various controversies. *Dharma* is perhaps the most complicated concept in the entire history of Indian thought and it is very difficult to find one single definition of *dharma*. *Dharma* is an ancient *Sanskrit* term first found in the *Ṛg Veda*, the oldest Sanskrit text, for the underlying laws of the universe, not only of matter but of life, mind, and consciousness as well. It can refer to natural law, social rules and regulations, the principles of art or philosophy, and above all, the ways of truth behind religion and spirituality. It is a very influential notion and sentiment of human beings. According to some philosophers, *dharma* is the socially approved conduct concerning one's fellowmen or superhuman powers. In short, *dharma* is a far-reaching concept that embraces the whole human life and one must avoid identification of *dharma* as directly equivalent to any of the various components of its meaning, such as nature, intrinsic quality, moral law, usage, practice, custom, right, morality, justice, merit, duty, virtue, or religion etc. In addition, *dharma* implies the law or principle on which society is based.

The Sanskrit term '*Dharma*' bears various meanings. The word '*Dharma*' has two etymological senses and both are accepted traditionally. These are viz., (a) *dhana-vṛ+mak = dharma* means that by which one gains wealth (*dhana*). And (b) √dhṛng (to give support or to sustain) = '*dharma*' means that which sustains the individual as well as the society.'

Objectives

The foremost emphasis of this research study is a general study to understand the concept of *dharma*, classifications of *dharma*, and its

significant role in society and personal life, focusing on different aspects of *dharma* that are established in the Indian traditional texts, dharmasūtras, smṛtis, dharmasaśtras, epics, different philosophical schools, present understanding, and others as an ideal one. And also, to understand why human beings are different from animals, why is *svadharma* better? In addition, is *dharma* only some activities or something else?

Dharma in different Indian Philosophical Schools, Sūtras, Smṛtis, Dharmaśāśtras and others

According to Jaiminī, the propounder of the *pūrvamīmāṁsā* school *dharma* has been described as that which is indicated by Vedic injunction leading to the attainment of the highest good (*codanālakṣano'rthaḥ dharmaḥ).*[1] Here *codanā* is the proof for *dharma.* The *Vedic* injunction which makes us inclined or declined doing any work is called *codanā.* That whose proof is *codanā* is called *dharma.* It is a beneficial act indicated by *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*. "*Yatobhyūdaya-niśreyasa-SiddiḥSaDharmaḥ*" – that is *Dharma* which results in the attainment of welfare & prosperity (*abhyudaya*) and salvation or spiritual greatness (*nihśreyasa*). *Dharma* is a ritualistic action (*YāgādirevaDharmaḥ*). Through the intermediary of *apūrva* (unseen potency), it yields its fruit. According to the *Naiyāyikas*, *Dharma* is a quality that is present in the self. For theistic Schools *Dharma* is either a quality or an action. Buddhist Conception of *Dharma* the realist document of which is found in the fourth rock-edict of emperor Ashoka, emphasises on non-injury (*ahiṁsā*). However, in Buddhist philosophical literature it is used in the sense of an entity similar to that of early *Advaita*.

The *Mīmāṁsakas* have described the moral injunctions (*vidhi*) as *Dharma*. *Dharma* may be defined within the purview of Vedic injunctions as well as in the forms of *vidhi* and *niṣedha*. Since it is described as *Dharma,* it is always associated with good by way of generating satisfaction or *prīti* as coined by Jaiminī, by which any type of action sanctioned by scriptures is regarded as *Dharma*. So, here *Dharma* in the Indian philosophy is treated in the moral terms.

According to Manu (II.I), *Dharma* is heartily approved by those who are honest and free from hatred and attachment. From Manu, 1.2, it is clear that *Dharma* is what has been narrated in the *Manusmṛti* as the duties of all the castes, as well as duties to be performed in the four stages of life (*āśramas*).The *Āpastamba-Dharma-sūtra* (17.20) declares – *yattuāryāḥkriyamānampraśaṁśantisaDharmaḥ* i.e. that practice or observance, which the Āryas praise, is *Dharma*; *Ārya* means respectable, noble or honourable persons. Tulsidas, author of *Rāmcharitmanas*, has defined the root of *Dharma* as compassion. This was also admitted by the followers of Lord Buddha in the immortal book of great wisdom called *Dhammapāda*.

Righteousness (*Dharma*) according to *Praśastapāda* is *Viśuddhābhisandhijah* i.e. is born from the purity of the intention i.e. of the intention free from pride and the like (*dambhādira-hitasamkalpaviśeşu*). So, that there is no righteousness even in good acts prompted by impure or evil intentions, e.g. by pride or vanity etc. *Dharma* has been described as a principle, which promotes harmony and stability in society. Truth in action is described as *Dharma*. *Dharma* is used to denote also the general good sense of a man who wishes and works for the welfare of others. *Dharma* is a moral law that governs and seeks to regulate the life of human beings. Thus, it is seen that *Dharmaśāstric* literature exercised substantial influence on the view of an ideal man in society from the Vedic period onwards. The *Dharmasūtras* deal with the practical side of the Vedas which deal with ritual as well as common morality. *Dharmasūtras* have enormous significance to society as they serve as guiding principles to decide what is right or wrong and thus show what would lead to land merit or demerit and *Puṇya* or *Pāpa*. The subject-matter of these treatise deals with three aspects. (1) Code of conduct (*ācāra*) (2) expectation (*Prāyaścitta*) and (3) Jurisprudence (*Vyavahāra*), *Dharma* as enunciated in the *Dharma-Śastras*, is the comprehensive umbrella term denoting all moral laws, ethics, code of conducts and righteous acts. It is said that *Ṛta* is the logical concept underlying *Dharma*. *Ṛna* presents the obligation of man to make his life confirmed to *Dharma* and *Ṛta.*[2]

P. V. Kane says that "*Dharma*" has been one of the most powerful and influential terms in Indian thought and society since several millennia, right from Vedic times till today. In the words of P. V. Kane – "The writers on *Dharmaśāstra* meant by *Dharma* not a creed or religion but a mode of life or a code of conduct, which regulated to bring about the gradual development of a man and to enable him to reach what was deemed to be the goal of human existence."[3] According to the view of Devala, the ancient sage *Dharma* means that one should not do to others what would be disliked by one's self. *Dharma* is the cause of happiness. It is said that happiness is impossible without *Dharma*. *Dharma* is that which upholds the world (*DharayatilokānitiDharmaḥ*). P. V. Kane further describes *Dharma* as five-fold: *Varṇa-Dharma, Āśrama-Dharma, Varṇāśrama-Dharma, Naimittika-Dharma and Guṇa-Dharma* (Like the duty of the king is to protect). The Arthaśāstra enumerates *Dharma* as six fold, *ahiṁsā, śauca, anasūyā, anṛsaṁṣya and Kṣamā*.

Yājñavakya distinctly mentions nine dharmas which means qualities or virtues to be adopted by each individual member of the society respectively no-violence, truthfulness, not stealing, purity, control of senses, charity, mercy, self-restraint and forgiveness. *(ahiṃsā satyamasteyaṃ śaucamindriyanigraḥ/dānaṃ damo dayā kṣāntiḥ sarvesaṃ dharmasādhanaṃ// Yājñavakyasmṛti*, 10.63).[4]

Vasiṣṭha states that conduct or action is regarded as the basis of highest *dharma* for all, and people should always practice *dharma*, i.e. righteousness but not *adharma*, i.e. unrighteousness and one should speak the truth, not false etc. *(ācāra paramo dharmaḥ sarveṣāmiti niścayaḥ/dharmaṃ carata mādhanaṃ satyaṃ vadanta mānṛtam).*[5]

Svadharma, Sādhārana Dharma* and *Āpada Dharma

When a man speaks of his *Dharma*, then he means not only his duties but also his constitution, what he should do and why he should do it are combined in the concept of *Dharma*. Society was structured upon an intricate system of interrelated obligations of various social groups, which are taken as different castes. In ancient Hindu society, *Dharma* is

generally taken as *Varṇāśrama Dharma.* The *VarṇāśramaDharmas* are all obligatory without condition in their respective spheres. It may be said in brief that in *Varṇa Vyavasthā* it is regarded as the *Dharma* of *Brāhmana* to study and teach, of *Kṣatriya* to rule and to protect the land from enemies, of the *Vaiśya* farming and making business and of the *Śūdra* to serve all these three classes. A distinction was made between *Varṇāśrama Dharma* and *Sādhāraṇa Varṇāsramadharma* which implies the duties of one's caste and stage in life and the universal duties of man.The word '*svadharma*' is composed of two words *sva* and *dharma*. *Svajāti, svadharma,svavarṇa, svabhāba* those instances dully *sva* is used but as far as the *svadharma* is concerned it is one's own *Dharma*. That is defined by the duty and for every person of the society it is assigned which is implied by the concept of *varṇāśramadharma*. The focal attention is on the discourse between ŚriKṛṣṇa and Arjuna during the war of *Kurukṣetra*. Kṛṣṇa reminds Arjuna about *svadharma* and *paradharma*and why is *svadharma* better? The concept of *svadharma*, in this regard, can be taken into consideration. "*ŚreyanSvadharmaViguṇaḥParadharmātswanuṣṭhitātSvadharmenidhan aṁŚreyaḥparadharmobhayāvahaḥ*."- said Lord Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā.* Why is it important according to Kṛṣṇa? The moral agent has to perform certain prescribed action according to his character or duty of the nature of *svabhāba*. If he performs those acts as his character makes him so, then he may be a virtuous being.*Sādhāraṇa Dharmas* are common duties equally obligatory for all men. It is evident from this division of *Dharma* into two classes that every human being must perform two types of duties. The idea underlying this classification is that two kinds of services are obligatory for every individual. First, it is necessary that he must perform his specific duty to his fellow beings according to his capacity for this special advantages and opportunities of life it provides and apart from that it is necessary for him to perform his duties to mankind in general by assisting the cause of humanity in general and seeking the common good as distinguished from the good of his own community. Apart from these two classes of *Dharma* another class of *Dharma* has been mentioned in the *Mahābhārata's Śānti Parva* which is called *Āpad-Dharma*.In this regard, I reflect on a conversation in the *Mahābhārata*, where Bhishma tells the Pandavas, about *Āpad Dharma*, or *Dharma* during crisis. *Āpad-Dharma* means those *Dharmas* which

we should not perform in normal time, but we may perform it in some abnormal or contingent situations just to save our life. *Āpad* means calamity. We know for example a *Brāhmana* should never take the meat of dog but we find in the *Mahābhārata* that *Viśvāmitra* devoured dog's meat at the time of great famine. This is cited as an instance of *Āpad-Dharma*in the *Mahābhārata*. Mentioning of such *Āpad-Dharma* suggests that *Dharma* is something, which may be sometimes rigid and sometimes flexible. This peculiarity of *Dharma* leads to the question: Can *Dharma* be regarded as something absolute? The present research article tries to find out an answer to this question.

We know *Dharma* is the only source by which we can lead our life smoothly and even evil of our life can be removed by performing *Dharma*. We can say *Dharma* is the law of universe like *Ṛta*. We know there are so many *Dharmas* in the various scriptures, viz., *svadharma*, *sādhāraṇa Dharma* and *āpad-Dharma* and these are very controversial issues in the present scenario of the Indian ethics.

In *Manusaṁhitā*, we find that Manu enumerates the following ten: 1. Steadfastness, 2. Forgiveness, 3. Endurance of physical pain, 4. Avoidance of theft, i.e., to say, non-appropriation, 5. Cleanliness, 6. Repression i. e. control of sense-organs, especially the sex organs, 7. Wisdom, 8. Learning, 9. Adherence to truth and 10. Restrain of anger. *Dharma* promotes welfare for all and proper social order. This is basically about the *Dharma*, taken as *sādhāranaDharma*. *Dharma* has various meanings. It has the ancient interpretations I have dealt with where and one of the key features of *Dharma* lies, for example if we take non-violence as virtue (*ahimsā paramadharma*), it is a moral value. But we find that in the *Mahābhārataahiṁsā* is not practiced in every case because there the war is fought because of the fight for the justice. That was *svadharma* of the *pāṇḍavas* to establish the justice. Now there are many other narratives of *Dharma.* I have written or expounded those narratives in my paper. *Dharma* is also rule of life. I have referred to Manu also who says that *Dharma* is the means of that of good seer. Who is *dhārmika* in this context? Those who are really *Dhārmikas* in nature should possess such types of moral virtue like; *aparopatāpitā, anasūyatā, mṛdutā, apāruṣyaṁ, maitratā, priyaṁvadatā, kṛtajñatā, kāruṇyaṁetc*. *In addition,* I have referred to Kauṭilya who thinks that in

a harmonious society pleasure can be achieved. Everybody should do his part for *kalyān* of human good and thereby of the society.

Dharma establishes a rule of life and gives coherence to the different activities of life. It reminds us that our life is meant not only for us but for the society as well. In *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* Manu's concept of *Dharma* is similar to that of the *Mahābhārata*. According to Manu, *Dharma* is the means of the attainment of the good (*Śreyaḥ*). To him *Dharma* is performed by honest and intellectual persons having no malice and support of the consciousness *"hṛdayenābhyanujñātah."*[6] In other words, that which is performed by the honest, maliceless, intellectual person and that which can associate us with our well-being and highest good is called *Dharma.* Those who are really Dhārmikas in nature should possess certain types of moral virtue like; *aparopatāpitā, anasūyatā, mṛdutā, apāruṣyaṁ,maitratā, priyaṁvadatā, kṛtajñatā, kāruṇyaṁetc.*[7] All these moral virtues constitute *Dharma* and hence these are to be developed for the sake of justice to the social beings.

Dharma* in *Mahābhārata, Bhagavadgīta, Uponiṣad* and *Rāmāyana

The entire Hindu way of life is dominated by the concept of *Dharma*, regarded as eternal and revealing the divine will. All aspects of human life are enveloped within its character. '*Dharma'* is said to be one of the four *puruṣārthas*, basic ideals of human life as envisaged in Indian philosophical traditions. The notion of *dharma* may be regarded as the most important factor in Indian thought. The great war in *Mahābhārata* has been described as '*Dharmayuddha*' and *Kurukṣetra* as '*Dharma Kṣetra*'.It is evident from Hindu philosophy that a true understanding of Hindu culture requires considerable attention to life and thought, which is structured around *dharma*. *Mahābhārata*, the great epic which is acclaimed as the *Mānava Kartavya Śāstra* (Code of duties of human beings) contains a discussion of this topic. Being asked by Yudhiṣṭhira to explain the meaning and scope of *Dharma*, Bhīṣma who had mastered the knowledge of *Dharma* replied thus: *Tādriś' oyamanupraśno yatra DharmaḥsudurlabhaḥaDuṣkaraḥpratisaṁkhyātumtakenātraVyavasyatip*

rabhavārthāyabhūtanāṁDharmapravacanaṁKṛtamYasyātahiṁsāsaṁyuktam SaDharmaitiniscayaḥ.[8]

It is found in the *Bhagabadgītā* that *dharma* is the regulating or controlling principle of *kāma* and *artha*. Thus, we may say that in the scheme of Indian conception of values, viz. *puruṣārtha, dharma* is taken as a regulatory principle. Sage *Vyāsa* in the end of the *Mahābhārata* proclaims that even *Artha* and *Kāma* result from *Dharma*. Āpastamba also approves, that knowledge of *dharma* is necessary even for those who are seekers of only worldly pleasures. The *Uponiṣad* identifies *Dharma* with truth. In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* '*Dharma*' and 'truth' have been used interchangeably (1.4.1).

The *Rāmāyana* rightly sums up "One obtains everything through *Dharma* whole world has *dharma* as its essence of basis. *Dharma* brings about material benefits and physical pleasures". *Dharma* gives us whatever we desire to possess viz. worldly progress, material prosperity, and all-around pleasure and also otherworldly and everlasting happiness and bliss. Hence, one can secure everything through the performance of *dharma*.

Now the questions why are human beings different from animals? What is the role of *dharma* in society and personal life? Can we think about our existence without maintaining *dharma?* In addition, is *dharma* only some activities or something else?

Why are human beings different from animals?

It is well known fact that the human beings are different from animals. If it is asked in what aspect human beings are different from animals, the answer will, of course, come from different perspectives. Our scriptures have a view to this question. Our scriptures observe that this difference is implicated by *dharma*' i.e., human beings are different from animals due to *dharma*. *Dharma* is a distinguishing property of human beings.

A person without *dharma* is said to be an animal (*dharmenahīnāpaśubhiḥsamānāḥ*). But why is a man considered an animal even though he is more intelligent and advanced? The biblical answer is that both man and animal have four instincts. These include eating, sleeping, anxiety, enjoyment of sex life, and more. Dogs eat men too. For humans, it might be well-cooked food. Dogs sleep, frighten, and deprive them of the pleasure of sex. Men do the same but in more complicated ways. Maybe he sleeps in a well-appointed room and enjoys sex with a beautiful woman. He saves the trouble of crafting weapons. The above differences do not mean that humans and animals are different, as the purpose is the same in both cases. The following verse tells us that one is taken to be distinguished from an animal if one resort to *dharma* in one's day-to-day life (*āhāranidrāBhayamaithunañcasāmānyametatpaśubhirnarāṇām; dharma hi teṣāmadhikaviśeṣadharmeṇahīnāḥpaśubhiḥsamānāḥ*).[9]

There are numerous other ways in which humans differ from animals. The following are some significant variations: Cognitive talents: Compared to animals, humans are the only species with highly developed cognitive abilities such as complex reasoning, language, and problem solving. Self-awareness: Humans are highly self-aware, able to identify as unique beings with a consciousness and sense of self. Cultural and social complexity: Only humans are able to build complex civilizations, societies, and cultures. Technology and tool use: To adapt to their surroundings and find solutions to issues, humans have created and employed tools, technology, and inventions. Moral and ethical reasoning: Due to our highly developed moral sense, humans are able to solve moral conundrums and make decisions that are in line with our beliefs and moral standards. Language and communication: The intricacy of human language is unmatched, enabling sophisticated discourse and abstract expression. Emotional complexity: People can feel a wide range of emotions, including sophisticated ones like existential awareness, nostalgia, and empathy. Philosophical and spiritual inquiry: Humans are uniquely suited to investigate their spiritual selves, ask existential questions, and engage in philosophical discourse. Humanity: Although animals are born with their inherent natures, humans have the power to become human in this world through

sādhanā. These distinctions are recognition of the unique qualities that constitute humans rather than necessarily an indication of superiority or inferiority.

Is *dharma* considered only as activity or something else?

Here the question arises as to what *dharma* is. Is *dharma* just an activity? In general, we find that all religions (including Buddhism) begin with some activity dedicated to a god or goddess. Activity here means ritual. It is important to note that all ordinances are performed in the name of God. These are done to please God or to obtain God's grace. Different religions have different rituals. But the ritual has one purpose and that is to please God. In Hinduism, rituals are primarily said to be the means of acquiring knowledge. Instructions for performing the *yajna* can be found in the *Mimāṁsā* Schools (*SvargakāmoYajeta*, etc.). These types of activities have a purpose, but the importance of these rituals is to recognize human needs. Because no one wants to work unless it is generally necessary. All theories are accepted only if the need is expressed. Therefore, humans perform some rituals to meet their needs. And by performing these rituals one achieves devotion to God. Different religions prescribe different rituals, but the goal is the same: to encourage people to dedicate themselves to God. All rituals prescribed by different religions help to purify our minds. We need to understand the meaning of these ceremonies because they purify the mind and help us move on to a moral life. If we cannot achieve a moral and spiritual life, then doing such activities becomes meaningless. These activities (rituals) are called *AparāVidyā* and are said to be necessary as facilitators to attain moral and immortal life. It is stated in *Iśopaniṣad*: *avidyāmṛtuyṃtīrtvāvidyayāmṛtamaśnate.*[10] *Manusaṁhitā*says that one who tries to know *dharma* by his reasoning knows *dharma* in the true sense of the term (*sastarkeṇānusaṁdhattasadharmaṁvedanetrḥ*).[11]

A section of scholars expresses the view that the performance of rituals is called *dharma* because it helps an individual attain moral value in him through the purification of the mind. In other words, by banishing qualities like greed, desire, etc. from the heart a man with a

purified mind receives moral consciousness. The performance of rituals is called *dharma* in a wider sense, but not in the strict sense of the term for without a purified mind, the rituals performed by a man would become meaningless and futile. The derivative meaning of the term '*Dharma*' is that which upholds our well-being and prosperity. In the *Atharvaveda* (XI.7.17), the word *dharma* appears to mean merit occurring from the observance of religious rites.

The role of *dharma* in society and personal life

This paper tries to become involved in the discussion of the role of *dharma* in individual and social life. To the modern mind, in an age, in which secularism is upheld as the ideal and *dharma* has long been ignored, such a traditional view of *Dharma* may appear as a dynamic force. *Dharma* in this sense can be a living spirit of globalization; as in our great epic *Mahābhārata*it is mentioned, *Dharma* is that which holds together the people of the universe. Ancient civilization is only a signpost that guides us on our onward journey to newer and newer vistas of life. India, the land of *Dharma*, is one such ancient civilization. *Dharma* is offered as a signpost and as a philosophy. It is therefore, a unique contribution to humanity on this planet, i.e. *karmabhumi*.

In the present scenario of society, we see that poverty; political disturbances, communal riots, social injustice, corruption, unemployability, toxic issues among the young generation, gender discrimination, population explosion, inequality, and environmental degradation, etc. may be the hindrances for modern society. If we maintain *dharma* as *Pancamahāvrata*, and *Pancaśila*, and possess moral values in individual's and social life properly, above mentioned issues may be solved by the people of the modern society. By having values like *dharma* as basic value like *Sarva Dharma Sambhava* (equal respect for all religions), there has come communal harmony in our society. For having *Dāna* (liberal giving) as basic value embodied in the Indian culture helps to maintain equality in the society. *Vidyā*, wisdom, forgiveness, cleanliness such types of cultural and moral values help to make modern society free from the above-mentioned issues also. Our values of culture teach us to be self-confident as in Buddhism, we have found that '*ātmadipabhava*' (enlighten by self-lighting).*Dharma* teaches

us to give due respect to the parents and to treat them as the God and also a guest should be treated as his or her God, i.e. be one, showing respect to father and mother and treating the *atithi*, i.e. guest and men as our God – "*pitṛdevo bhava*/*atithidevo bhava*."[12] According to Vedic Literature, "*Satya* (truth) is considered essential, and reality falls apart, cannot function." Hence, we can say there is an important role of *dharma* to the modern society and individual. A sense of universal brotherhood helps people to live happily in our society through the Mahāupaniṣadic phrase *VasudhaivaKuṭumbakam*.

The *panca-mahāvrata* or 'five great vows' is an integral part of the moral life of human being. *Ahiṁsā*, *Satya*, *Asteya*, *Brahmacarya* and *Aparigraha* are the great vows, which can make the life of the individual and society an ideal one. The value of the five great vows (*panca-mahāvrata*) is recognized by the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers as well as the Jaina for the individual and society. The principles of most of these are recognized also in the commandments of the Bible. However, the Jainas try to practice these with a rigour scarcely found elsewhere. These vows consist of the following:

Ahiṁsā (Non-violence): *Ahiṁsā* means abstinence from all injury to life. Life exists not simply in the moving beings (*trasa*), but also in some non-moving ones (*sthāvara*) such as plants and beings inhabiting bodies of earth. The ideal of the Jaina is, therefore, to avoid molesting life not only of the moving creatures but also of the non-moving ones.

The Jaina saints who try to follow this ideal are, therefore, found even to breathe through a piece of cloth tied over their noses lest they inhale and destroy the life of any organism floating in the air. Ordinary laymen would find this ideal too high. They are advised, therefore, to begin with the partial observance of *ahiṁsā* by abstaining from injury to moving beings that are endowed with at least two senses.

Satyam (Truth): *Satyam* means abstinence from falsehood. This vow is also taken very rigorously. Truthfulness is not speaking what is only true, but speaking what is true as well as good and pleasant. Without these qualifications, the practice of truthfulness would be of little use as an aid to moral progress because, merely speaking what is true may

sometimes descend into garrulity, vulgarity, frivolity, vilification, etc. The truth set as the ideal of this vow is sometimes called, therefore, *sunrta*, to suggest the fuller meaning of truth which is also wholesome and pleasant. It is also pointed out that for the perfect maintenance of this vow; one must conquer greed, fear, and anger and even restrain the habit of jesting.

Asteyam: Abstinence from stealing is implied by the term *asteyam*. This vow consists in not taking what is not given. The sanctity of the property of others, like that of their lives, is recognized by the Jainas.

Brahmacaryam: *Brahmacaryam*is abstinence from self-indulgence. This vow is generally interpreted as that of celibacy. But the Jaina attaches to this also a deeper meaning that raises the standard of this vow far above mere sexual self-continence. It is interpreted as the vow to give up self-indulgence (*kāma*) of every form.

Aparigraha: Abstinence from all sorts of attachment is called *aparigraha*. This is explained as the vow to give up all attachment to the objects of the five senses—sound, touch, color, taste, and smell. As attachment to the world's objects means bondage to the world, and the force of this causes rebirth, liberation is impossible without the withdrawal of attachment.

According to Buddhism, the foundation naitik *dharma* (Ethical Religion) is the *pañcaśīla* (five rules), which advocates refraining from killing or destroying living creatures, stealing or taking that which is not given, lying or incorrect speech, sexual misconduct and intoxicants or intoxicating drinks and drugs which lead to carelessness. In becoming a *dhārmika* (Religious), a lay person is encouraged to take a vow to abstain from these negative actions.

Only *dharma* as moral value may teach human being to live in peace and harmony with one another. In addition, *dharma* teaches us to coexist and peacefully live with neighbours in the society. Emperor Ashoka was upset with his violent conquests of the Kalinga War that killed hundreds of thousands; he embraced Buddhism and treated his subjects humanly. He is credited with rethinking the Mauryan Dynasty from a war machine into a society of tolerance and non-violence, based

on Buddhism. The policy of Emperor Ashoka's *Dhamma* also laid stress on non-violence, which was to be practiced by giving up war and consequests and also as a restraint on the killing of animals.

Dharma is the principle of social justice. It is also a highly important concept in the life of the individual as well as the social group and it is the principle underlying social fabric. *Dharma* is offered as a signpost and as a philosophy. It is therefore, a unique contribution to humanity on this planet, i.e. *karmabhumi*.*"Mānasaṁsarvabhūtānāṁdharmamāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ/tasmāt sarveṣubhūteṣumanasāśivāmacaret."*13 and *"Adroheṇaivabhūtānāṁyaḥdharmaḥsasatāṁmatah."*[14] To make friendship with all beings is considered as *Dharma"Sarvabhūtahitaṁ maitraṁpurāṇaṁyaṁjanāviduḥ."*[15] If someone does not speak the truth connected with an individual's and society's non-well-being it is not taken as a fault. In the same way, speaking the truth which relates to someone's total loss of property in an unwanted situation is also not supportable *"Satyājjyayo'nṛtaṁvacaḥ."*[16]

Dharma as humanity is comprised of five virtues, which are non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, cleanliness and self-control. For having these in human being, our individual life and society run smoothly. Buddhism and Jainism, Sikhism, Advaitavedānta and Chaitanyadeva teach us to maintain these virtues (Humanity) due to act and develop the individual and society without making harm to fellow beings. According to Vivekananda, *dharma* is the manifestation of the divinity already in human. The pursuit of awakening this divinity is the greatest pursuit of human life.

Dharma establishes a rule of life and gives coherence to the different activities of an individual's life. It reminds us that our life is meant not only for us but for society as well. In *Mānavadharmaśāstra* Manu's concept of *dharma* is like that of the *Mahābhārata*. According to Manu, *dharma* is the means of the attainment of the good (*Śreyaḥ*). To him *dharma* is performed by honest and intellectual persons having no malice and support of the consciousness

"hṛdayenābhyanujñātah."[17] Those who are *Dhārmikas* in nature should possess thirteen types of moral virtue; "*aparopatāpitā, anasūyatā, mṛdutā, apāruṣyaṁ, maitratā, priyaṁvadatā, kṛtajñatā, kāruṇyaṁetc."*[18] All these moral virtues constitute *Dharma* and hence these are to be developed for the sake of justice to the social beings.

Dharma plays an important role in regulating human activities to promote worldly prosperity and spiritual bliss. When an individual acts following his *dharma*, he is in tune with ultimate reality. A well-ordered and harmonious society must, therefore, have ethical foundations. By the observance of moral principles, a man becomes disciplined and he gains fame and prosperity. Ancient Indian thinkers express that *dharma* is not something absolute or fixed; rather it is highly dynamic and flexible. *Dharma* has been conceived as relative to human needs, orders, temperaments of man, and spatial as well as temporal conditions of society. Manu admits this flexible character of *dharma* when he recognizes different types of duties for men of different ages, men of different temperaments, men belonging to different orders in life, and men in distress.[19] Our *Dharmaśāstrakāras* have formulated some moral codes in such a way so that the interest of different communities, weaker sections, women, etc. is protected.

Dharma as values determine and regulate a man's conduct, enable him to stand life's stress and strain, and define his relationship with his fellow beings. Value shapes a man's character and makes him divine or devilish. Hence, *dharma* is accorded the first position in the list of puruṣārthas. The Hindu thinkers have given much importance to the harmonious pursuit of the three objectives of life- *dharma, artha,* and *kāma*. But *dharma* is declared to be of the greatest significance. If *dharma* is properly preserved, it protects a man. But if it is violated, a man is ruined.[20] To achieve the harmonious pursuit of *trivarga, kāma,* and *artha* are to be abandoned if they are not in harmony with *dharma*. Therefore, also *dharma*, which gives rise to miseries in the future or is cruel and harsh to others, should be discarded. In other words, *Dharma* is that from which an individual is associated with welfare and prosperity. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (2/23), perhaps for the first time,

clearly spells out the full application of *Dharma* as follows: There are three aspects of the word *dharma*for the development of an individual and society. Of these, the first consists of sacrifice (i.e., *yajňa*) study, and clarity (to be practiced in *gārhasthyaaśrama*). The second is marked by austerities applicable to the *Vānaprastha*. The third is practiced in the stage of *Brahmacarya*; a brahmacārin must stay in the house of the preceptor for a fixed period. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (VII.17) seems to take *dharma* to mean the entire body of religious duties.

From the term *dharma*, the noble inspiration of integration emerges is brought to all individuals and society. *Dharma* makes a stronger bond with the people who are devotees of the same Guru than the people who are siblings. *Dharma* has an important role in human life and society. *Dharma* plays an essential role as vital energy for making our minds movable. Human beings get inspiration from *dharma* to realise the eternal power in which she has a natural right to have that unending energy. People get inspirational power to build character and to finish the noble deed from *dharma*. The permanent nature of a human being is his divinity. *Dharma* is the human being's permanent nature divinity. There is a character in *dharma* that purifies the individual from animal nature to divinity. *Dharma* has the power to bring about a radical change in individual character; *dharma* is the expression of whatever goodness exists in human beings.

Apart from the above discussion, we can say more *dharma* plays a significant role in society as well as personal life of individuals by:

Preserving social peace: *Dharma* contributes to social harmony by outlining expectations, duties, and functions for each member of the social hierarchy. Encouraging solidarity and community: *Dharma* places a strong focus on the value of community and interdependence, motivating people to cooperate for the common good. Giving moral guidance: *Dharma* encourages moral behavior and righteous life by providing a framework for moral behavior. Upholding social norms and values*: Dharma* protects social legacy and cultural identity by upholding cultural traditions, values, and beliefs. Encouraging personal development: *Dharma* motivates people to follow their passions and

fulfill their responsibilities (*Svadharma*), which results in self-actualization and personal progress. Giving people a feeling of direction and purpose: *Dharma* enables people to make significant decisions and overcome obstacles in life by giving them a sense of purpose and direction. Promote introspection and self-improvement: *Dharma* promotes introspection and self-improvement among people, which advances both individually and as a group. *Dharma* is essentially a guiding principle that fosters moral purity, social cohesiveness, and both individual and group well-being.

Dharma plays the role as the ideal form of conduct and it embraces every type of righteous conduct covering every aspect of life, essential for the sustenance and welfare of the individual and society. *Dharma* as the universal moral and ethical order plays a significance role in social and personal life. *Dharma* can help policymakers to make decisions that are good for society as well as an individual as whole. It is seen as essential and vital for keeping a fair and peaceful society. Thus, the term *dharma* signifies and plays an important role for all kinds of rules such as religious, moral, legal, physical, metaphysical, or scientific in its widest sense.

Conclusion

In the concluding part of this article, I would like to say that *dharma* is fully related to responsibility, freedom, and duty (rule-based) for the sake of the well-being of individuals and society. It is mandatory to perform *dharma* for both the ruler and the ruled of the society. Where there is *dharma*, there is responsibility. The man should be *dhārmika* means taking responsibility for the family, society, state, and universe. There are so many dharmas in terms of place, time, and person. *rāja dharma,prajā dharmaguṇadharma*(special duties of king), *naimittikadharma* (secondary duties which are enjoyed for transgression of prescribed duties)*, yugadharma, sādhāraṇadharma*(common duties of all men, added by *Mitākṣara*), *āpaddharmavarṇadharma,āśramadharma andvarṇāśramadharma* etc. are the various types of *dharma*. An action would be *dhārmika* if it is based on development for an individual as well as the others in the society. No action would be moral or value-based unless and until it

gets the responsibility and status of duty towards the whole society in the true sense. *Dharma* is like software of the society. It helps to sustain, develop, and turn the individual from vicious action. *Dharma* is always the end of an individual as well as society. If *dharma* is based on morality, then it means moral values such as patience, forgiveness, kindness, compassion, non-violence, honesty, kindness, simplicity, selflessness, and duty and truthfulness. To bring peace and harmony in society and personal life, *dharma* has a prime role. *Dharma* as moral value and service is the true meaning of the *dharma* phenomenon, which is the main tenet of all religions. I think *dharma* as true learning is very important to resolve religious tensions and violence around the individual and society.

Dharma should be dedicated to the welfare of mankind. In the *Kenoponiṣad*, it is written that wise people find God in all the living creatures of the world and go beyond this world by offering them service (*bhuteṣubhuteṣuvicityadhīrāḥpretyāsmāllokādamṛtābhabanti*). Therefore, from the time of the *Upaniṣads*, this ultimate truth (God) has been sought in humans and other living beings. If someone spends their day worshiping a god, locks him up in a temple, and hates humans, there will never be a god there. Though we think that food, clothes, health facilities, education, and shelter are very much needed in our life, yet these do not give the fulfillment of all needs. In giving reason favour to this, people search for a life of higher peace, giving up the life of luxury and z plus category security. *Dharma* has a unique role in the human mind. *Dharma* arouses in human beings a desire, which gives rise to an intellectual urge towards the infinite. It is a feeling that is nothing but realization in the extreme. *Dharma* as basic value embodied in Indian culture give a message to mankind for realising the people that character-building is equally essential as career-building. *Bhakti* (devotion), *śradhyā* (respect) and belief in *karma* (action) are the very much important to develop the society. *Dharma* plays a role as a banyan tree under which all travellers get shadow and shelter during the summer as *dharma* upholds the whole universe. *Dharma* is like the sun. For the cause of providing warmth by the Sun, all entities of the world are warmed. This warmth of the sun is the ultimate cause of production of our food even we can boil water by this. In the same way, *Dharma*

provides us power by which we can change our animalistic and brute nature etc. It is never possible for a human being to live without adaptation of *Dharma*. *Dharma* does not merely keep man in harmony with his environment; it also enables him to attain his own ends in life both here and elsewhere. Only for the existence of *dharma* a man is designated as man otherwise human being would be like a beast and miss-managements would cover our world. We only with the weapon called *Dharma* can rectify our life. All the problems we experience during our daily life originate in ignorance and the way for eliminating them is to practice *Dharma*. Practising *Dharma* is the ultimate way for improving the quality of human life.

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Exploring Propositional Attitudes through the Lens of Russellian Philosophy

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Abstract

Russell introduced the term 'propositional attitudes' in his book "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth". We also found some discussions about propositional attitudes in his book "The Problem of Philosophy". In this book, he developed a certain theory of judgement. He used the terms 'judgement' and 'belief' are interchangeably. Russell said that propositional attitude is belief. Belief is psychological phenomena. Therefore, according to Russell, the analysis of belief should be an analysis of psychological phenomena. Here I have seen the similarity between Russell and Davidson. Davidson said that, belief is the central to propositional attitudes. Russell gave an example: 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio' here he said that the analysis of this sentence gives an analysis of belief. Verb and clause are changing the attitude of propositions. Quine also used two terms viz. de re and de dicto for analysing the propositional attitudes. Russellian view is akin to the concept of de re of Quine and Quine opposed the concept of de dicto as a propositional attitude.

Keywords: Judgement, Belief, Clause, de re, de dicto, Propositional attitudes, Psychological phenomena, Russell.

To discuss about the concept of propositional attitudes, I think it is necessary to give some examples of propositional attitudes. Belief, disbelief, doubt, supposition, imagination, hope, desire, fear, pride, awareness, knowledge etc. are generally considered examples of propositional attitudes. A typical example of a sentence ascribing a propositional attitude to a subject can be cited from Quine: Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy (1). "Russell's example is: Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio (2)."[1]

There can be many alternative analyses of such propositional attitude ascribing sentences. Let us take our two examples. Alternative analyses of (1):

1. Believes (Ralph, that Ortcutt is a spy)

2. "Ralph believes that (Ortcutt is a spy)"[2]

3. Believes (Ralph, Ortcutt, spyhood)

4. Ralph believes that--- Ortcutt-is-a-spy.

5. Ralph believes spyhood of Ortcutt.

6. The Fregean Analysis.

7. Davidson's Paratactic Analysis.

"The term 'Propositional Attitude' was introduced by Russell for the first time in his book *An Inquiry into meaning and Truth*."[3]We also find discussions on propositional attitudes in some of his other works. For instance, in his book *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell spoke of propositional attitudes. It is very unfortunate that for a very long time, people used to think that it was a cheap and inconsequential work. But fortunately, the merit of this work is now recognized by scholars.

In *The Problems of Philosophy*, a certain theory of judgement, viz., multiple relation theory was proposed by Russell. Here 'judgment' and 'belief' are used interchangeably. Since, according to Russell, the prototypical example of propositional attitude is belief, the analysis of propositional attitudes given in *The Problems of Philosophy* (in the chapter 'Truth and Falsehood') is an analysis of beliefs.

According to Russell, belief is the basic propositional attitude. Whatever we think about involves a sort of belief. There cannot be any thinking at all unless there are beliefs. In this regard, Davidson's view is very close to Russell's view. Davidson holds that belief is central to propositional attitudes, to thinking as such. This may not be considered to be helpful, however, to those philosophers who think that some propositional attitudes are very different from belief.

I would like to make a preliminary remark here. Belief is undoubtedly a psychological phenomenon. So,an analysis of belief should be an analysis of a psychological phenomenon. However, how can such an analysis be made? We can try to find a behaviouristic counterpart of belief and can take recourse to a physicalistic approach. This, however, may not appear to be reasonable, as beliefs, like other mental entities, are very controversial in nature. So, let us take another approach. Let us take sentences that ascribe beliefs to subjects. If we can give a satisfactory account of sentences that ascribe belief to subjects, then we may be able to give a philosophical analysis of the concept of belief, i.e., a sort of logical, syntactical and semantical analysis of mental phenomena.

In *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell himself approaches the subject of belief via analysis of sentences ascribing belief. For example, 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio'— analysis of this sentence gives an analysis of belief.Propositional attitude is characterised by a verb that expresses the attitude and takes a that-clause as a complement, meaning that the verb will come after that-clause. For example, Ralph thinks Ortcutt is a spy, whereas Othello thinks Desdemona is in love with Cassio.

But there are some verbs of propositional attitudes which do not normally take a that-clause as a complement. They take a 'whether' clause rather than 'that' clause. In any case, what are expressed by any of these clauses are propositions. The verb in a propositional attitude is directed towards a proposition.

Let us now consider one after another the seven possible analyses of a sentence ascribing a propositional attitude to a subject.

On the first analysis, a sentence ascribing the propositional attitude of belief involves a two-place predicate, one place is occupied by a designation of the subject (who has that particular attitude) and the other is occupied by the object of belief. Belief is a two-place predicate. One of the two places is occupied by what is designated by a name and the other by what is designated by a that-clause.

The simplest analysis that can be done is the first one. The first analysis and the second are diametrically opposite. Sentential connective analysis is the second analysis. "In the sentence 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', 'Othello believes that' is the sentential connective like 'it is necessary that' or 'it is possible that'."[4]It is not the case that we are expressing a relation between a subject and a peculiar kind of thing. We get another sentence by attaching the sentential connective to a sentence. However, this sentential connective is not a truth-functional connective. So, all the components occurring in the sentence are not used extensionally and cannot be replaced by co-extensive terms without a change of truth-value. In this analysis, we cannot replace the terms *salva veritate,* but *salvaconcretate*. The sentential connective analysis would dispose of propositions as entities.

The third analysis offered by Russell is the sentential analysis. The predicate in the belief-assigning statement has three places. A relationship between four terms is expressed in the sentence that attributes belief: Othello, Desdemona, Cassio, and loving—loving is another term that, in the greater belief, is assigned to these sentences. Loving is to be compared with spyhood in Quine's analysis of 'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.' All relational predicates have a sense (direction). This is not to be compared with Fregean sense. Every relation consists of terms, a relation and a direction of the relation.

We get two other suggestions in Quine's writings (Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy). One of them is found in the fourth analysis. Here we have a monadic predicate, but the predicate is a very complex one, viz, believes--that-Ortcutt-is-a spy. "The content becomes a kind of qualifier of the belief: belief- that-Ortcutt-is-a-spy. To believe something is to believe in a particular way. This sort of analysis would enable us to avoid propositions as entities."[5]

"The fifth analysis is: Ralph believes spyhood of Ortcutt. In this case, the predicate is a two-place predicate."[6]A dyadic relation is said to be obtained between Ortcutt and spyhood. The object which is expressed is not a proposition. The predicate is complex— believes spyhood of Ortcutt. Ralph takes a certain attitude towards Ortcut and this attitude is modified by spyhood. The attitude is not towards a proposition.

The sixth analysis is a variant of the second analysis, i.e., the sentential connective analysis. Even according to Frege, the particular verb 'believes' enables us to form a sentential connective which enables us to form a sentence out of a given sentence. But the difference between the second analysis and the sixth analysis is the following: While, according to Russell, there is a failure of reference within the context governed by sentential connective or some other propositional attitude, according to Frege, there are no such failures. The reference of that sentence is its customary sense. This is a shift of reference. (The sense becomes its reference). The principle of extensionality is operative here — a term can be replaced by a co-referent term. But Quine says that the embedded sentence does not have any reference. He failed to realise that a sentence may have an indirect reference, non-customary reference in some contexts.There are two approaches to understanding a sentential connective analysis: Quinean and Fregean. We must acknowledge the proposition as an entity in the Fregean manner. But propositions can be eliminated in a Quinean manner.

The seventh analysis can be given following some suggestions given by Davidson. This analysis, the paratactic one, is a grammatical device of placing clauses one after another without the use of any word standing for conjunction or alteration or subalternation. Let us take an example: Galileo said that the earth moves round the sun. We have a simple sentence having a complex structure. Two sentences conjoin each other without conjunction or subordination or coordination. We have demonstrative that. The demonstrative demonstrates the sentence, *i.e.,* refers to whatever is expressed by the sentence without making any ontological commitment. "There are two sentences— the first sentence refers to the second in a non-committal sense. There is an X such that Ralph believes that X."[7]

Russell's analysis is comparable to the third analysis. Quine, however, rejected the third approach since it creates an abstract concept called "spyhood" (which is a relational term). An abstract being is a dark creature. We have no idea how to recognise it. The fact that this specific approach is predicated on the idea that the context of belief is an extensional context serves as another explanation. It is possible to substitute one phrase for another while using co-referential terminology.

Let us take the sentence 'Othello loves Desdemona. It asserts a relation between Othello and Desdemona.' Each of the two singular terms can be replaced by co-extensive terms. For there are two existential generalisations (1) There is an X such that X loves Desdemona and (2) there is an X such that Othello loves X. But it is not possible to make such existential generalisations in the belief ascribing sentences. Existential generalisations in propositional attitude ascribing sentences would be possible if we had a propositional attitude to a certain object.

Quine drew attention to a certain kind of distinction between two different kinds of belief or propositional attitudes (1) *de re* and(2) *de dicto*.

One can say that when one says "Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy— this is regarding Ortcutt. This way of looking at the belief-ascribing sentence can be analysed as follows: Ortcutt is such that he is believed by Ralph to be a spy. Understood in this way, it is not a sentence about Ralph, but about Ortcutt."[8]

In a different way also, we could understand this sentence, in a way that is nearer to analysis four. Although Ortcutt was a name in the original sentence, it no longer is a name, but it becomes a part of a polysyllabic predicate — transforming the name into a modifier. Somehow, we have formed a predicate out of the name Ortcutt. There is no other place in the sentence where existential generalisation was possible.

In my opinion, Quine was mistaken, for the case of abstract entities would not be brushed aside so easily as Quine thought they would be. This point has been argued again and again by philosophers.

Besides, we cannot wash away the difference between two kinds of belief, i.e., *de re* and *de dicto* belief. If we follow Russell's argument, then we shall find that every belief is *de re*. If we come down to terms, if they have any role to play in the sentence, then they must stand for entities.

We can stop short of the full-scale Russellian analysis and say that there is room for two kinds of analysis. If we go through all the analyses, we notice that the first analysis cannot possibly be rejected, for all other analyses depend upon it.

Consider the statement "Ralph thinks Ortcutt is a spy" once more. It is clear from this statement that Ralph holds a belief. Ralph does not think Ortcutt is a spy if he has no faith in anything. What he believes is something if he believes. Ralph therefore thinks that there is an X. Therefore, we are unable to abandon this analysis.

Instead of plunging into the ontology of propositions, we can try to build a halfway house — we have to admit propositions of some kind — a *de re* proposition where objects themselves occur as subjects of a proposition. The *de re* analysis of belief ascribing sentences satisfies Russell's ambition. In Frege, we find *de dicto* analysis of belief-ascribing sentences. Quine is opposed to *de dicto* analysis.

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Doubts on *Āptaḥ* of Nyāya: The Impossibility with Special Reference to Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa's Views

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Abstract:

This article explores an analysis the basic characteristic features of a reliable or trustworthy person of Nyāya Schools and the counter arguments against it leveled in *Tattvapaplavasiṁha* of Jayarāśi and *Khaṇḍaṇa-khaṇḍa-khādyam* of Śrīharṣa. In Indian philosophy, apart from Carvāka, Buddha and Vaiśeṣikas have recognized that the *śabda (*of a reliable person) as an independent source of knowledge. It is true that a number of schools of Indian philosophy have accepted*śabda* as an independent and separate *pramāṇa* but they do not go hand in hand to define the same. For instance, the Yoga and Saṁkhya schools, which are treated as the allied systems (*samānatantra*), have maintained same opinions on so many issues. But the views of the Saṁkhya or Yoga school and the Nyāya School regarding the nature of a reliable person are very similar. Jayarāśiand Śrīharṣa both have applied a wide range of skeptical arguments and it simultaneously showed the proper characteristic of the trustworthy person can never be immune from doubts. In this article, firstly I would like to analyze about Nyāya's theory of trustworthy, secondly skeptical contributions against it and lastly some observation.

Keywords: *śabda, āptaḥ, sākṣātkṛtadharmā,* Jayarāśi's doubt, Śrīharṣa's doubt.

(I)

It is well known to us that Indian thinking of philosophical contribution is mainly divided into two streams - *Pramāṇavādīns* and *Apramāṇavādīns*. They have both tried their best to explore the arguments as they have applied for construction of own philosophical standpoints. *Pramāṇavādīns*try to hold their philosophical stand point as

the knowledge claim. They believed that epistemic knowledge (*pramā*) is possible through *pramāṇa or (*valid instrument of knowledge) and it gives birth to sure such cognition to us. For example, Naiyāyikas are accepts four *pramāṇas* and they have explained the world and every speculative objects of the world with the help of these four *pramāṇas.* But there is disagreement among the Indian schools about the acceptance of *pramāṇas.*

On the other side, the skeptical point of views on philosophical contributions put forwarded by *Apramāṇavādīns* like Jayarāśi, Nāgārjuna, Srīḥarsa etc. and they have basically two allegations against the knowledge claim. They are –

1. We have no exact definition of knowledge or *pramā*
2. There would be no *pramāṇa*or valid instrument of knowledge.

However, the Indian skeptics have accepted on these two analogous issues though their philosophical conclusions are not complementary to each other. My unanimous aim of this article is to show how Jayarāśi and Srīḥarsa utilize their doubts against a reliable person of Nyāya School.

Here, I have primarily started the discussion with the definition of verbal knowledge pointed out by Goutama and as the matter would be prolonged I have not take up the doctrines of other Nyāya thinkers. The definition of verbal testimony (*śabdapramāṇa*) employed by sage Goutama in his book *Nyāya-sūtra* as follows – *'Āptopadeśah*Śabda*' (NS, 1.1.7.).* If we analyses the definition of *śabdapramāṇa*, i.e., *Āptopadeśah*Śabda*'*, we can see that the wholedefinition consists in two terms i.e., '*Āptopadeśa'* and '*Śabda'*. Again, the term*Āptopadeśah*is combined of two words i.e., '*āptaḥ'* and '*upadeśaḥ'*. The word '*āptaḥ'* is to be treated as a trustworthy or reliable person.However, Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāsya*, the earlier available commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra*, states that a person can be regarded as a reliable or trustworthy if he fulfills the following conditions- *āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikbyāṣayā prayukta upadeṣtā* (*Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūrta* 1.1.7 p.14). It means

1. The person must have direct apprehension or first-hand knowledge.
2. The person must have the desire to communicate the achieving knowledge to others without any distortion.
3. The person must have an effort to utter the sentence and,
4. The person must be capable to speak properly.[1]

If a person or speaker fulfills all these conditions then he will be free from some defects. Firstly, the speaker must be free from *ajñatā* (ignorance), *bhṛama* (wrong notion) about the thing(s) that he wants to speak of. This fulfills the first condition mentioned above. Then the speaker needs to remove from *akṛpa* (lack of compassion), *svārthakāmtva* (utter selfishness) and *vipralipśā* (desire of misleading others). This fulfills the second condition. Thirdly, the person must overcome his idleness or laziness (*alasya*) which satisfies the third condition. Finally, the speaker should be free from *pramāda* (carelessness) and *vāgindriyavaikalya* (any defect of speech-organs. This is satistythe fourth condition.[2] Above all, a speaker should also be free from any bias (*pakṣapāta*) of the thing(s) that he wants to speak about.

Again, Vātsyāyana expresses that *āpta* or *āpti* means a person who is characterized by the property and that property consists in direct or perceptual knowledge of the thing(s) that he wants to speak about. This following condition is equally applicable to all kinds of persons – be they honorable people or be they sages (*ṛṣi* – s) or be they barbarians. But this above discussion gives rise to some incidental questions against the view of Vātsyāyana. The scripture (which is considered to be*śabdapramāṇa* in Nyāya philosophy) contains sentences about imperceptible objects like the merit (*apūrva*), the heaven, the hell etc. The meaning of the word *āpta* as it has been emphasized by Vatsyayāna should be equally applicable here also. The reason is obvious because the verbal testimony comes only from a speaker who has direct knowledge of the objects that he actually wants to speak about. So, doesVatsyayāna say regarding the concept of verbal testimony? It will pose problems regarding the classification of verbal testimony that has been mentioned by sage Gautama in his *Nyāya-sūrta*. 1.1.8. The classification of verbal testimony is as follows:

Sa dvividhaḥdṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt /8/

Verbal testimony, here, has been considered to be two types and this classification depends on the difference of the nature of the objects – whether the object is perceptible or imperceptible. Now, if the notion of*āptopadeśaḥ* is taken in the sense of Vatsyayāna then there cannot be any verbal testimony regarding imperceptible entities. Thus problems crop up regarding the classification of*śabdapramāṇa*.

Uddyotakara, anotherNyāya scholar, has proposed an answer to the objection raised against Vātsyāyana. According to Uddyotakara, the distinction between perceptible and imperceptible entities is not an absolute one. We know that, the heaven, the hell etc. are not perceptible to us, but they are perceptible to sages (*ṛṣi*-s) or to God. Hence though ordinary people like us cannot be authoritative or *āpta* regarding the imperceptible entities the extra-ordinary persons like sages can very much be*āpta*. So the theory, suggested by Vātsyāyana is not refutable.Here, I stop discussing it because this concept is being discussed in depth and detail in *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* Vācaspati Miśra and *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa.

Jayarāśibhaṭṭa's Doubt

Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, a qualified skeptic, who has been flourished on between 800 AD -840 AD in sought India[3], presenting a kind of methodological skepticism which is associated with the materialistic *Cāvāka* or *Lokāyata* school of thought. He wrote a manuscript *Tattvapaplavasiṁha* (*tattva* means categories, *upalava* means destruction and consequently *simha* representing the lion) which was discovered in 1926 in a Jain manuscript library at Sanghavina Padano Bhander, Patan by Pandit Sukhlalji and Bechardas Dosi. He, a radical skeptic, has doubted on various epistemological, metaphysical etc. theories offered by various schools of thoughts. His main objective is that it is not possible to define properly the true cognition with standard form which is derived from our cognitive procedures or *pramāṇas*. It is simply because the *pramāṇas*, according to him, are either unconstructed or unreasonable or fundamentally flawed.

In *Tattvapaplavasimha*, the skeptical objections from different perspective have been raised by Jayarāśi against the theory of verbal knowledge and one of the most important objections made by Jayarāśī is about the certainty of the assertions of a reliable or trustworthy person. He maintains that the sentences uttered by a reliable or trustworthy person can never be immune from doubt. Therefore, the certainty of a statement, for him, is highly questionable. The arguments pointed by Jayarāśī are as follows:

As it is stated by Vātsyayana a person is called trustworthy when he is characterized by some qualities. Among of them one principal characteristic is that the trustworthy person must have direct knowledge of the object (*sākṣātkṛtadharmatā*)[4] he is talking about. It is worthy to note that by direct knowledge Vātsyayana means any sort of valid knowledge ascertained through any one of the *pramāṇas* admitted by the Nyāya School. But Jayarāśi argues that no *pramāṇa* can give us valid knowledge. Thus it shows that a person cannot have direct knowledge of anything and owing to this reason no person can be considered as trustworthy (*āpta*).

Secondly, Jayarāśi's doubt is about the relationship between a word uttered by a reliable person and it's signified or its meaning. Regarding the relation between word and its meaning, four views have been proposed by the cognitive thinkers of Indian schools. Jayarāśi in *Tattvapaplavasimha* critically explains all these views. At the very beginning, Jayarāśi has pointed out some relevant doubt of identical relation of the Grammarian thinkers. Then he has examined the causal relationship of the word – meaning of Buddhism. After that he has gradually refuted the third alternative about the conventional relation of word – meaning of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas Lastly, he shown the absurdity on natural relation of Mīmāṁsāka School.

Jayarāśi's refutation of the above views cannot be acceptable at all. I will not discuss all the views. Here basically I will try to show concisely what Naiyāyikas says against Jayarāśi's refutation of a word uttered by a reliable person and its meaning. Jayarāśi has gradually examined the third alternative about the conventional relation of word – meaning of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. According to them, the conventional

relation of word and their meaning demonstrated to us either by God or by human being. Jayarāśi demonstrated some critical observations against the opinion of Naiyāyikas. For him, Naiyāyikas believe in the momentariness of the origin of word. Jayarāśi, here, pointed out that the meaning of a word originated in the first step does not remain the same meaning in the second step while the word remains as same. And the meaning of word produced in a second step does not remain the same meaning in the third step. It goes on in this way and in this case the word remains unchanged but the meaning of a word changes from moment to moment and at the moment of expressing the relationship the same meaning of a word is not still there. As a result, it involved a fallacy of unwanted consequences or *atiprasaṅgā*[5].

I think, the arguments made by Jayarāśi against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas's concept of word-meaning cannot be justifiable because he has shown the problem on the momentary of the meaning of word i.e. the meaning has changed one moment to another moments but the word remain as same. In this regards, to support of Naiyāyikas's argument, we can say the content of the meaning of word remains as same i.e. the meaning originate in the first moment does not remain the same meaning in the second moment though the content of the first meaning of a word is maintained in the second meaning of a word.

Śrīharṣa's Doubt

The skeptic, Śrīharṣa is an Indian poet and philosopher of 12th century CE of Northern India. He never included himself in any school in traditional Indian philosophy. Some have proved that he was an affiliate of Advaita Vedānta (Phillips 1995; Ramprasad 2002). He starts his skeptical view with the assertion that '*lakṣaṇa - pramāṇābhyāṁvastusiddhiḥ*, i.e., something will be considered as true if and only if it is established by and defined with valid proof.[6]He critically analyses in *Khaṇḍaṇa-khaṇḍa-khādyam* that it is impossible for us to define a real thing because if we try to define a real thing, it leads us to the fallacy of *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*, it is equally true in the case of verbal testimony. Verbal testimony, for maintaining his position, has been denied by Śrīharṣa in two ways. In other words, his denial of *śabdapramāṇa* consists of two steps. In the first steps, he is primarily

concerned with the term '*āpta'* and in the second steps, he criticizes the definition of word or proper meaning of word (*pada*) as it stated in Pāṇinian philosophy. Let us now see in the first part, how Śrīharṣa raises objections against the term '*āpta'*.

Śrīharṣa says that if by the term '*āpta'* is to be understood as a person who has directly cognized the object he wants to talk about (*sākṣātkṛtadharmatā*) then the definition leads us to *ativyāpti* (too wide). If the term '*āpta'* again is defined as a person who is free from ignorance, doubt, i.e., every possible defects (*doṣa*) then the definition becomes too narrow (*avyāpti*). Therefore, it is impossible to define the term '*āpta'* and consequently the validity of verbal testimony cannot be recognized.

The argument employed by Śrīharṣa that if a trustworthy person is defined as a man who has direct awareness of the objects he goes to talk about then the definition becomes too wide because it includes illusory cognition also.[7] A person does not always see an object as it really is; sometimes he has illusory cognition also. Now, if a person ascertains valid as well as invalid cognition then how can we know that the statement uttered by a reliable person is a valid one? Suppose a person sees a piece of silver in the place of shell. Here, the awareness of the speaker in that particular moment appears to be valid, but actually it is not a valid knowledge; it is just as an illusory cognition. Consequently, the statement of such a person cannot be considered as a means of valid knowledge.

But the above objection raised by Śrīharṣa is applicable to some persons but it is not applicable to all. Because this fact cannot be denied that, there are at least some persons who are purely free from all sorts of erroneous cognition. But, Śrīharṣa thinks that, it is not a logical answer to his question. Sometime it is seen that a man unconsciously or unintentionally commits a wrong or invalid statement by slip of tongue although he has right or valid awareness about it. For instance, a person is quite aware about the fact that his body is different from his mind but unconsciously utters that 'the body is identical with the mind'. Here, the sentence is wrong because body is totally different from mind. But the awareness is not wrong because he is aware about that distinction.

Hence, if by *āpta* is understood as a man who acquires knowledge by the valid means then the definition of *āptapuruṣa* can be applied to this man also. But in fact this person is not to be considered as *āpta* since the statement uttered by him is wrong or invalid though he has valid knowledge about it.

Again, Śrīharṣa emphasizes that if the word '*āpta'* or a trustworthy person is characterized by as a person who is free from every possible *doṣa*-s (defects) like doubt, lack of compassion, wrong notion, ignorance etc. then this definition would suffer from the fallacy of *avyāpti* (too narrow). Because there are so many persons who are not totally free from the above defects but inspite of that suddenly he utters something which is valid or right. It can be explained with the help of an example. Suppose, Ram has 100 dollars in his pocket and he is not aware about it. But suddenly utters that 'I have 100 dollars with me'. Here, Ram is not to be said as *āptapuruṣa*, because he is not free from all defects; he is totally ignorant about it. But the statement is valid or right because it leads us to pragmatic success (*pravṛttisāmarthya*). If a reliable or trustworthy person, Śrīharṣa thinks is characterized in this manner then many persons whose statements are absolutely right or valid would be excluded from that definition.

The opponents may, again, argue that the valid definition of a reliable or trustworthy person runs as one who expresses his cognition about something only so far and exactly in the same in which it has been cognized by him"[8] But this definition has not been accepted byŚrīharṣa, if somebody would try to define it in this way then nobody will be considered as a reliable or trustworthy person; because it is impossible for a person to express his awareness in the same form in which he has cognized. In this way Śrīharṣa shows us that it is not only difficult but also impossible to give any definition of a reliable or trustworthy person.

Conclusion

Now it is really a very difficult task for us to decide which view is acceptable. If we go to the philosophy of Jayarāśi and Srīharṣa, we will see that they both have given some strong arguments against the

acceptability of the term *āpta* and *upadeśaḥ* (sentence) in verbal testimony. But if we look at our practical life then we see that none of the views that *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* and *śabda* is a tool for communication can be denied.

Both skeptics Jayarāśi and Srīharṣa, deny the validity of *śabdapramāṇa* or linguistic communication because they are both find some inconsistency in the term *āpta* (and *pada*) as it is stated in Nyāya philosophy. But our practical experience clearly shows that linguistic communication or verbal knowledge is possible in our day to day life. We use language to make others understand our thoughts and similarly to refute the views of others we use language. Therefore, language becomes the source or medium of communication for both that are expression our thoughts to others and the refutation of the views of others. We can say that without accepting verbal knowledge, our communication system is impossible to communicate others. But our communication system is possible in our society. Thus, verbal knowledge is possible.

Secondly, if we do not accept *āpta-vākya* as a source of valid knowledge, then a number of problems crop up. Suppose a doctor treats a patient and prescribes some medicines for curing him from his illness and give him some instructions to follow. The patient follows all the instructions given by the doctor and he becomes cure. Here the doctor is the*āptapuruṣa* and the instructions are *vākyas*. Here the patient follows the instruction (*vākyas*) given by a doctor (*āptapuruṣa*) and ultimate becomes cured. That is called *saphalpṛvṛthijnanakattva*. If we do not admit verbal testimony as a source of knowledge then how can Jayarāśi and Srīharṣa explain this type of *saphalpṛvṛthijnanakattva* in our day to day life? Thus, as far as our practical life is concerned verbal knowledge of a reliable person must be admitted.

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Importance of Matter and the Issue of Mental Causation in Nyāya Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract

For philosophers adhering to dualism, elucidating the causal connection between the body and mind holds significant importance. Some Substance Dualists regard consciousness as the essence of the mind, while others regard consciousness as an accidental attribute of it. But they agree on one point that there is a need to admit a permanent entity beyond material substance as the substratum of consciousness. If the mind can exist independently of the body or material substance and consciousness is considered its essential attribute, the significance of material substance in explaining consciousness becomes less relevant. Since Cartesian dualism interprets the mind as un-extended, there is logical inadequacy in explaining its connection with the body. At the same time, the Cartesian Mind is not dependent on matter for consciousness and there is no room for the imagination of mind without consciousness. So explaining the unconscious mind is also somehow difficult for Descartes. In general, it seems impossible for us to conceive of consciousness apart from the body. While Naiyāyikas adhere to substance dualism, they differ on various aspects from Cartesian dualism. The purpose of this article is to shed light on how material substance becomes important in the mind-body dualism of the Naiyāyikas and how they rationalize the mind-body causal relationship.

Keywords: Matter, Mind, Substance Dualism, Mind-Body Complex, Mental Causation.

Introduction

Nyāya philosophy hold a deep reverence for the material world, acknowledging wholeheartedly that both matter and mind are fundamentally real. Some philosophical perspectives, such as Advaita monism or Berkeleyan immaterialism, assert that matter ultimately

lacks an independent existence beyond our consciousness. Contrary to these views, Nyāya accepts both mental and physical entities as ultimately real. The Advaita Vedantins perceive the external world as an illusion. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas, in acknowledging the reality of the material world, are inclined to elucidate the connection between the knower and the object of knowledge. Most importantly the Nyāya view of consciousness and life presupposes the material conjunction with the self and their causal roles that are missing in either the self alone or the matter alone. Therefore, it is important to delve into the ontological aspect of material substances and their conglomeration with the individual self that leads toward consciousness. Dualists provide several justifications for rejecting the notion that the human self is identical with the human body or any of its components. In light of this, we must explore how to explain the apparent phenomenon where the mind or self seems to influence and control various aspects of our physical body. In other words, how can we make room for the concept of mental causation? Mental causation can be understood as the causation of a specific desired outcome, which is based on intention. The objective here is to evaluate if Nyāya dualism is better suited than other forms of substance dualism, such as Cartesian dualism, in explaining the capacity for mental causation. To avoid terminological confusion, *manas* is referred to as inner sense throughout the article without treating it as synonymous with mind or self.

Nyāya conception of matter

Presently, it is crucial to elucidate the distinctive characteristic or defining property of physical or material substances as per the Nyāya philosophy. The defining feature of material substance, according to Nyāya, is possessing a specific quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) that can be externally perceived (*vahirindriya-grāhya*). Unlike the idealistic notion that attributes such as color and shape exist solely in the mind, Naiyāyikas advocate for these qualities to be attributed to physical substances. Here a physical substance is the causal substratum (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of externally perceivable quality such as size or color. External perception is not a priori or necessary condition for material substance but without the support of material substance externally perceivable quality cannot exist. However, the Nyāya

perspective on a physical entity being the underlying cause of externally observable qualities presents a meaningful approach for exploring the philosophical dilemma of the mind-body relationship. The Nyāya philosophy recognizes five types of physical substances: earth, water, fire, air, and *ākāśa* (the substratum of sound). Among these, the first four are fundamentally composed of atoms, while the last, *ākāśa*, is non-atomic and all-pervading. In contrast, the self or *ātman* is a spiritual substance that stands apart from all physical substances. It serves as the foundation of consciousness and lacks any externally observable characteristics. Additionally, Nyāya acknowledges three other types of substances. The first two are space (*dik*) and time, both of which are singular, boundless, and continuous, devoid of any distinct external qualities. The remaining substance is the inner sense (*manas*), which cannot be directly perceived but is inferred to explain our awareness of internal states such as pleasure and pain.

According to Nyāya philosophy, our body is a composition of material elements serving as a receptacle (*āyatana*) for worldly experiences. The body itself lacks consciousness and is neither the enjoyer nor the sufferer. The conscious self is the one experiencing pleasure or pain. The self must be associated with a body to have sensation. This connection is termed as a conjunction (*saṃyoga*), and it is specific to each individual, existing solely between a particular self and a particular body. This unique connection is crucial to explaining the personal and private nature of our inner mental experiences. The internal state depends on the essential causal requirement of being in contact with the body and, by extension, with space. As per the Naiyāyikas, they assert that only an object possessing extension (*parimāṇa*) is capable of making contact with a physical body.

Nyāya argument for the existence of individual self or jīvātmān

In his *Nyāyasūtra*, Goutama expressed the view that, "The self cannot be denied, because the fact of memory can be explained only on the admission of its being a quality of the self…".[1] According to Nyāya philosophy, memory is regarded as a quality requiring an underlying substratum. The substratum for this quality cannot be the object being recollected, as instances exist where recollection pertains to objects that

no longer exist. Sense organs are also ruled out as the substratum, as each sense organ is limited to perceiving specific types of objects; for example, the visual sense is limited to color and does not encompass taste or smell. Likewise, the body is eliminated as the substratum for memory, as physical qualities are perceptible by others, leading to the illogical conclusion that one person's memory could be recollected by another.

The argument extends to the changing nature of the body from infancy to old age, making it untenable for the same person to recollect something perceived during infancy in their youth or old age. Consequently, a distinct conscious agent capable of perceiving various types of objects must be posited to account for the comprehensive nature of memory. Since neither the sense organs nor the body fulfill this role, the conscious agent is identified as the self.

Goutama also elucidated that the attributes like desire, aversion, volition, happiness, misery and cognition as the probans of the self *("ichhā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duhkha-jñānāni ātmano lingam"-Nyāyasūtra-1.1.15*). The presence of the *ātman* can be identified by examining these attributes or qualities using the inner sense as a tool. These attributes cannot belong to the material substances or the body because they are not tangible or physical qualities perceived by the external senses. The external senses are merely tools or supports for the manifestation of consciousness. Consequently, Naiyāyikas acknowledge that these attributes are distinct properties belonging to a distinct type of substance other than physical substances. The existence of numerous selves (*jīvātman)* in numerous bodies is justified by the fact that their experiences do not overlap but remain separate and distinct.

Nyāya dualism vs. Cartesian dualism: overcoming the problem of explaining the mental causation

Now it is worth noticing the differences between Nyāya dualism and Cartesian dualism. Both Nyāya and Cartesian dualism recognized the need to acknowledge the existence of a distinct type of substance that alone is the substratum of consciousness and that lacks any externally perceivable specific quality. However, Naiyāyikas do not believe that

this substance must necessarily lack extension. Certainly, the Nyāya philosophy asserts that the self or the mind possesses extension. As per the Naiyāyikas, they believe that for one substance to contact another, it must possess extension because they argue that contact relies on the presence of spatial dimensions. Furthermore, it challenges the notion that the division between physical and mental is all-encompassing, acknowledging various types of substances that do not fall into either category. As mentioned earlier substances like time and space do not belong in either physical or mental substances. Lastly, the Nyāya philosophy makes a clear differentiation between the mind and the inner sense, viewing them as distinct types of substance. In contrast, Cartesian dualism does not make such a distinction and often attributes the inner sense's functions to the self.

Frequently, there's a common complaint against Cartesian dualism that it's quite perplexing to understand how a non-physical, un-extended substance could have any influence on the body. This complaint is often rooted in the belief that any cause of a physical event should either be located where the event occurs or connected to it through a series of events linking the cause's location to the effect's location. This belief is closely tied to the idea that the realm of physical events is causally closed to material substances that have extension. No causal chain can be traced back from a purely physical effect to previous causes, some of which are non-spatial in nature. Cartesian dualism appears to struggle with this objection. Nevertheless, Nyāya dualism takes a different approach by not insisting that the self lacks spatial properties, making it less obvious that the earlier objection applies to it. In any case, it's necessary to reevaluate the concept of mental causation to determine whether and how Nyāya dualism can accommodate it.

Descartes posited that while the mind possesses beliefs, desires, and volitions, it lacks physical attributes such as shape, size, or velocity. On the other hand, the body possesses attributes like shape, size, and velocity but lacks mental aspects such as beliefs, desires, or volitions. According to his perspective, mental states such as pleasure and pain are constrained to time but not in space. Conversely, Naiyāyikas believe that all positive, impermanent entities occupy specific spaces and persist

for defined durations, including internal states like pleasure and pain. To put it differently, my pleasure, for instance, occurs within the confines of my body (*avaccheda*), much like other internal states.[2] Time, akin to space, is singular, boundless, and uninterrupted. Its segmentation into distinct temporal periods relies on impermanent composite substances like the body. Therefore, temporal attributes apply to internal states like pleasure, but spatial attributes do not, a perspective not embraced by Nyāya.

It also appears to be challenging to explain my feelings, my sensory experiences, and similar aspects without considering my body. If this assertion holds true, it supports the argument that both spatial and temporal predicates apply to internal states. While Descartes struggles to claim that internal states like cognition and pleasure exist within my body, the Naiyāyikas can assert the opposite. According to Nyāya philosophy, while the self possesses extension, it is not dense or obstructive, and it doesn't obstruct other physical objects from coexisting in the same space. In this sense of extension, an extended entity is merely in contact with another substance and doesn't hinder other substances from coming into contact with the same entity. According to their viewpoint, contact entails spatial proximity, which presupposes the presence of spatial extension.

Descartes held the belief that anything with extension is physical, while anything conscious lacks extension.[3] It's reasonable to assert that most physical entities possess extension. However, it doesn't necessarily mean that all extended entities are physical. For instance, according to Naiyāyikas, there exist extended substances like the self, which aren't physical. One significant distinction lies in the fact that, in contrast to Descartes, the Nyaȳa philosophy does not assert that consciousness is the core essence of the self. According to Nyāya, the self serves as the foundational basis of consciousness, but consciousness is considered an accidental (*agantuka*) attribute that arises within the self only when certain necessary causal conditions are present. Descartes, on the other hand, views the self as a thinking substance and maintains that it is always accompanied by consciousness. For Descartes, lacking consciousness is equivalent to being purely material. The Naiyāyikas reject the assumption that everything can be categorized as either mental

or physical, as either inherently conscious or inherently extended. In terms of consciousness, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the self remains conscious during states of deep sleep, coma, and similar conditions. Therefore, the Nyāya philosophy believes that consciousness is a contingent quality of the self.

The main challenge within the Cartesian perspective lies in explaining how a physically extended entity interacts causally with something that lacks any extension. Descartes proposed that this interaction occurs within the pineal gland, which he believed to be the location of the core conscious self. However, as this idea appears to lack sufficient logic, it underscores the fundamental problem with his viewpoint.

According to Nyāya, life and consciousness result from the combination of the *ātman* or the self and the body, and they play unique causal roles that are absent when considering only the self or the body separately. This concept is consistent with the conservation principle, which permits the emergence of new features and causal functions in an effect that is not present in its causal components. For instance, this principle remains valid even when we observe that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen but exhibits causal functions that neither hydrogen nor oxygen possess.

According to the Nyāya theory of causation, a causal factor is constantly present where the effect arises just before it occurs. Nevertheless, they rigorously analyze and dismiss the belief that the effect exists in advance (*satkāriya*) within the cause. They do not adhere to the causal adequacy principle like Descartes, which states that the cause determines the characteristics of the effect, and the effect can have less but not more than what is inherent in the cause.

If we accept the Nyāya perspective on causation, explaining the interaction between bodily and internal states becomes straightforward. This interaction is no different from the interaction between two bodily states or two internal states. When we say that one bodily state is a causal condition of another, according to Nyāya, we mean that the former consistently precedes the latter within the same body or a group

of bodies. Similarly, when we claim that an internal state is a causal condition of another internal state, it implies that the former consistently precedes the latter within the same self or a group of selves. Likewise, when an internal state causally affects a bodily state, it is present when the bodily state is produced immediately before its occurrence. The same principle applies in reverse, where a bodily state causally influences an internal state. This is because the self and the body are in contact and together constitute the mind-body complex.[4]

Conclusion

In our everyday encounters, it is challenging to conceive of consciousness without considering the body. In contrast to the Cartesian perspective, where consciousness is the core of the self and not reliant on the body; Cartesian mind can uphold its essence independently. This poses a challenge when attempting to elucidate the unconscious mind within Cartesian dualism. In contrast, the Naiyāyikas emphasize the significance of matter, as they view consciousness as an accidental attribute of the self and at the same time consciousness claims connection with bodily or material substance.

Descartes presupposes that location inherently implies extension, but this assumption is challenged by the Naiyāyikas, who assert otherwise. According to their perspective, internal states possess a location but not extension. For instance, consider an internal state like desire, viewed by Naiyāyikas as a quality (*guṇa*) that, notably, lacks extension (*parimāṇa*), a characteristic that can only be ascribed to a substance (*dravya*). These strong views, coupled with their well-established regularity theory of causation, enable the Nyāya philosophy to avoid a significant challenge posed by Cartesian dualism, particularly in the context of the mind-body problem.

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Quine and Bhartṛhari on Meaning Holism: A Comparative Study

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Abstract

The paper aims to make a comparative study between Quine and Bhartṛhari regarding the conception of meaning holism. Besides many differences, they may be similar in regard to accepting a holistic theory of meaning. Quine establishes his idea of meaning holism from the perspective of naturalism, according to which language and meaning are natural facts that are based on linguistic behaviour. Within this naturalistic framework, Quine has explained his notion of meaning holism. It says, against meaning atomism, that sentences in a theory are not meaningful separately; they are meaningful as a whole. Bhartṛhari, on the other hand, accepts the "indivisibility thesis," which talks about the *sphoṭa* theory *and Pratibhā* theory. According to these theories, the sentence is an indivisible whole that manifests meaning holistically. This paper consists of four sections. It begins with an introduction where I shall try to explain the logical ground or basis for the comparative study between them. In the second section, I shall attempt to explain Quine's idea of meaning holism in detail. The third section will deal with Bhartṛhari's idea of meaning holism in detail. Finally, in conclusion, I will make a comparison between their positions on meaning holism: In which way, they are different from each other, and in which way they are similar.

Keywords: Analyticity, Reductionism, Naturalism, Meaning holism, Indivisibility thesis, *Sphoṭa* theory, *Pratibhā* theory, Sentence holism

1. Introduction

The notion of comparison is very much related to our lives. When we make a comparison between things, between persons, or between ideas, etc., we find some connection between them. In the case of a comparison between something, we see both similarities and dissimilarities between them. So, when we make a comparison between,

e.g., two people, it is necessary to have some connection between those two people. Taking this notion of comparison in mind, let's try to make a comparison between the well-known grammarian cum philosopher Bhartṛhari and the philosopher of language Willard Van Orman Quine. The problem is that these two philosophers are very much different in time and geographical location. Bhartṛhari is an Indian grammarian cum philosopher who belongs to the ancient period of time. Quine, on the other hand, is an American philosopher of language and belongs to the 20th-century analytic philosophy. It should also be said that their philosophical background are very different from each other. Bhartṛhari deals with *Sanskṛta* grammar and its relevance to philosophy, whereas Quine deals with epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and so on in English. In this context, it seems that there is no relevant reason to make a comparative study between Quine and Bhartṛhari. But we can attempt to find a relevant basis for comparison between them. If we study the works of Quine carefully, we may find a link to compare them. In the footnote[1] of *Word and Object*, Quine appreciates the ancient Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari's holistic theory of meaning, although he did not directly mention the name of Bhartṛhari. When Quine read the paper written by J. Borough, he found that Borough talked of the notion of 'indivisibility thesis' (*akhaṇḍapakṣa*) of Bhartṛhari regarding language and meaning that is analogically related to Quine's notion of meaning holism. That is why Quine appreciates Bhartṛhari in the footnote of *Word and Object*. So, we have found a basis for comparison between Quine and Bhartṛhari. But I do not claim that no one has made a comparative study earlier between those crucial thinkers. Rather, many philosophers or writers have explained earlier regarding this issue.[2] But my approach is to clarify and understand the relationship between Quine and Bhartṛhari regarding the notion of meaning holism more simply. In this context, first of all, we shall try to understand Quine's view on meaning holism and then Bhartṛhari's view on the 'indivisibility thesis.'

2. Quine on Meaning Holism

Quine explained the doctrine of meaning holism in his various writings. The "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) is considered one of his

crucial papers, from which he begins to explain the holistic approach to meaning. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine primarily dealt with some crucial arguments to conclude that the classical distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* cannot be entertained, and in addition to it, he also argued against the reductionist claim. To explain the background of analyticity, he defined it in this way: a statement can be analytically true "when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact" (Quine, 1951, p.21). In contrast, the truth of a statement can be synthetic when it is "grounded in fact" (p.20). One thing should be made clear that Quine did not arise any problem with synthetic truths; rather, his major problem is with analyticity, the analyticity which is based on synonymy.[3] Synonymy can be understood in a *cognitive* sense, [4] according to which, for example, if two expressions "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are synonymous cognitively, it means that they are the same in meaning. Quine has given various arguments against the notion of synonymy that leads to denying analyticity.[5] The denial of analyticity leads to denying "*a priori* knowledge, which is independent of all experience" (Das, 1949, p.3) and necessary. In this way, Quine denies Kant's analytic statement and a priori ideas. Later on, he denies both Frege's notion of sense and Carnap's notion of *intension* (or *meaning*) because both represent analyticity in terms of synonymy.[6] In this context, he does not accept the distinction between analytic and synthetic and considers it a dogma of empiricism (or positivism).

He finds that the empiricists' approach to reductionism is another dogma, according to which there is autonomy of sentences in isolation. It represents an atomistic approach to meaning because it says that in a scientific theory sentences are significant (or meaningful) separately. It is very much acquainted with the positivist's notion of verificationism which states that "the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically confirming or infirming it" (Quine, 1951, p.35). Quine also shows that there is a link between reductionism and analyticity because both are based on synonymy. It can be clear by his next definition of verificationism. According to verificationism, Quine says, "statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in the method of empirical confirmation or information" (p.35). So, positivists' notion of

verificationism admits synonymy that represents both reductionism and analyticity. Against this analytic and reductionist approach, Quine suggests a holistic view as: "our statements about the external world face the tribunal sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" (p.38).

The problem is that I won't say that no objection arises against Quine's attack on the two dogmas. Rather, Grice and Strawson (1956) raised objections against Quine's attack on the first dogma. They argued and say that "In short, "analytic" and "synthetic" have a more or less established philosophical use; and it seems to suggest that it is absurd, even senseless, to say that there is no such distinction" (Grice and Strawson, 1956, p.143). But they did not succeed in defending analyticity because Gilbert Harman (1967) argues that Quine's rejection of the first dogma states that "nothing is analytically true" (Harman, 1967, p.125). This is why; he says that the distinction between analytic and synthetic is analogously related to the difference between "witch" and "nonwitch," which cannot win to distinguish anything, since no witch really exists. In this context, he says that Strawson and Grice are wrong in saying that Quine's attack on the first dogma is meaningless or senseless. Rather, it can be said that Quine's position is right to deny both analyticity and reductionism.

However, we can say that Quine's refutation of two dogmas consequently refutes the classical and the positivist's notion of analyticity, the notion of intension, meanings, rules, necessities, and also denies verificationism. He (1951) says that the result of this denial is a step towards naturalism and pragmatism. It is naturalism because it is a philosophical approach that denies all kinds of *a priori* ideas and supernatural things. That is, it omits the difference between philosophy and natural science. Gibson (1988) says that naturalism claims that no real knowledge exists outside the realm of natural science, and there is no reality other than natural science. It is pragmatism because Quine's approach to natural science is based on theory testing in physics. So, we can say that within a naturalistic and pragmatic framework, Quine's idea of holism can be best understood. Such holism can be called confirmation holism because, in a scientific theory, the sentences cannot

be confirmed or infirmed separately. Rather, "the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science" (Quine, 1951, p.39). Later on, Quine named this holism the "Duhem-Quine thesis" (Quine, 1975, p.313) because like Duhem, he says, "scientific statements are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly as a theory that they imply their observable consequences" (p.313). We can understand Quine's holism by taking Gibson's example of theory testing in physics. He says:

> "For example, a given theory might entail (or predict) that under certain conditions water boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. Now suppose we set up an experiment designed to test this claim only to find that our water boiled at 214 degrees Fahrenheit. Have we refuted the hypothesis? Not necessarily, not if we are willing to revise the truth values of other sentences in the theory. Perhaps our water is not pure, or some other condition was violated, or our thermometer is faulty, or we simply misread the thermometer. There are any number of ways of saving the hypothesis, for the despite appearances it is not the single hypothesis that is being tested, but the theory as a whole." (Gibson, 1988, p.12).

However, we have explained Quine's notion of confirmation holism. In the same vein, Quine explains the holistic theory of meaning: sentences of a theory are not meaningful separately but as a whole. As we have explained, Quine denies the classical notion of meaning and then establishes a naturalistic and pragmatic approach to language in the spirit of John Dewey's way[7], which is based on the action of speaking of language and its meaning can be understood in a behaviouristic way. So, Quine says that "meaning…is primarily a property of behaviour" (Quine, 1969, p. 29). This is why; for him, language and meaning are natural facts that are based on linguistic behaviour. So, Quine's approach to meaning is characterised as the naturalization of meaning (naturalistic semantics). Quine's notion of naturalistic semantics can be understood through the thesis called indeterminacy of translation which leads to meaning holism.[8]

Quine (1960, pp.23-27) explains the indeterminacy of translation through *radical translation* where, e.g., a linguist translates an unknown language (e.g., a native language), and he has no prior aids to translate the language. So, he will start to translate the unknown language just based on the behaviour of the native speaker. If we develop Quine's view of meaning through radical translation, we will find that meaning is indeterminate. According to the indeterminacy of translation, "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" (Quine, 1960, p.24). It says that we can set up two or more translation manuals for the sentence uttered by the native speaker. Each manual is compatible with the totality of the native speaker's linguistic dispositions. But they are incompatible with each other. So, the linguist has two or more translation manuals of the sentence uttered by the native speaker. In this context, we can say that meaning is tied to the behaviour of the speaker and his surrounding circumstances. It leads to the claim that the linguist has two or more translation manuals, so the linguist cannot translate the language determinately; this is why translation is indeterminate. Since translation is indeterminate, meanings are also indeterminate, which leads to meaning holism.

However, whatever the meaning is, is manifested from the linguistic behaviour of the speaker, which says that there are two or more translation manuals of language. So, it says that there is no uniqueness of meaning; rather, translations are indeterminate. According to the indeterminacy of translation, "the choice between two behaviourally equivalent translation manuals is immaterial; it is pseudo-choice: there is no reality of sentential meaning as entities, about which translation could be right or wrong" (Gaudet, 2006, p.5). That is, we have found Quine's doctrine of meaning holism through his indeterminacy of translation thesis. It leads to the conclusion that Quine is a relativist because he says that meaning cannot be understood by what the speaker utters; rather, to grasp meaning, we have to observe his (the speaker's) relative surrounding circumstances. That is why a sentence's meaning is relatively connected to other sentences of the

language; they together construct a network for discovering the meaning of the language.

However, we have explained Quine's notion of the meaning holism. But if we carefully observe his writings, we will find two sorts of meaning holism. If we think of meaning holism in the form of a "corporate body" or "Duhem-Quine" thesis, we will find meaning holism in a strong sense, what Gibson (2000) calls "extreme holism". According to it, there is no autonomous meaning of sentences of the language; they are meaningful as a whole, corporate body. In *Word and Object*, we may say that he gives very much importance to the sentences that are immediately connected to observation, called *observation sentences*.[9] In this case, he might not deny the autonomous meaning thoroughly of those sentences; rather, he appreciates that a sentence with some autonomy connected to the other sentences (meaning-bearing units) simultaneously constructs a web of belief or network for discovering the meaning of the language. So, the meaning of sentences (observation sentences) is a "device…for exploring the fabric of interlocking sentence" (Quine, 1960, p.35). In this case, sentences are relative to (or dependent on) the total theory, and vice versa. This type of holism can be called Quine's moderate version of holism. As we have seen above, Quine appreciates Bhartṛhari's "indivisible thesis," which may be related to the meaning holism in the moderate sense. In this context, we are going to understand Bhartṛhari's thesis.

3. Indivisibility Thesis and Bhartṛhari: A Step towards Meaning Holism

Bhartṛhari's study of meaning plays a unique role in the history of Indian philosophy of language. The Indian theory of meaning is divided into two groups (*pakṣa*): *Khaṇḍa-pakṣa* and *Akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*. The former is maintained by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā, and Naiyāyikas. For it, small elements of language are meaningful in isolation, which may be called meaning atomism. The latter one is maintained by Bhartṛhari. For it, the sentence (*vākya*) is an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*) (Bhartṛhari, 1971, 2.7). Division of a sentence into words (*pada*) and division of a word into the base (*prakṛti*) and affix

(*pratyaya*) were assumptions (2.10). He does not admit the meaning of an individual word in isolation; rather, he opines that word-meaning in isolation is an illusion. Only the meaning of an undifferentiated sentence is true. As defined by Bhartṛhari, "the sentence is an inseparable sentence-essence (*akhaṇḍavākya sphoṭa*)" (2.58); a *sphoṭa* is the semantic component of the phenomenon of language, and it etymologically means that the meanings are burst forth. However, Bharthari asserts the sentence is the indivisible whole, which can only adequately express 'reality'. So, his idea of meaning is known as sentence holism. To explain the holistic study of meaning in terms of *sphoṭa*, Maṇḍana Miśra, a famous follower of Bhartṛhari, says that "when we perceive a cloth, our cognition is of the cloth as a whole and is quite distinct from the various threads and colours involved" (Coward, 1980, 30). Thus, the sentence can be called *sphoṭa*, which is the indivisible whole. Words emerge as part of our artificial analysis from the indivisible whole.

In *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari also gives more clarification regarding sentence-meaning. Here, he explains at least eight sorts of theories regarding the concept of sentences. Among those, the *Pratibhā* theory is very significant to his idea of sentence holism. The term *pratibhā* means a flash of light (a revelation). Taking a sentence as an indivisible unit (or as a whole), Bhartṛhari defined that "intelligence (*pratibhā*), which possesses fresher flashes of wisdom (*navanavonmeṣaśalinīprajñā*), is sentence-meaning" (Bhartṛhari, 1971, 2:119-20). He used the word *pratibhā* from a broader perspective. *Pratibhā* is the flashing revelation of language within the mind that is not composed but provided universally and is revealed non-differently through language within the mind. As Bhartṛhari has given an opinion for it as follows: "This *pratibhā* cannot be in any way explained to others in terms of 'it is this', its existence can be ratified only in the individual's experience of it, and the experience himself cannot be described it" (Bhartṛhari, 1974, p.146). This is the way to understand the indivisible meaning of a sentence as a whole. According to Bhartṛhari, the sentence is 'a single integral symbol' revealed by the isolated letters and the words that comprise it. The meaning conveyed by it is an 'instantaneous flash of insight or intuition' (*pratibhā*).[10] As a

holist, he opines that, in general, a whole is more actual than its individual parts. The words do not have any reality in themselves.

Hence, sentence-meaning (*pratibhā*) is a single-meaning unit of integrated language. It cannot be analysed further into a smaller meaning unit which is the real, known as *akhaṇḍavākyārtha* of Bhartṛhari. "There is no division of a sentence into words and also no division of sentence-meanings into constituent meanings" (Bhartṛhari, 1971, p.2.13). We must thus accept that the sentence is an indivisible whole and bears one single meaning. Bhartṛhari takes the word *pratibhā* for a flash of awareness within the mind, which is sentential meaning. Remarkably in Bhartṛhari's view, '*sphoṭa*' is the sentence, and the meaning it expresses non-differently within the mind is *pratibhā*. Thus, Bhartṛhari accepts a holistic theory of meaning, called sentence holism: a sentence is taken as an indivisible whole that manifests meaning holistically.

4. Concluding Remarks

However, we have understood meaning holism from the perspectives of Quine and Bhartṛhari. They indeed belong to two different spaces and times, and their philosophical backgrounds are also different from each other. Quine is a contemporary philosopher from America who takes philosophy in a naturalistic position. Within this naturalistic framework, Quine establishes his theory of meaning. But Bhartṛhari is a famous ancient grammarian-philosopher from India who developed his meaning theory from a grammatical perspective. Besides these differences, both of the philosophers welcome meaning holism, and we have mentioned above that Quine himself appreciates Bhartṛhari for his indivisibility thesis, which suggests a holistic approach to meaning. It is also true that there is a difference between them in their approach to meaning holism.

Bhartṛhari, as a grammarian, has emphasized the relevance of the sentential whole. It says that the sentence is an integrated whole having no real components, and the sentence itself directly bears the meaning of the entire sentence. But in the case of Quine's holism, he does not accept sentence holism like this. According to him, a sentence and theory are mutually dependent for expressing meaning. In this case, a sentence with autonomous meaning depends on theory, and vice versa.

So, Quine's meaning holism can be called theory-holism, while Bhartṛhari's idea of holism is sentence holism. We may say that Bhartṛhari's idea of sentence holism is close to the Frege's (1953) notion of "context principle," according to which, a word is not meaningful separately; rather, it will only have meaning when it is used contextually in a sentence, but there are methodological differences between them. Hence, my finding is that Quine's holism is wider than that of Bhartṛhari.

Notes

1. See the footnote 2 in Quine, W., V. (1960). *Word and Object*, p.8. In this book, Quine refers to see Brough, J. (1953). Some Indian Theories of Meaning, pp. 164-167.

2. See, Ghosh, J. (2022). *From Meaning Atomism to Meaning Holism: A Study of Bhartṛhari, Wittgenstein and Quine*, Chapter 2. In that chapter, he elaborately explained the relationship between Quine and Bhartṛhari.

3. See, Quine, W., V. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism, p.24.

4. See, Ibid., p.28.

5. See, Ibid., pp.24-34.

6. See, Ibid., pp. 21-23.

7. See, Quine, W., V. (1969). Ontological Relativity, pp.28-29.

8. See, Rosa, R.,D., & Lepore, E. (2006). Quine's Meaning Holism, p.71.

9. See, Quine, *Word and Object*, pp. 36-41

10. For understanding *pratibhā* theory, I have followed, Ghosh, J. (2022). *From Meaning Atomism to Meaning Holism: A Study of Bhartṛhari, Wittgenstein and Quine*, pp.77-78.

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Unity and Diversity in *Ātman*: Exploring Indian Culture through Spiritual Traditions

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Abstract

The concept of Ātman, central to Indian philosophy, explores the nature of the self (ātman) and its relationship with Brahman, the ultimate reality. This study examines Ātman's profound influence on Indian art, literature, and music, highlighting its role in shaping cultural and spiritual expressions. Through a philosophical lens, Ātman emphasizes the unity and interconnectedness of all beings, reflecting Vedic insights and Upaniṣadic wisdom. Spiritual depths are conveyed through temple architecture, sculptures, paintings, and other works of art that use Ātman as an inspiration to express deity and eternal truths symbolically. Literature such as the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa explores Ātman through narratives of ethical dilemmas and the quest for self-realization, illustrating its enduring relevance in philosophical discourse. Moreover, Indian music, encapsulated in classical ragas and tālas, serves as a transformative journey aligning individual consciousness with universal harmony, echoing Ātman's essence of unity in diversity. This paper explores how the concept of Ātman continues to inspire and resonate across generations, fostering a deep connection between the individual soul and the cosmic reality of Brahman in Indian cultural and spiritual traditions.

Keywords: Ātman, Brahman, Indian literature, Artistic expression, Cultural spirituality, Self-realization, Philosophical discourse.

Introduction

The profound idea of *Ātman*, which is frequently translated as 'the doctrine of self,' is at the center of Indian philosophy. In Indian cosmology, *Brahman* is the ultimate reality. This fundamental concept explores the essence of the self, or *ātman*, and its inherent relationship with *Brahman*. As articulated by Radhakrishnan, "Reality is *Brahman* or *ātman*. No predication is possible of *Brahman* as predication involves

duality in empirical phenomena. The saving truth which redeems the individual from the stream of births and deaths is the recognition of his/her own identity with the Supreme. The multiplicity of the universe, the unending stream of life, is real but only as a phenomenal" (Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 26). This philosophy emphasizes the unity (*ekatva*) and interconnectedness (*ananyatva*) of all beings through the essential essence (*mūla*) of *ātman*, leaving an indelible mark on various aspects of Indian cultural expression. The concept of *ātman* holds that the individual self, or *ātman*, is not just a separate being but rather a crucial component in the cosmic web, deeply entwined with our existence. This comprehensive viewpoint is well aligned with the ancient Vedic texts, Upaniṣads, and Spiritual treatises that form the philosophical bedrock of Indian culture. In addition to being a philosophical pursuit, studying *ātman* is also an artistic endeavor that influences the creative expressions that define Indian cultural identity. This study explores the diverse influences of *ātman* on Indian art, literature, and music, offering more insights into the enduring significance and deep effect of *ātman*.

Through the lens of *ātman*, Indian art manifests as a profound spiritual expression, imbued with symbolic representations of divinity and the eternal self. The deeper philosophical principles regarding the nature of existence and the unity of all life forms are intended to be communicated through Indian art. Examples of this include colorful paintings presenting legendary narratives and ornate temple construction decorated with celestial figures. Similarly, in Indian literature, *ātman* is explored via stories that illuminate the complexities of human nature, moral dilemmas, and the quest for self-realization. From the Upaniṣads to the great epics like the Ramāyana and the Mahābhārata these narratives vary widely. By serving as a compass, *ātman* enriches and elucidates the Indian cultural and spiritual tapestry, cultivating a strong connection between the individual soul (*ātman*) and the ultimate reality (*Brahman*). This discussion explores how *ātman* continues to influence and shape literary, musical, and artistic expressions within the Indian tradition.

Impact on Indian Art

Indian art is characterized by its profound symbolism and devotion to representing divinity. The concept of *ātman*, a fundamental element of Indian philosophy, has left an indelible mark on the portrayal of deities and mythological figures within artistic expressions. These artistic renditions go beyond superficial representation; they encapsulate the profound notion of the divine self-existing within all living entities. The art's iconography meticulously conveys the philosophy that the *ātman,* transcends mere physical form, compelling artists to convey a spiritual presence that transcends material limitations. The influence of *ātman* is evident in various forms of Indian art, ranging from temple architecture and sculptures to paintings and contemporary digital arts. Temple architecture and sculptures, for example, often depict deities in meditative postures or with tranquil expressions, emphasizing their connection with the eternal *ātman*. The *āsana* (posture), *hasta* (hand gestures or *mudras*), and *mukha* (facial expressions) are intricately fashioned to convey the underlying spiritual import of the depicted deity. Gupta notes, "The meticulous design of *āsanas, hastas,* and *mukhas* in temple sculptures is intended to reflect the divine qualities and spiritual state of the deities, making them more than mere representations" (Gupta, 2004, pp. 107-114).

One of the most iconic representations of *ātman* in art is the portrayal of Lord *Śiva* in his form as *Nataraja* (also called *Narteśvara*), the cosmic dancer. This image is rich with symbolism, representing the dynamic balance of creation and destruction, a core principle in Indian cosmology. The encircling flames symbolize the continuous cycle of creation and destruction, while Lord *Śiva's* serene expression and balanced posture represent the calmness and stability of the *ātman* amidst the cosmic dance of change. As Harshananda elaborates, "The sculptures of deities often portray them in *dhāraṇā* (meditative) postures or tranquil expressions, encapsulating the essence of inner divinity and accentuating their nexus with the eternal *ātman*" (Harshananda, 2004, p. 62). In addition to temple art, paintings from various periods in Indian history reflect the influence of *ātman*. The intricate miniatures of the Mughal and Rajput forts, for instance, often depict scenes from the epics and *Purāṇas*, focusing on the divine

aspects of the characters. These paintings not only illustrate mythological narratives but also seek to convey deeper philosophical truths about the nature of the self and the universe. The use of vibrant colors and symbolic elements serves to enhance the spiritual message embedded within the artwork.

Contemporary artists continue to engage with *ātman*, infusing it into diverse forms such as paintings, digital art, and installations art. This ongoing engagement showcases the concept's enduring relevance and adaptability, bridging the gap between the material world and the metaphysical realm. Modern interpretations often blend traditional iconography with new media, creating works that resonate with both historical significance and contemporary sensibilities. In books like Ina Puri's *Manjit Bawa* (2010), discussions center on contemporary artists such as Manjit Bawa. These artists explore themes of spirituality, identity, and the divine, incorporating elements of *ātman* into their works. Manjit Bawa, well-known for his vivid color schemes and flowing forms, frequently portrayed characters from Indian mythology in ways that highlighted their spiritual and heavenly qualities. His portrayal of deities like Lord *Kṛṣṇā* and *Śiva* transcended mere narrative depiction, instead focusing on the ethereal and transcendent qualities of these figures. Bawa's work reflects a deep engagement with *ātman*, presenting the divine as an intrinsic part of the human experience.

Similarly, M.F. Husain's work, though often controversial, frequently explored themes of divinity and the human condition. R. Bartholomew & S. S. Kapur, in *M.F. Husain* (1972), mentions that Husain's bold, expressive style and use of symbolism drew from the rich tradition of Indian art, reinterpreting it through a modern way. Husain's depictions of gods and goddesses, imbued with contemporary relevance, highlight the timeless nature of *ātman's* influence on artistic expression. The enduring significance of *ātman* in modern Indian art indicates its deep influence on the spiritual and cultural fabric of Indian civilization. The idea of the *ātman* continues to guide and inspire the production of art that rises above the material and toward the divine via a variety of artistic mediums. This persistent effect highlights the

significance of *ātman* in shaping Indian art's intellectual and spiritual aspects in addition to its aesthetic qualities.

Literature and *Ātman*

The concept of *ātman* finds eloquent expression in Indian literature, from the ancient Upaniṣads to the grand narratives of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. The Upaniṣads, philosophical texts that explore the nature of reality and the self, delve into the *ātman's* relationship with *Brahman*. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* states, *'sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahman,'* asserting that everything is *Brahman*, the ultimate reality (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14.1).

i. Rāmāyaṇa: *Dharma* and Inner Strength

The Rāmāyaṇa, another monumental epic, narrates the life and trials of Prince Rāma, an *avatar* of Lord *Viṣṇu*. Rāma exemplifies the ideals of *dharma* (moral duty) and righteousness, despite facing severe adversities and personal sacrifices. The concept of *ātman* is woven into the Rāmāyaṇa's moral fabric, reflecting the interplay between individual actions and universal principles. In the Rāmāyaṇa, Rāma's unwavering commitment to *dharma*, even at the cost of his happiness, illustrates the profound relationship between the self (*ātman*) and moral duty. This is evident when Rāma, upon being exiled from his kingdom, accepts his fate with equanimity, saying, "I consider that the great soul who takes no delight in affluence and who is never displeased with adversity is blessed and happy" (Rāmāyaṇa, 2.48.29). Rāma's equanimity and adherence to *dharma* underscore the *ātman's* transcendent nature, demonstrating the importance of self-realization and inner peace amidst external challenges.

The character of Sītā, Rāma's devoted wife, further exemplifies the ideals of *ātman* through her unwavering loyalty, moral integrity, and spiritual strength. Sītā's trials, including her abduction by the demon king Rāvaṇa and subsequent ordeal by fire, highlight her inner resilience and adherence to truth. Her journey represents the soul's (*ātman*) quest for purity and liberation, embodying the virtues of devotion and righteousness. The Rāmāyaṇa's enduring appeal lies in its portrayal of timeless moral values and the profound interplay between

human experiences and divine principles. It continues to inspire generations with its depiction of the *ātman's* journey towards self-realization and the fulfillment of *dharma.*

ii. Mahābhārata: Reflections of Human Nature and *Ātman*

The Mahābhārata, often hailed as the longest epic in world literature, intricately weaves together the lives of its myriad characters, each symbolizing different aspects of human nature and ethical dilemmas. Central to the epic is the Bhagavad Gītā, a philosophical discourse within the Mahābhārata, where Lord *Kṛṣṇā* imparts spiritual wisdom to the warrior prince Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. The Bhagavad Gītā illuminates *ātman* through Arjuna's existential crisis and inner conflicts. Facing the prospect of engaging in a fratricidal war, Arjuna wrestles with his moral duty (*dharma*) and the consequences of violence. In Bhagavad Gītā, Arjuna confesses his moral dilemma to *Kṛṣṇā*: "My limbs fail, my mouth dries up, my body quivers, and my hair stands on end. The *Gāṇḍīva* (divine bow of Arjuna) slips from my hand, and my skin burns all over" (Bhagavad Gītā, 2.11). This moment encapsulates Arjuna's profound psychological turmoil, symbolizing the human struggle to reconcile duty with personal ethics and the pursuit of self-realization. *Kṛṣṇā*, as the divine charioteer and guide, expounds on *ātman*, revealing the eternal nature of the self (*ātman*) and its unity with *Brahman*, the cosmic reality. *Kṛṣṇā* asserts: "That which pervades the entire body, know it to be indestructible. No one can destroy that imperishable self" (Bhagavad Gītā, 2.17). Here, *Kṛṣṇā* elucidates the *ātman* philosophy, emphasizing the imperishable nature of the self beyond physical existence, thereby guiding Arjuna towards self-realization and action without attachment.

The Mahābhārata's narrative complexity and psychological depth underscore *ātman's* multifaceted influence on Indian literature, portraying its characters as embodiments of human virtues and flaws. Its teachings continue to resonate, offering profound insights into the human condition and the quest for self-understanding.

iii. *Ātman* in Modern Narratives

Contemporary Indian literature continues to explore the concept of *ātman*, blending traditional themes with modern sensibilities. Writers such as R.K. Narayan, Salman Rushdie, and Arundhati Roy infuse their works with philosophical reflections on the self, identity, and the human condition. R.K. Narayan's novels, set in the fictional town of Malgudi, often depict characters grappling with ethical dilemmas, personal aspirations, and the search for meaning. In The Guide (1958), Narayan explores the transformation of Raju, a tourist guide, who undergoes a spiritual awakening and attains self-realization. Raju's journey from a materialistic guide to a revered spiritual figure mirrors the *ātman's* quest for inner truth and enlightenment. Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1981) intertwines historical events with magical realism, exploring themes of identity, destiny, and the interconnectedness of individuals within the larger tapestry of history. The protagonist, Saleem Sinai, embodies the collective consciousness of post-independence India, reflecting the *ātman's* role in shaping personal and collective identities. Arundhati Roy's *The God of Small Things* (1997) delves into the complexities of human relationships, societal norms, and the pursuit of personal freedom. Through the lives of the protagonists, Rahel and Estha, A. Roy (1997) explores the impact of socio-political forces on individual identities and the quest for self-understanding. While rooted in modern contexts, these contemporary narratives continue to engage with the timeless themes of *ātman*, offering fresh perspectives on the nature of the self and its place in the world.

Music and the Soul's Harmony

Indian music, deeply rooted in *ātman*, unfolds as a profound spiritual journey through traditional *ragas*, the basic melodic structure of Indian classical music. These *ragas* and *tālas* are meticulously crafted to resonate with the inner journey of the soul, reflecting the cosmic rhythm of the universe. As noted by Basham, "This musical expression transcends mere entertainment, serving as a potent tool to harmonize individual consciousness with the universal consciousness" (Basham, 1959, pp. 383-384).

i. Traditional *Ragas* and Cosmic Resonance

Each *raga* and *tāla,* in Indian classical music, embodies a unique emotional essence, akin to the manifold qualities attributed to the *ātman* in Indian philosophy. Just as the *ātman* is believed to encompass diverse attributes and experiences, the *ragas* manifest a kaleidoscope of emotions. This diversity aligns seamlessly with the principle of unity in diversity inherent in *ātman*. Basham further emphasizes, "There is a connection between the musical notes and their relationships are metaphors for human feelings and expressions" (Basham, 1959, pp. 384-385). This intricate interplay of musical notes mirrors the complexity of human emotions, thereby bridging the gap between the individual's inner world and the broader cosmic order. In the framework of Indian music, the pursuit of musical excellence and the quest for self-realization are intertwined. Sarangdeva, in his seminal work *Saṅgītaratnākara*, draws a parallel between musical knowledge and the understanding of ultimate reality, stating, *"gānavido gāyate yasya tasya brahma vido viduḥ;"* this verse indicates that one who is a master of song (*gānavid*) understands *Brahman* (*Saṅgītaratnākara*, 1.15). This insight underscores the spiritual depth embedded within musical practice, where mastery of *ragas* becomes a path to transcendence and self-discovery.

ii. Harmony and Divine Essence

Beyond its technical intricacies, Indian music embraces *ātman's* essence by encouraging musicians to seek harmony not only within melodic structures but also with the divine. This profound sentiment suggests that music is something that goes straight to the heart, and when it goes to the heart it opens the door to the soul. This statement resonates with the concept of *ātman* as the eternal and unchanging core of the self, implying that music is a direct conduit connecting with one's innermost essence and universal consciousness. Indian music, through its *ragas, tālas,* and philosophical underpinnings in *Ātmanvāda*, offers a transformative journey for performers and listeners alike. It embodies the principles of unity in diversity, facilitates self-realization, and resonates with the divine essence, making it a profound vehicle for spiritual exploration and expression in the Indian cultural milieu.

Thus, the concept of *ātman*, a cornerstone of Indian philosophy, profoundly influences Indian art, literature, and music. Its enduring relevance lies in its ability to transcend temporal and cultural boundaries, offering insights into the nature of the self and its relationship with the cosmos. In Indian art, *ātman* is depicted through symbolic representations of divinity and the eternal self, creating a spiritual connection between the viewer and the divine. Indian literature, from ancient epics to contemporary narratives, delves into the intricacies of human nature, ethical dilemmas, and the quest for self-realization, reflecting the multifaceted influence of *ātman*. Music, with its emphasis on *rāga* and *tāla*, serves as a medium for expressing the ineffable and transcending the material world, resonating with the concept of *ātman* as the eternal essence of the self. The profound influence of *ātman* on Indian cultural expressions underscores its significance in shaping the spiritual and intellectual landscape of Indian civilization. As artists, writers, and musicians continue to engage with this profound concept, *ātman* remains a source of inspiration, guiding creative and philosophical endeavors that define Indian cultural identity. By nurturing insights into interconnectedness, divinity, and the ultimate reality of *Brahman, ātman* has inspired generations of creators to explore the nature of existence. As these artistic expressions evolve, the essence of *ātman* continues to bridge individual aspirations with universal truths. Integrating *ātman* into diverse forms of creativity highlights its enduring relevance, providing a philosophical foundation for artistic pursuits and imbuing them with a profound purpose. Ultimately, *ātman* fosters a deep connection between the individual and the universal, enriching India's cultural and spiritual tapestry. Its impact invites ongoing exploration and interpretation in contemporary contexts, ensuring that *ātman* inspires and resonates across generations.

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Feminist Ethics and *Mahābhārata*: Some Reflections on Caring and Knowing

Ria Mondal

Abstract

In Philosophy, by the method of theorizing, we are able to make a coherent relationship between man and the world. Here, ethics has a special place to define moral self, moral knowledge, different values, cultures, moral language and also some practical problems, i.e., war, terrorism, euthanasia, abortion, human rights etc. Some theorists think the concept of feminism starts with movements and ends with socio-political jargon to pursue the reason behind disparities between men and women. Philosophy makes us curious about these differences and brings a new perspective where the idea of feminism gets support from the broad area of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Feminist ethics is all about the reformation of a moral developmental process that includes women's different codes of morality. If we look at Indian epics and nineteenth century literature depicted in Rabindranath Tagore's classics some, forms of character are scrutinized with the notion of moral self that enhances the capacity of theorizing care-based ethics, the concept of caring, the relationship between care-giver and care-recipient. It makes us conscious about the interconnections between the mode of caring and the mode of knowing. This article is an attempt to show the significance of theorizing the concept of caring and knowing in the light of contemporary feminist ethicists and also taking some insights from the epic Mahābhārata we can examine how the objects of desire or care connects with the inquiry of the nature of caring or desires! And also we can find the nature of that inquiry pursuing the virtues of "living well" and "knowing well".

Keywords: feminist ethics, caring, knowing, Mahābhārata, moral dilemmas.

Introduction

Feminism takes its own room where different aspects of gender bias, sexism, androcentrism, female oppression and female marginalization are manifested with the concept of gender inequality. The history of philosophy, on the other hand, is depicted with varied problems relating periodical and perennial. Some problems are emphasized with the notion of existence, first principle of being, substance, cause and effect, nature of human reason, ethics and cultures etc. Philosophy has no definite aim to produce a result. Rather it is explained as a way of life and select some irresolvable problems that other branches of discourse incapable to explain. In Philosophy, by the method of theorizing, we are able to make some coherent relationship between man and the world. Here, ethics has a special place to define moral self, moral knowledge, different values, cultures, moral language and also some practical problems, i.e., war, terrorism, euthanasia, abortion, human rights etc. Some theorists think the concept of feminism starts with movements and ends with socio-political jargon to pursue the reason behind disparities between men and women. According to them those theorizations are not always valid or evident. But if we look at the source of those socio-political issues and define as distinct categories some implications will be formulated that support the gender biased nature of society. Philosophy makes us curious about these differences and brings a new perspective where the idea of feminism gets support from the broad area of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics.

Feminist ethics is all about the reformation of a moral developmental process that includes women's different codes of morality. According to Virginia Held, "Understandably, we do not yet have fully worked out feminist moral theories to offer. But we can suggest some directions our project of developing such theories is taking"[1]. It offers the dialogues that adopt the dynamic nature of human society. Alison Jaggar clarifies the necessary position of feminist ethics as commitment to "rethinking ethics with a view to correcting whatever forms of male bias it may contain".[2] Regarding these views it is clear that, feminists prefer to avoid the method that is associated with justice ethic. Justice ethic is oppressive as a rigid structure that does not allow the flexibility of individual differences. Feminist ethics is known as

care-based ethics that deals with human relationship connecting with each other. This care-based ethics evolves with sharing and interpersonal relationships in which humans manage their lives. Daryl Koehn, a feminist philosopher, claims that care is an "active concern, with interpersonal, mutual reciprocity".[3] This is evident that for moral development we need both categories of reason and sentiment. David Hume also believed that reason and passion both play an important role to make a moral judgement.

If we look at Indian epics and nineteenth century literature depicted in Rabindranath Tagore's classics some, forms of character are scrutinized with the notion of moral self that enhances the capacity of theorizing care-based ethics, the concept of caring, the relationship between care-giver and care-recipient. It makes us conscious about the interconnections between the mode of caring and the mode of knowing. Vrinda Dalmiya, a philosopher, understands "to care is to make something which might not be naturally valuable, important to us. Caring, therefore, involves a 'caring about caring'. So, to care about anyone entails getting clearer on what the object of care is like and on the nature and reasons for that caring itself".[4] This article is an attempt to show the significance of theorizing the concept of caring and knowing in the light of contemporary feminist ethicists and also taking some insights from the epic *Mahābhārata* we can examine how the objects of desire or care connects with the inquiry of the nature of caring or desires! And also we can find a nature of that inquiry pursuing the virtues of "living well" and "knowing well".

Feminist Ethics: Caring and Knowing

Caring or ethical caring evokes an ethical domain where every moral dilemma is concretized through listening instead of mechanically applying universal rules. It demands every individual with autonomy to care and form a desirable moral world. Everybody should have that freedom to express his or her concern and they should be encouraged to do accordingly without any judgement. Care-ethics asks the care agent to receive the other as equal humans. As human beings, we all have sensations, emotions and feelings that need to be reflected in other considerations. In some cases, in spite of agreement and disagreement

our behaviour should follow courtesy and regard along with rationality. This is the epitome of every other fact that the feminist thinkers focus on. In this way, Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings foreground the concept of moral evaluation that gets priority through the alternative moral concepts in feminist ethics. Virginia Held expresses a substantial view in her article, '*Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory'* that the history of ethical theory has been established on the foundation of three major aspects- a) reason over emotion; b) public vs. private sphere and c) the concept of the self as depicted from a male point of view. These three aspects of moral behaviour of the society explores considering the fact that the moral developmental process is gender biased. Held also defines the discourses that are specially given by the philosophers, like, Kant, Hegel, Rousseau, "morality must be based on rational principle, and women were incapable of full rationality, or a degree or kind of rationality comparable to that of men, women were deemed, in the view of these moralists, to be inherently wanting in morality. For Rousseau, women must be trained from childhood to submit to the will of men, lest their sexual power lead both men and women to disaster. For Kant, women were thought incapable of achieving full moral personhood, and women lose all charm if they try to behave like men by engaging in rational pursuits. For Hegel, women's moral concern for their families could be admirable in its proper place, but is a threat to the more universal aims to which men, as members of the state, should aspire".[5] Two feminist philosophers, Gilligan and Margaret Walker, clarify women's experience of moral problems deals with actual human relationship with responsibility where attention, contextual and narrative appreciation and communication in any moral deliberation are necessary. For the public and private sphere debate sociologists define masculine awareness relating with public realm and feminine consciousness related with private realm. Their implication is, "the public realm is seen as the distinctively human realm in which man transcends his animal nature, while the private realm of the household is seen as the natural region in which women merely reproduce the species".[6] Regarding this deliberation it can be said that, in every field of philosophy public sphere is associated with rationality, masculinity, objectivity, intellectuality where men are considered as having strong moral principle and consistent power of judgement. On the contrary, the

private sphere is exemplified as emotional, subjective, feminine and personal. Thus, reason and intellect are considered more valuable than emotion as public sphere is stated for the lawmaker, protector provider and private sphere is situated in the emotional interconnectedness relating the role of the women. Though, Sara Ruddick, feminist philosopher, emphasizes on maternal thinking contributing the view of non-violence and peace. Feminist thinkers are keen to clarify the gender discrimination based on this point and actively participate in the ground of virtue-making theories. The concept of motherhood is one of them. With this, the concept of self has another importance to define the cultural differences between the feminist thinkers and other theorists. The concept of individual self and universal self are two important features of morality according to traditional moral thinkers. They clarified universal self is superior to individual self. Though, both are failed to attain the relational outlook at the time of taking moral decisions. This relational self is considered as relational autonomy according to feminist notion of autonomy. This relational autonomy deliberates a logical connection with the dignity and proper functions of responsibilities of women and also it gives an answer to mainstream ethical theorists for the emergence of care or care-based ethic.

Caring and knowing both are the methods of inquiry where moral developmental process could be transformed with the notion of virtue. Western moral theorists explained moral life in two different ways, such as, action-based and agent-based. Both theories confirm deontological theory and teleological theory accordingly. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, considers cultivating characters as a kind of inner nature. According to Vrinda Dalmiya, caring is also an intellectual virtue of mechanism and an intellectual virtue of character. Here the concept of caring and knowing can be defined as both the mechanism and the character. When someone says that a doctor is good because he or she is caring for his or her patient, an intellectual virtue of character is flourished here. Dalmiya considers that, "caring as a virtue of mechanism (the mechanism of knowing people) has to be fleshed out with a self-consciousness about the pathologies of care and the dangers of exploitation and paternalism in relations that fulfil needs of dependent others".[7] In another sense caring is also a disposition or

quality that forms personality of the individual. According to Dalmiya, caring is an epistemic disposition of "being careful". She has also claimed that "Being careful then goes hand in hand with deference to third-person points of view and recognizing that others can be right (even when we have gone wrong). This complex characteristic of according authority to others to undermine our own authority is the virtue of relational humility. Based on such a disposition, I argue that a caring person becomes a careful knower and caring becomes a 'virtue of character' guiding not just knowledge of people, but knowledge of the world as well".[8] It is clear that the observation of care ethics is different from the orientation of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is negotiated with the atomistic self where care ethics determines the relational self. Both personal virtue and relational care develop the notion of 'relational virtue'.

This relational virtue transformed into relational humility reinforcing the dialogues between caring person and cared-for. The justification of caring and the epistemic foundation of knowing both are explicitly depicted in the episodes of the *Mahābhārata.* Indra's dialogue with a parrot and with Yudhiṣṭira reinforces the concept of *anukrośa* or 'crying after'. Dalmiya stated this episodic notion as, "When the parrot pleaded with Indra, 'why are you trying to weaken my bond (*anukrośa*) with the tree under the guise of sympathizing with me?', we have someone aware of the possibility of a different (tree-independent) life and someone who even feels the attraction of this alternative and yet chooses an identity in-relation-(to-the-tree) after conscious deliberation. It is to be remembered also that Indra applauded Yudhiṣṭhira for his intelligence and compassion. The engagement of both our subjects with a contrary position represented by Indra indicates a reflective and imaginative role-playing with the caring relation that is ultimately chosen".[9] Hence, *anukrośa*-as-care is actively present in thinking about the nature of the caring relation itself.

In another sense, the learned sage Kauśika's anger towards the bird and an ordinary housewife indicates the first ordering care or self-consciousness of knowing something. Exploring the stories of this epic we can easily apprehend that the nature of the relationship between caring and cared-for and also the characteristics of the good knower.

Knowing is something that enhances the ground of caring perspective towards the third person relating to the first and second person. This communicative process foregrounds the collaborative thinking for transformation of the society aiming at the survival of mankind.

Resolving Moral Dilemmas

Moral dilemma is considered as a notion of inconsistencies in our thinking. B.K.Matilal analyses moral dilemma as a "species of action guide dilemmas".[10] According to him, action guide dilemma is regulated by obligatory principles. He clarifies, "An action-guide dilemma arises in a situation in which an agent cannot do everything that is obligatory for him to do in that situation. He feels obliged to do, say both x and y; but it is impossible to do both of them. For the situation is such that doing x would be undoing y; and vice versa. You cannot cook your goose and have it alive at the same time. This is that kind of situation".[11] Though there are different kinds of dilemmas. Some are religion based and others are mere moral conflicts. If we look at Greek mythology, Hindu mythology, other Indian texts including two epics and also the lives of great spiritual leaders, like, Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and Sarada Devi, the different modes of moral dilemmas could be explored and prepare a new model of care-based solution of them. In the *Mahābhārata* female protagonist Draupadi raised some questions to her husbands and all elders present in the sabha, whether she was really conquered or not? Why she was considered as possession to stake? Nobody in the sabha could able to answer those dilemmatic situations. Apart from this dilemma the sense of caring perspective could answer emphatically and clear our vision of caring and knowing. Gambling is itself a combination of greed and despair. It takes people to the dark chamber of the lust. Yudhiṣṭhira as a keeper of dharma and wise or caring person he should have considered this situation as his duty and protect his wife as to protect the honour of any woman. This is clear that caring and knowing both could be enhanced to save the agents from the intoxication of the ego.

Conclusion

Our aim of life should be formed in the way to receive others and enhance our own capabilities to them who are not able to connect. Reconciliation of reason and care is the solution to develop our thinking. For caring and knowing the sense of morality needs to be reframed to join fellow living beings. In any situation of moral dilemmas or any structural reformation of society, we always face some difficulties. In that case, care-based perspective could be the solution indicating its epistemic foundation to Indian texts and develop distinct relationship based on plurality of the nature of inquires to caring and knowing.

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